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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 
BY 
URMIMALA SEN 
JULY 2014 
Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox 
Major Department: Economics 
 The first chapter reports experiments with payoff-equivalent public good and common 
pool games. Behavior of high-caste and low-caste Indian villagers is compared with behavior of 
American students in terms of economic surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of cooperation 
in the public good and common pool games. When information about caste is withheld no 
significant difference is observed in the efficiency of play between villagers and student subjects 
at American universities for both the public good game and the payoff-equivalent common pool 
game. Providing caste information leads to: (i) the lowest level of efficiency when low-caste first 
movers interact with a low-caste second mover, and (ii) the highest levels of efficiency when 
high-caste first movers engage with a high-caste second mover. Cross-caste play generates 
intermediate levels of efficiency.  
In my second chapter I examine competition and cooperation across genders and castes in 
India and compare the data with incentivized laboratory experiments across genders and races in 
the US. High-caste males (India) and White males (U.S.) choose to compete the most and are 
universally cooperative. In India females compete more and cooperate less when they are paired 
with other females but not with males. The level of cooperation among the females of either race 
(US) is lower than that of the White males but is insignificantly different from the level of 
cooperation among the African American males. 
In my third chapter I conducted artifactual field experiments in rural India with variations 
of dictator and ultimatum games. Eight treatments are played: in four we provide information 
that the other player is the spouse and in the remaining four variations spouse information is not 
provided.  When subjects are unaware of playing with their spouses, they choose to keep the 
dictator role for themselves or not empower the other player. Male spouses make higher offers in 
general relative to female spouses. The divisions in these games (no spouse information) are far 
less equitable than in dictator games with student subjects. We find more concern for procedural 
fairness when subjects know they are playing with their spouses than when they do not have this 
information.  
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 Chapter I: Caste, Efficiency and Fairness with Public Goods and Common Pool Resources 
Introduction 
Authors from several different disciplines have argued for the importance of “trust” and 
“social capital” on the level of cooperation in a society that can promote economic development, 
democracy, and the rule of law. In economics, (Arrow, 1972) states: “Virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted 
over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”  (North, 1990) argues that failure to 
account for differences in coordination and cooperation across countries is a missing element in 
development economists’ explanation of disparity of economic performance across 
countries. (Putnam, 1993) puts forward the hypothesis that trust and civic attitudes could account 
for differences in the economic (and government) performance between northern and southern 
Italy. (Fukuyama, 1995) argues for the importance of “social capital” – defined as a set of norms 
shared among members of a group that supports cooperation – as a determinant of economic 
development. (Knack & Keefer, 1997) find that “social capital” – measured by answers to 
questions from the World Values Survey – is strongly positively correlated with country levels of 
income per capita.  
Recently, some authors have reported experiments with subjects in villages in India, 
designed to measure the effects of the caste system on economic behavior. An underlying 
question is whether the caste system has contributed to the historical poverty of India and, if so, 
might be continuing to retard Indian economic development. According to (Fehr, Hoff, & 
Kshetramade, 2008) “Spiteful preferences may constitute a considerable obstacle for trade, 
cooperation, and, thus, development.” Several studies report caste effects on spiteful behavior 
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(Fehr et al., 2008) and subjects’ performance in an incentivized maze solving game (Hoff & 
Pandey, 2006). We report results from public good and common pool experiments that directly 
reveal economic surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of cooperation. We compare the 
behavior of caste-uniformed West Bengali villagers to behavior of undergraduates at American 
universities as well as behavior of caste-informed villagers. By design, the public good game and 
the common pool game in our study are payoff equivalent. Thus behavior is predicted to be 
similar across the two games by models of unconditional social preferences, regardless of 
whether that behavior is spiteful ((Fehr & Schmidt, 1999); (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) or 
altruistic (Charness & Rabin, 2005), (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). In contrast, reciprocal 
preference theory (Cox, Friedman, & Sadiraj, 2008) predicts more altruistic (or less spiteful) 
behavior in public good than common pool games. We test hypotheses derived from the 
alternative models.  
When we withhold information about caste of other subjects in a session in India, we find 
that the efficiency of play in these caste-uninformed treatments with villagers is not significantly 
different from the efficiency of play observed in similar experiments with student subjects at 
American universities (reported in (Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, & Walker, 2013); this is true in both 
the public good game and the common pool game. Thus an overall cultural difference in level of 
cooperation across countries is not observed. Our results confirm the empirical failure of the 
isomorphism of public good and common pool games implied by the unconditional social 
preferences models as reported by (Cox et al., 2013). The data are consistent with a theory of 
reciprocal preferences (Cox et al., 2008).  
Different outcomes are obtained when we provide caste information to subjects in India. 
Our data indicate that the caste system has a strong effect on how social dilemma situations 
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among Indian villagers are resolved. We find strong within-group favoritism that supports 
cooperation among high caste individuals but not among low caste individuals. Efficiency is 
highest (lowest) in homogenous groups with high (low) caste subjects. 
Disaggregation of the results into the behavior of first movers and second movers reveals 
that when the second mover is from the low caste, high caste first movers cooperate the least in 
the public good game but in the common pool game the least cooperative come from the low 
caste first movers. Uncooperative behavior towards in-group members is observed when low 
caste second movers withdraw a significant amount of contributions to the public good made by 
low caste first movers whereas high caste second movers exhibit the most (in-group) cooperative 
behavior in both games. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an exposition of payoff 
equivalence between the public good game and common pool game. Section 3 reports 
implications of alternative theories for these games while section 4 explains the experimental 
protocols in India and the United States. Section 5 compares the behavior of students at 
American universities with that of West Bengali villagers who are not informed of the castes of 
other subjects. Section 6 compares and contrasts behavior of villagers who are informed of 
alternative homogeneous or heterogeneous caste compositions of subjects in their common pool 
or public goods games. Section 7 concludes. 
 
Payoff-Equivalent Public Good and Common Pool Games 
We report experiments with the “king” versions of the public good (or provision) game and the 
common pool (or appropriation) game studied in Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj and Walker (2013). 
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Public Good Game 
This game has n players consisting of n-1 first movers and one second mover. The first movers 
simultaneously choose amounts they will contribute from their private property endowments to a 
public good. Each agent is endowed with “tokens” in an Individual Fund and can choose an 
amount pi  from the feasible set to contribute to the Group Fund. Contributions to the Group 
Fund create surplus; each “token” added to the Group Fund decreases the value of the Individual 
Fund of the contributor by 1 frank (experimental currency unit) and increases the value of the 
Group Fund by m franks, where n > m > 1.  
After observing the first mover choices, the second mover can choose to contribute any non-
negative number of tokens up to his endowment to the Group Fund. Alternatively, the second 
mover can choose to take (in integer amounts) any part of the tokens contributed by the n-1 first 
movers if it is strictly positive. The second mover can choose an amount ps to take or contribute) 
from the feasible set  pg { pj
j s
 , pj
j s
 1,..,0,1,..,e}. 
Let P  ( pi | i  1,...,n)  denote the vector of numbers of tokens contributed to the public good 
by the n players. The payoff to agent i in the public good game equals the amount of her 
endowment that is not contributed to the public good plus an equal (1/n) share of m times the 
amounts contributed to the public good by all agents:1 
(1)   ipg (P)  e pi  m pj
j1..n
 / n  
 
                                                            
1 Note that the asymmetry between the most selfish choice across first and second movers: the maximum 
value of e pi  for a first mover i is whereas the maximum value of e ps  (for the second mover) is 
e pj
js
  e . 
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Common Pool Game 
The game has n players consisting of n-1 first movers and one second mover. The Group 
Fund is endowed with ne tokens worth m franks each, for a starting total value mne franks. The 
first movers simultaneously choose how much to extract from a Group Fund. Each first mover 
can choose an amount from the set to extract from the Group Fund. Extractions from the Group 
Fund destroy surplus; each token removed from the Group Fund increases the value of the 
Individual Fund of the extractor by 1 frank but reduces the value of the Group Fund by m franks 
where, as above, n > m > 1.  
After observing the first mover choices, the second mover decides how many of the 
remaining ne z j
js
  tokens to extract. The second mover (player s) chooses an amount zs  to 
extract from the feasible set of integers Ψcp= {0, 1,…, ne - ∑ ݖ௝௝ஷ௦ }. 
Let Z denote the vector of numbers of tokens extracted from the common pool by the n 
players. The payoff to agent i equals the number of tokens he extracts from the common pool 
plus an equal (1/n) share of the remaining value of the common pool after the extractions by all 
agents (which is m times the total number of tokens left in the common pool by all players):2  
(2)   icp (Z )  zi  m(ne z j ) / n
j
 .   
Implications of Alternative Theories for the Public Good and Common Pool Games 
 
The public good and common pool common pool games are constructed to be payoff 
equivalent, as follows. If the amount added to the Individual Fund (i.e. extracted from the Group 
Fund) in the common pool game equals the amount -pj retained in the Individual Fund (i.e. not 
                                                            
2 Note that the maximum value of for a first mover ( i  s ) is whereas the maximum value of zs  (for the 
second mover) is ne z j
js
  e. 
e
6 
 
contributed to the Group Fund) in the public good game, for each player j  1,  ,n , then the 
payoff to any agent is the same in both games.3 This follows immediately from statements (1) 
and (2) by noting that they imply (P) = (Z), when Z=E-P and E=(e,…,e).4 Several 
testable hypotheses will be derived in this section. 
We first consider the implications of unconditional preferences models including homo 
economicus (or “selfish”) preferences and models of social preferences including inequality 
aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and the quasi-maximin 
model (Charness and Rabin 2002). These models have different implications for play in one of 
our games (either public good or common pool). But they all imply that the payoff equivalent 
public good and common pool games are strategically equivalent, which implies that agents will 
realize the same efficiency in the two game forms. This is stated in the following proposition.   
Proposition 1. Unconditional (selfish or social) preferences imply that efficiency of play 
is the same in the public good and common pool games. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
 
Proposition 1 implies the following testable hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Efficiency data in a public good or common pool game are drawn from the 
same distribution. 
An alternative to unconditional preferences is provided by the model of reciprocal 
preferences in Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008). In that model, the reciprocal preferences of a 
                                                            
3 Payoff equivalence does not require symmetric play; i.e. we do not assume that pk and pj are equal, for 
 
 
4 We use capital letters for vectors and lowercase letters for scalars.  
pg
i cpi
.k j
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second mover in an extensive form game are characterized by a partial ordering of opportunity 
sets (MGT), a partial ordering of preferences (MAT), and two axioms that link the partial 
orderings (Axioms R and S).5 Opportunity set G is said to be More Generous Than (MGT) 
opportunity set F if: (a) the largest second mover payoff in G (denoted ) is higher than the 
largest second mover payoff in F (denoted ); and (b) the difference between and is not less 
than the corresponding difference for first mover(s), . Part (a) of MGT 
“rules in” generosity and part (b) “rules out” the inclusion of instances of “self-serving 
generosity.” Preference ordering A is said to be More Altruistic Than (MAT) preference ordering 
B if preference ordering A has higher willingness to pay to marginally benefit another than does 
preference ordering B. Axiom R formalizes reciprocity by stating that a second mover will be 
more altruistic when first mover(s) choose G rather than F if G MGT F. Axiom S states that the 
effect of Axiom R is stronger when a generous act (of commission) overturns the status quo than 
when an otherwise same act (of omission) upholds the status quo. The model of reciprocity with 
the preceding properties has testable implications for play of the payoff-equivalent public good 
and common pool games in our experiment, as follows. The higher (lower) first mover (FM) i’s 
contribution (extraction) in the public good (common pool) game, the more generous the budget 
set of the second mover (SM),6 and by Axiom R the more altruistic the SM’s decision. Any 
contribution by a FM in the public good game provides the SM with a more generous budget set 
by overturning the status quo. Any extraction by a FM in the common pool game provides the 
SM with a less generous budget set by overturning the status quo. Therefore, by Axioms R and S 
                                                            
5 We here provide an informal characterization of the model of reciprocity; it is formally developed in 
Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008). 
6 In the public good game, for a given vector, P-i of contributions of other first movers, differences in the 
most selfish payoffs of FM i and the SM when i contributes pi and pi+x, x>0 satisfy 
 ipg*( pi  x, P i ,e) ipg*( pi , P i ,e)  mx / n  0  x   spg*( pi  x, P i , Pj
js
 ) spg*( pi  x, P i , Pj  x
js
 )  
SMg

SMf

SM SM FM FMg f g f
     
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SMs’ choices are more altruistic in the public good than (the payoff equivalent) common pool 
games but in both games SM’s altruism increases with higher (lower) contributions (extractions). 
As budget sets in our game preserve the own-payoff price of altruism, Axioms R and S imply the 
following testable hypothesis.  
Proposition 2. Assume reciprocal preferences that satisfy Axioms R and S. 
a. For any given vector of contributions (resp. appropriations) of first movers in the 
public good (resp. common pool) game, second mover’s choice in the public good game is 
efficiency-enhancing compared to the choice in the common pool game. 
b. Efficiency is higher in public good games than in common pool games for social 
preferences that are convex, separable and with willingness to pay that (locally) increase when 
own payoff increases (weakly) more than other’s payoffs. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
 
Proposition 2, part a implies the following testable hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Second movers’ choices are more altruistic in the public good game than in 
the common pool game.  
Our third hypothesis follows from part b of Proposition 2. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Efficiency is higher in the public good game than in the common pool 
game.   
 
Recall that there are two types of subjects in our experiment: high caste and low caste. 
An implication of within-group favoritism is higher degree of altruism in homogenous groups 
that in mixed ones, which gives us the fourth hypothesis 
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Hypothesis 4: The degree of altruism revealed by second movers’ choices is higher in 
homogenous than in mixed groups. 
 
If the degree of altruism of second movers’ is affected by caste (as suggested by earlier 
studies) then the revealed level of altruism in the no caste information treatment is expected to be 
between the levels observed in the homogenous and mixed groups (Harsanyi, 1968). This gives 
us a fifth hypothesis  
Hypothesis 5: The degree of altruism revealed by second movers’ choices in the absence 
of information on caste is between the ones observed in homogenous and mixed groups. 
Experiment Protocols 
The experiment with students was previously reported in Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj and Walker 
(2013). The experiment with villagers has not been previously reported. 
Experiment with Students  
Experiment sessions were conducted at both Georgia State University (GSU) and Indiana 
University (IU). In each session, subjects were recruited from subject databases that included 
undergraduates from a wide range of disciplines. Via the computer, the subjects were privately 
and anonymously assigned to four-person groups. No subject could identify which of the other 
subjects in the room were assigned to their group. Because no information passed across groups, 
each session involved numerous independent groups. At the beginning of each session, subjects 
privately read a set of instructions that explained the experimental treatment. Additionally, an 
experimenter reviewed the instructions publicly. The games described above were 
operationalized in a one-shot decision setting with a double-blind payoff protocol. The game 
settings and incentives were induced in the following manner. 
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In a public good game, each individual is endowed with 10 tokens worth $1 each in his or 
her Individual Fund. The decision task of each individual is whether to move tokens to a Group 
Fund. Any tokens moved to the Group Fund are tripled in value. An individual’s earnings equal 
the end value of his or her Individual Fund plus one-fourth of the end value of the Group Fund.  
In the common pool game, each group is endowed with 40 tokens worth $3 each in their 
Group Fund. The decision task of each individual is whether to move tokens to his or her own 
Individual Fund. Each token moved from the Group Fund reduces the value of the Group Fund 
by $3 and increases the value of the Individual Fund of the decision maker by $1. An 
individual’s earnings equal the end value of his or her Individual Fund plus one-fourth of the end 
value of the Group Fund.  
Experiment with Villagers 
The treatments in this experiment cross the public good or common pool game form with caste 
configurations in a 2 X 5 design. The caste configurations are as follows: 
1. No caste information 
2. High caste second mover, with three low caste first movers (Mixed High) 
3. Low caste second mover, with three high caste first movers (Mixed Low) 
4. High caste second mover, with three high caste first movers (Homogenous high) 
5. Low caste second mover, with three low caste first movers (Homogenous Low) 
Procedures for the Village Experiment  
We have a total of 808 subjects, 788 of them are Hindu subjects. Each subject 
participated in only one treatment. Twenty-one experimental sessions were conducted with each 
11 
 
session lasting 3-4 hours.7 Each experimental session was planned for approximately 40 subjects; 
however some sessions had 44-48 subjects and one session had 32 subjects. The sessions were 
conducted in West Bengal, India in conjunction with three different Non-Government 
Organizations (NGOs).8 At each place, volunteers from the NGO visited people’s homes a few 
days before the experiment and read out the invitation script generated by us (in Bengali). The 
volunteers invited only one individual from each family. The experimenter was introduced to the 
assembled participants by the Secretary of the NGO and thereafter she read the consent form out 
to subjects. Subjects indicated their willingness to participate by either signing the form or 
putting in a thumb print (for subjects unable to read or write). Information on caste (and other 
demographic details) was collected by one of the experimenters (Sen) and was used in forming 
the treatment groups.  Thereafter, the experimenter read the instructions for the experiment to 
them in Bengali and answered questions. In all ten (5x2) treatments, every subject is a member 
of a four-member group. In each of the five public good (PG) treatments, each individual is 
endowed with Rs 150 in a Private Fund. The first movers’ decision task is whether to move 
money from their Private Funds to the Group Fund. Each of the three first movers can contribute 
anything from zero to Rs 150 (their entire endowment) to the Group Fund in increments of Rs 
15. Any amount of money moved to the Group Fund reduced the value of the decision maker’s 
Private Fund by that amount and increased the value of the Group Fund by three-times that 
amount. The second mover could contribute some or all of her own Rs 150 Private Fund 
                                                            
7 The first group of eight sessions was conducted during the months of July-August 2011 while the second group of 
six sessions occurred during February 2012. The final group of seven sessions was conducted during July-August 
2012. . 
8 Locations for the West Bengal experiments are: (1) Sagar Island, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal, (2) Panarhat, 
Falta area, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal, and (3) Jharkhali, Canning & Basanti block, South 24 Parganas, West 
Bengal.  
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endowment to the Group Fund or she could withdraw some or all of the contributions of the 
three first movers.  
In each of the five common pool (CP) treatments, a group is endowed with Rs 1,800 in 
their Group Fund. The choice of each individual is whether to move money from the Group Fund 
to his or her Private Fund. A first mover can move any amount from 0 to Rs 150 into her Private 
Fund in increments of Rs 15. Any amount of money moved from the Group Fund reduced the 
value of the Group Fund by that amount and increased the value of the Private Fund of the 
decision maker one-third that amount. The second mover could withdraw none, some, or the 
entire amount left in the Group Fund by the first movers. 
In both public good and common pool treatments, an individual’s earnings equal the end value of 
his Private Fund plus one-fourth of the end value of the Group Fund. Note that the figures are 
economically significant: the minimum wage for unskilled workers in West Bengal at the time of 
this study was approximately Rs 110-130 per day.9 Subjects were informed about the (single 
blind) payoff procedures. Further details on the procedures and challenges in conducting the 
experiment with villagers is reported in Appendix B. Instructions may be found in Appendix D. 
 
Comparison of Caste-Uninformed Play with Student Play 
  
In this section we report realized efficiency in the two games between villagers (provided no 
information on caste) and students. To get some insights on the norm of reciprocity (resp. trust) 
we compare normalized second (resp. first) movers’ choices of students with choices of (caste-
uninformed) villagers. The main question is whether data reveal different norms of cooperation 
and reciprocity across these two subject pools, and if so whether these differences are robust to 
the type of game.  
                                                            
9 Source: http://labour.nic.in/wagecell/Wages/WestBengalWages.pdf  
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Efficiency of play by U.S. students and West Bengali villagers  
We compare the efficiency of play by U.S. students with that of West Bengali villagers who are 
not informed of the caste identities of the other subjects in the group. Efficiency of play is 
measured by the ratio of actual surplus generated from play of the game to the maximum 
possible surplus in the game (expressed as a percentage). Let  denote the salient payoff of 
subject  from participating in the experiment. Each subject’s initial endowment is  and there 
are n subjects in a game. Therefore the numerator in (3) is the surplus generated by a group of n 
subjects from making choices in an experiment session. The maximum possible surplus is mne, 
which would be generated by contributing all tokens to the Group Fund in the public good game 
or withdrawing 0 tokens from the Group Fund in the common pool game. Therefore the observed 
efficiency of play is: 
(3)    
 i  ne
i1
n
mne ne 100  
 Figure C.1 shows (estimated kernel) densities of efficiencies for public good (or 
provision) and common pool (or appropriation) treatments in the U.S. and India. These figures 
suggest strong game effects on efficiencies with public good games inducing more cooperative 
behavior; but behavior seems similar between students and villagers.  
Indeed, in the public good game, the (mean) efficiency among the caste-uninformed 
villagers is 44.88% and 39.08% for the students. In the common pool game, the (mean) 
efficiency among the caste-uninformed villagers is 20.74% and 18.42% for the students. Data 
from either game fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution of efficiency across two 
populations (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.24 (public good) and p=0.996 (common pool)). 
These data support the following conclusion:  
i
i e
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Result 1a: Resolution of social dilemmas is similar between caste-uninformed play by villagers 
and U.S. students in either the public good game or the common pool game.  
We next turn our attention to a testable implication of unconditional social preferences models, 
stated in Proposition 1: for such preferences, the payoff-equivalent public good and common 
pool games are strategically equivalent, which is our hypothesis 1. Data reject this hypothesis 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.002 (West Bengali villagers) p=0.069 (US students)). The 
efficiencies are significantly smaller in the common pool game than in the public good game, 
which is consistent with hypothesis 3.  Thus a second finding is:  
Result 1b: Inefficiencies from social dilemmas appear to be more severe in the common 
pool game than in the payoff-equivalent public good game regardless of whether subjects 
are U.S. students or caste-uninformed West Bengali villagers.  
 
Trusting attitudes across U.S. students and West Bengali villagers  
Many studies (e.g., North 1990, Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, and Knack and Keefer 1997) 
argue that trusting attitudes have a significant effect on prosperity of societies. So the question 
we are interested in is whether caste-uninformed villagers are more (or less) trusting than U.S. 
students. To normalize data, we divide a first mover’s contribution (or amount not extracted) by 
the maximum possible amount that he can contribute (or not extract).10 Measured in this way, 
mean trust levels across populations are 0.49 (West Bengali villagers)11 and 0.53 (U.S. students) 
in the public good game. The figures are slightly lower in the common pool game: 0.42 (West 
Bengali villagers) and 0.45 (U.S. students). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the null 
                                                            
10 As is true in much social preferences literature, we can’t separate behavior motivated by trust from effects of 
altruism or risk attitudes with our data; so our measure of “trust” is a measure of all three effects combined. 
11 We get the trust figures in the following way: from Table C.1, we consider the average level of trust among the 
no-caste information groups in Public Good (73.57) and divide this by the initial endowment of 150 to arrive at 0.49. 
The other figures are obtained in a similar fashion.  
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hypothesis of equal distributions of trust across the two populations (p=0.92 for the public good 
game and p=0.97 for the common pool game). U.S. students’ choices are characterized by 
similar levels of trust across games (p=0.239) but villagers trust marginally less in the common 
pool game (p=0.086). If we classify subjects into the categories of “almost no trust” (trust 
measure   0.1), “almost full trust” (trust measure   0.9) and put all others in one group, we 
again find that distributions of subjects in these three categories are not different across the two 
populations (Pearson chi2 test, p = 0.813 (public good) and p=0.616 (common pool)). In 
contrast, differences are significant across games (Pearson chi2, p = 0.009 (villagers) and p = 
0.053 (students)); the number of subjects in the “almost no trust” category is twice as high in the 
common pool game than in the public good game (22 vs. 11 among villagers and 19 vs. 8 for 
students). We conclude that our data are consistent with: 
Result 2a: Trusting levels are similar between caste-uninformed play by West Bengali 
villagers and U.S. students; this is robust across games.  
Result 2b: Significantly more people are trusting in the public good game than in the 
common pool game; this is robust across U.S. students and West Bengali villagers. 
Norm of Reciprocity across U.S. students and West Bengali villagers  
In order to gain some insight into whether the norm of reciprocity is different across the two 
populations, we turn our attention to second mover data. Since second mover choices can be 
dependent on choices made by the first movers and payoffs in the villager and student 
experiments are in different currencies, we construct normalized second mover choice variables 
for comparability, as follows. In a public good experiment, the minimum feasible choice of a 
second mover is a negative amount equal to the total contributions of the first movers. The 
maximum feasible choice is the second mover’s Private Fund endowment, which is Rs150 in the 
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India experiment and $10 in the student experiment. The normalized choice variables for second 
movers in a public good game are:   
(villagers)  
        (students) 
In a common pool experiment, the minimum feasible choice of a second mover is 0.  The 
maximum feasible choice of a second mover equals the amount left in the common pool by the 
first movers, which is Rs600 minus the sum of the extractions by the first movers in a villager 
experiment or $40 minus the sum of the extractions by first movers in a student experiment.  The 
normalized choice variables for second movers in a common pool game are:    
 (villagers) 
        (students) 
Note that  (resp. ) is the least generous feasible choice for a second mover in the 
public good (resp. common pool) game. Also,  (resp. ) is the most generous 
feasible choice for a second mover in the public good (resp. common pool) game.  Means of 
normalized second movers’ choices are:  0.74 (Villagers) and 0.57 (US students) in the public 
good game whereas in the common pool game these figures are 0.31 (Villagers) and 0.30 (US 
students). According to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test our data fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
similar levels of reciprocity across two populations: p=0.446 (provision) and p=0.996 
choice of the SM + sum of the choices by the FMs
150 + sum of the choices by the FMs 
pg
nY 
choice of the SM + sum of the choices by the FMs
10 + sum of the choices by the FMs 

choice of the SM + (600 - sum of the choices by the FMs)
600 - sum of the choices by the FMs 
cp
nY 
choice of the SM + (40 - sum of the choices by the FMs
40 - sum of the choices by the FMs 

0pgnY  0cpnY 
1pgnY  1cpnY 
17 
 
(appropriation). Data from both populations reject12 the null hypothesis of similar reciprocity 
across games in favor of the alternative hypothesis of higher generosity in the public good 
games, which is our hypothesis 2. We conclude that:  
Result 3a: Overall reciprocal attitudes are similar across students and villagers. 
Result 3b:  Public good games elicit higher generosity than common pool; this is robust 
across U.S. students and West Bengali villagers. 
 
Comparison of Caste-Informed Play with Caste-Uninformed Play 
Social norms of trust and reciprocity may differ across caste. If so, then as stated in hypothesis 4 
in section 3, in the presence of different norms, levels of trust and conditional altruism that we 
observed among caste-uninformed villagers reflect convex combinations of trust and reciprocity 
levels of homogenous (all players form the same caste) and mixed (first movers and the second 
mover belonging to different caste) groups. In-group favoritism requires higher (lower) trust and 
reciprocity in homogenous groups than in mixed groups in public (common) good games. The 
interplay between different norms across caste and across surplus creation/destruction games 
affects play efficiency, which is what we report next.   
Realized Surplus with Public Goods and Common Pools 
A central question is the effect of caste in-group and out-group behavior on cooperation in public 
good and common pool games. What effect does knowledge of other players’ castes have on the 
ability of group members to generate surplus in a public good game or not to destroy surplus in a 
common pool game?  
                                                            
12 Kolmogorov –Smirnov test, p=0.004 (villagers) and p=0.028 (US students) 
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Figure C.2 shows (estimated kernel) densities of efficiencies observed among West 
Bengali villagers when information on the caste of own group members is provided. Visual 
inspections suggest higher efficiency among high caste players (green dashed lines) than low 
caste players (red dashed lines); play efficiencies in other group compositions are between the 
ones observed in homogenous groups. Game effects are pronounced in the absence of 
information on caste (blue solid lines) but they seem to disappear in the presence of information 
on caste of others in the group, suggesting that caste effects on play efficiency are stronger than 
game effects.  
Information on magnitudes of the caste and game effects on play efficiency (as well as on 
trust and reciprocity) is provided in Table C.1.Entries in each row show means (and 95% 
confidence intervals) of the variables reported in the top row of the table across different games 
but with the same caste composition. Entries in each column, on the other hand, correspond to 
play across different caste compositions within the same game; the largest and the smallest 
values of each column are on bold.   
Consistent with insights from a visual inspection of Figure C.2, data reveal that play 
efficiency is highest (lowest) in groups with homogenous high (low) caste subjects whereas 
efficiencies in mixed groups are somewhere between; This ranking is robust to the type of game 
subjects are participating in.13 Providing information on the caste of other members in the group 
has a significant14 negative effect on play efficiency in public good games only in case of 
homogenous low caste groups (p=0.001) whereas the effect in common pool games is positive 
                                                            
13 If we use the homogenous low caste treatment as the control group, according to Kruskal-Wallis test, efficiencies 
are significantly higher for all groups but the Mixed Low group in case of the public good game; Mean efficiency is 
still higher in the Mixed Low treatment (0.30) than in Homogenous Low treatment (0.17) but the difference fails to 
be significant as we are using adjusted p-value. In case of the common pool game, significantly higher efficiencies 
are observed only for data from homogenous groups with high caste subjects. 
14 Kruskal-Wallis test, (multiple comparisons) adjusted p-value for significance is 0.006. 
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for homogenous high caste players (p=0.006). Preserving caste composition, play efficiencies 
across games are similar; only when the information on caste is absent, public good games 
enhance efficiency (p<0.006; 0.45 (public good) and 0.21 (common pool); see No Caste 
Information row, the first two columns of Table C.1). Thus our data are consistent with the 
following conclusions: 
Result 4a. Homogenous groups with high caste subjects are more successful in solving 
social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste subjects; The success of mixed 
groups in solving such dilemmas is somewhere between and comparable to the success of 
caste-uninformed groups. 
Result 4b. Resolution of the social dilemma by caste informed villagers are similar across 
two games. 
These findings on play efficiencies raise some questions: are high caste subjects better in solving 
social dilemmas because of higher level of trust? Or is it due to different norms of reciprocity 
among villagers from different caste? We turn our attention to the effect of information on caste 
on trusting attitudes and reciprocal behavior.  
Trusting Attitudes across Games and Information on Caste: First Mover Data  
For comparison purposes we consider the decisions of FMs as the rupee amounts allocated to the 
Group Fund in the public good games or rupee amounts left in (not extracted from) the Group 
Fund in the common pool games. Aggregated figures (means and 95% CI) on the decisions of 
the first movers are reported in the two middle columns (Trust part) of Table C.1. In public good 
games, average levels of trust vary from a low 64.11 (43%) in the mixed groups with low caste 
SMs to a high 94.77 (63%) in the mixed groups with high caste SMs. In the common pool game, 
average levels of trust vary from a low 38.50 (26%) in the homogenous groups with low caste 
subjects to a high 93.33 (62%) in homogenous groups with high caste subjects. Kruskal-Wallis 
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test rejects the null hypothesis of equal trust across five treatments (p=0.016 (public good) and 
p=0.001 (common pool)).15  
When opportunities for surplus creations are available, trust levels are highest among 
groups with high caste SMs, with low caste first movers trusting more (94.77) than high caste 
first movers (88.33). In the presence of surplus destruction prospects, the high caste FMs show 
much greater restraint by leaving a larger quantity in the common pool for the high caste SMs. In 
comparison, the low caste FMs show the least amount of restraint when they play against SMs of 
their own caste in common pool games.  
Decisions made by FMs can be motivated by trust on other FMs cooperation as well as 
trust on SMs reciprocating FMs cooperative choices. If FMs decisions are mainly driven by trust 
on cooperation of FMs then high (low) caste FMs decisions in homogenous (high SM) and 
mixed (low SM) groups should reveal the same underlying distribution, which reflects the social 
norm of trust among people within the same caste. Data reject this hypothesis: Data from groups 
with high caste FMs, reveal more cooperative (trusting) FMs in homogenous than mixed groups 
(p=0.057, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) whereas data from groups with low caste FMs, reveal more 
cooperative (trusting) FMs in mixed than homogenous groups (p=0.015, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test). If, however, FMs decisions mainly reflect trust on SMs generosity then FMs decisions 
across groups with high (low) SMs should reveal the same underlying distribution of trust. Data 
support this hypothesis:  low caste and high caste FMs are not different in how much they trust 
high caste SMs (p=0.857, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test); low caste SMs are trusted less but equally 
so by low and high caste FMs (p=0.767, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). We conclude that decisions 
                                                            
15 If we do not include data from caste-uninformed groups, p-values are 0.008 (public good) and 0.0002 (common 
pool). 
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of FMs, despite the caste, suggest that high cast SMs are believed to be more generous than low 
caste SMs.16  
Result 5a. High caste SMs are trusted more than low caste SMs; the result is robust 
across games. 
The null hypothesis of FMs being equally trusting across games is rejected only by data from 
homogenous groups with low caste subjects17.  
 
Altruism across West Bengali Villagers: Second Mover Data  
Finally, we examine whether caste is associated with different levels of generosity.  Figures 
reported in the Public Good column (Conditional Altruism part) of Table C.1, show that 
contributions of SMs are smaller than FMs, but as with data on trust, high caste SMs and FMs 
contributions are closer (10=88.33-78.33) than contributions between low caste SMs and FMs 
(177.58=69.81-(-107.77))); thus high caste SMs appear more generous than the low caste SMs in 
homogenous groups. The general belief that high caste SMs are more generous than low caste 
SMs (see result 5a) is supported by data from homogenous groups, but not by data from mixed 
groups. Data from public good games played by mixed groups, show that FMs contributions are 
closer to low caste SMs contributions than to high caste SMs (74.99 (low caste SM) versus 
177.58 (high caste SM); similarly in common pool games. 
Axioms S and R predict higher generosity in the PG game than in the CP game. Figures 
reported in the Common Pool column, in the Conditional Altruism part of Table C.1, show that 
                                                            
16 Although data fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal trust across games, choices of the high caste FMs appear 
more trusting in the common pool games (93.33 and 70.75) than in the provision games (88.33 and 64.11)16. If low 
caste SMs are not believed to be generous, and if high caste SMs are believed to be less generous in the common 
pool games (as suggested by Axioms S and R), then high caste FMs trust revealing choices may have been 
motivated by an appeal to cooperation among high caste FMs as to resolve the social dilemma in the presences of 
negative externalities.  
17 See *** in the Common Pool column, Trust part of Table C.1; We see lower trust in the data from caste- 
uninformed groups, the p-values are 0.086 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).  
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with the exception of the homogenous low group, contributions of SMs are further (lower) than 
FMs contributions in CP than in PG : 114.96 (caste-uninformed), 37.33 (homogenous high), 
113.6 (mixed high) and 35 (mixed low). This is consistent with part 2.a of Proposition 1.  
We consider  the decisions of FMs as the rupee amounts allocated to the Group Fund in 
the public good games or rupee amounts left in (not extracted from) the Group Fund in the 
common pool games. The normalized decisions of the three FMs in a group, along with the 
normalized decisions of the SMs in the group are presented in Figures C.3 and C.4.  The first 
column in any pair of columns represents the normalized sum of the FM decisions in a group 
while the second column in any pair of columns represents the normalized SM decision in the 
same group.   
We see that there is significant difference in behavior when the SMs interact with FMs of 
a different caste compared to when they interact with FMs of the same caste.  In PG the high 
caste SMs reciprocate the most in the homogenous high groups while the low caste SMs 
reciprocate the least in the homogenous low groups.  When we turn to the CP treatments, on 
average the high caste SMs still show maximum restraint in the homogenous high groups. The 
lowest level of reciprocation, however, is found among the U.S. student population, which is 
lower than the average levels of SM behavior in the no-caste information treatment in India or 
the SMs in the homogenous low caste groups.      
To analyze data at the individual level, we ran censored linear regressions; censoring is 
warranted as the second mover’s choices are bounded from above by the initial endowment and 
from below by the total amount of money invested by the first movers in the Group Fund. In 
addition, arguably responses of subjects who come from the same village may be correlated and 
could reflect locally established social conventions or interactions. To control for this we cluster 
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responses at a village level in the censored regressions. Estimates (and p-values) are displayed in 
Table C.2. 
As the price of altruism is the same across SM’s budget sets (being determined by total 
contributions of FMs), in the regressions reported in Table C.2, our dependent variable, altruism 
is measured as deviation from the most selfish choice. Explanatory variables include the 
minimum as well as the total sum of money contributed by the three first movers in a group to 
the Group Fund. Both of these variables are known to the second mover before he makes his 
decision, and according to Axiom R may affect SMs choices. The other main variable of interest 
is whether second mover generosity in homogenous caste groups is different from groups with 
mixed caste or no information of caste and if so, whether the type of caste of homogenous groups 
matters. We also include demographic variables to control for idiosyncratic characteristics of 
second movers. All estimates (and p-values) are reported in the second and third columns of 
Table C.2. 
Public good games Both models, with and without demographics, report similar signs of 
estimates. Our data show that the level of generosity is, as predicted by Axiom R, positively 
affected by the sum invested in the Group Fund by the first movers. Compared to the 
mixed and no caste information groups, generosity is higher in high caste homogenous groups 
but significantly lower in low caste homogenous good. Our results are:  
Result 6a: There is a positive and significant relationship between the second mover 
choice and the total sum of money contributed by the three first movers in public good 
games.  
Result 6b: Generosity is highest in homogenous high caste groups and lowest in 
homogenous low caste groups in public good games.  
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Common Pool Games To test for robustness of findings across games, and to make comparison 
of generosity across two games transparent, both first and second movers choices in the common 
pool game used in our statistical analysis are transformed as described in the theoretical section: 
i.e., an amount extracted by a player is recorded as the money left in the common pool, which is 
the payoff equivalent choice in the PG game. All estimates (and p-values) are reported in the 
fourth and fifth columns of Table C.2. Again both models, with and without demographics, 
report similar signs of estimates in CP games. Unlike in the public good game, the level of 
generosity is positively affected by the minimum of the choices by the three first movers in the 
group but not by the total amount of money left in the fund. Generosity level seems to be higher 
(at least once controlling for demographics) for high-caste homogenous groups. Similar to the 
public good game, high caste second movers are not more generous than low caste movers as the 
estimate of High Caste variable is not statistically different from 0 (p=0.210). Our next result is:  
Result 7: The more cooperative the choice of the greediest first mover in the group, the 
higher is the generosity of the second mover in common pool games. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Previous literature (Fehr et al., 2008) has suggested that spiteful preferences of upper caste 
Indians may pose an obstacle to trade, cooperation, and development. But the “spite” observed 
by Fehr, et al. (2008) is third-party, costly punishment of defectors. While costly punishment 
inherently reduces total payoffs in the immediate instance, the credible threat of such punishment 
may elicit more cooperation and higher payoffs in a larger context. We experiment with public 
good and common pool games that directly reveal economic surplus foregone or destroyed by 
failure of cooperation.  
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Our public good and common pool games incorporate a type of power asymmetry that 
provides ample opportunity for failure of cooperation. Three first movers simultaneously decide 
how much to contribute to a public good or extract from a common pool. One second mover 
makes a choice after observing choices made by the first movers. In the public good game, the 
second mover can either contribute to the public good or appropriate as his private property all of 
the previous contributions by the first movers. In the common pool game, the second mover can 
either refrain from taking from the common pool or extract part or all of the remaining resource 
in the common pool after the first movers’ extractions.  
In one treatment with each (public good or common pool) game form, we withhold 
information about the caste identification of all other subjects in an experiment session. The 
efficiency of play in these caste-uninformed treatments with villagers is not significantly 
different from the efficiency of play observed in an experiment with student subjects at 
American universities (reported in Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj and Walker, 2013). This absence of a 
significant cultural effect holds for both the public good game and the payoff-equivalent 
common pool game. In this way, we did not observe an overall cultural difference in level of 
cooperation between the two subject pools.  
Behavioral patterns become more heterogeneous, however, in treatments in which the 
Indian villagers are informed about the caste identities of other subjects. The highest efficiency is 
obtained in both public good and common pool games when three high caste first movers are 
matched with a high caste second mover. The lowest efficiency is observed when three low caste 
first movers are matched with a low caste second mover. 18 
                                                            
18 This result may be compared with previous findings by (Hanna & Linden, 2012) who find discriminatory 
behavior in education by low castes towards other low castes in India and by (List & Price, 2009) who find that 
minority solicitors, whether approaching a majority or minority household, are considerably less likely to obtain a 
contribution. This finding is similar to what (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999) found earlier regarding the shares of 
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Intermediate efficiency levels are observed when the second mover comes from a 
different caste than the first movers. In comparison to the efficiency level observed in the public 
good game with students at American universities, the efficiency in homogenous (high caste) is 
significantly higher and the efficiency in homogenous (low caste) is significantly lower. For the 
common pool game, the efficiency of homogenous (low caste) treatment is significantly lower 
than for students; there is no significant difference between efficiency in homogenous (high 
caste) treatment and student efficiency of play in the common pool game.  
The public good and common pool games in our experiment are payoff equivalent. They 
are strategically equivalent for all models of fixed social preferences including inequality 
aversion ((Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), quasi-maximin ((Charness & 
Rabin, 2005), CES (Andreoni & Miller, 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox & Sadiraj, 2007). In 
contrast, the public good and common pool games are not strategically equivalent for revealed 
altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008). Revealed altruism theory predicts specific differences in play 
between the public good game and common pool game: that second movers will behave more 
altruistically in the public good game than in the common pool game. Tests of these predictions 
reveal the following. Observed differences in revealed altruism across treatments are inconsistent 
with strategic equivalence of the public good and common pool games. In contrast, observed 
differences in play of second movers across public good and common pool games are consistent 
with the prediction of revealed altruism theory. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
spending on productive public goods in U. S. cities are inversely related to the city’s ethnic fragmentation. 
(Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001) found systematic mistrust towards male players among the minority ethnic Jews by 
both more educated & wealthier ethnic groups as well as their own groups. 
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Chapter II: Competition and Cooperation: A Comparative Study between India and the 
U.S. 
Introduction 
Economists have been interested in gender differences for a long time - especially why 
we see differential behavior of the genders to competition.  This is an important question.  As 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) explain, fewer women entering competitions implies fewer 
women would win such tournaments which, “decreases the chances of women succeeding in 
competitions for promotions and more lucrative jobs.”  The nature vs. nurture story comes into 
play- whether we behave in a certain manner because it was genetically ingrained in us before 
being born (nature theory) or because we adapt our behavior to ensure our acclimatization to the 
surroundings and the environment we are born into (the nurture story), suggesting that genetic 
tendencies ultimately may not matter. Evidence of a self-selection story exists as well – the 
annual earnings for women who graduated from an elite MBA program with labor earnings 
nearly identical to their male counterparts (at the time of graduation) were found to diverge 
considerably from the men approximately 10-16 years after completion. Some reasons include 
women selecting into less demanding jobs due to pressure on their time which may be devoted to 
their families (Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010).  Some of the other reasons cited for gender 
differences include differential preferences or even gender discrimination.  For example, 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) confirm that men are more competitive than women among U.S. 
undergraduates; while (Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009) examine the same question across the 
Masai in Tanzania (a strictly patriarchal society) and the Khasi in India (a matrilineal society) 
and find females are more competitive compared to males among the Khasi but the opposite 
results hold for the Masai. Performance seems to also depend on the gender mix (Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2004). Evidence of differential preferences is provided by (Croson & Gneezy, 2009) 
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who identify that women are more risk averse; have different social preferences (e.g., more 
sensitive to social cues) and lower preferences for competition. (Babcock & Laschever, 2009) 
find that female MBAs may be less willing to aggressively negotiate for pay and promotion or 
may be subject to implicit or explicit gender discrimination ((Bertrand, Chugh, & Mullainathan, 
2005)).   
If women choose to compete less, it is important to ask what may be the possible cause 
here.  It is possible that the females have innately different preferences-they choose to be more 
cooperative.  Perhaps women feel the need to cooperate more towards their peers (contrasting 
with men being more competitive). This could be especially important in areas such as the 
workplace where it benefits an individual to be competitive; but being cooperative and helping 
others, even when not formally required, offer evidence of a positive externality. Studies in 
economics find that women tend to choose more equal distributions and to stick with those 
preferences even when the cost of doing so increases (Eckel & Grossman, 1998) as well as social 
psychology elucidating why females may be perceived as more cooperative relative to men: 
generally women are kinder (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996), more agreeable (Feingold, 
1994) and more supportive of their friends (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly, 2004).19   
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the males compete more than females 
in two very different environments – villagers in rural India and undergraduates in a U.S. 
university; further, are women more cooperative? 20 We conduct artifactual field experiments in 
                                                            
19 (Grant, 2013) provides an exposition of how important cooperation is. According to a team of Harvard 
psychologists who studied and determined what makes intelligence units effective: “The single strongest predictor 
of group effectiveness was the amount of help that analysts gave to each other. In the highest performing teams, 
analysts invested extensive time and energy in coaching, teaching, and consulting with their colleagues”. Other 
studies find that cooperation has positive externalities which strengthen morale, commitment to organizational 
values, and ultimately increase the overall productivity (O’Reilly, 1983); (Tjosvold, Andrews, & Jones, 1983).  
20 The only study which examines both competition and cooperation is by psychologists (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & 
Janssen, 2007) who determine that men contribute more to their group if their group was competing with other 
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rural India21  where we examine issues of gender and caste and compare the data with 
incentivized laboratory experiments conducted in Atlanta, GA where we examine issues of 
gender and race interactions. The games are conducted in an almost identical manner to enable 
parity across countries. We form mixed gender groups and single sex groups and examine the 
levels of competition and cooperation in such groups. We ask whether gender is determined as 
the stronger factor for subjects to compete or cooperate with each other, or does caste or race 
come up as important.  To the best of our knowledge, there have been no reported experiments to 
date (laboratory or field) that look at how both caste and race interact with gender issues; hence 
this paper is an attempt to add to the existing literature by incorporating the gender interaction 
with both race and caste. We first attempt to figure out whether the gender stereotype exists (that 
males are more competitive compared to females) in India or in the US- conditional on that we 
determine whether females cooperate more compared to males.  We ask whether males are found 
to be more competitive and if so, will females be found to be more cooperative. We also ask if 
caste or race matters at all in this scenario. We want to find out whether there is any group that 
can actually resolve the conflict between competition vs. cooperation.22  
Why is this important? Competition and cooperation may be placed at the opposite ends 
of the spectrum but both are of equal importance for an organization to flourish: a competitive 
team structure improves speed while a cooperative structure enhances accuracy (Beersma et al., 
2003). Both are essential since while a competitive team “emphasizes performance differences 
among team members, typically rewarding individuals with high performance and/or imposing 
sanctions on those with low performance”, cooperative systems on the other hand may focus on 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
groups compared to when there was no intergroup competition, female cooperation was relatively unaffected by 
intergroup competition and suggest that men respond more strongly than women to inter-group threats. 
21 An artifactual field experiment is one where we use non-standard subjects such as Indian villagers in this case. We 
use the terminology from (Harrison & List, 2004). 
22 Ideally a successful organization requires that an individual be competitive and cooperative at the same time. 
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“group accomplishments. They emphasize minimizing distinctions among group members (that 
is, distinctions based on performance) because these distinctions may impede teamwork, 
information sharing, and helping.” (Beersma et al., 2003). Understanding the interaction between 
cooperation and competition is vital since “almost all conflicts are mixed-motive, containing 
elements of both cooperation and competition.” (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962). When people in a 
team have cooperative goals, they want every members of the team to perform effectively since 
this process enables the team to be successful; while if people in a team have competitive goals, 
they are likely to feel that other team members acting ineffectively is beneficial to them since 
they have a better chance of attaining their goals (Tjosvold, 1998).  
In India, gender is an issue of concern – as is evident from the Gender Inequality Index 
(reflecting inequality in achievements between women and men in empowerment, labor market 
and reproductive health) which stands at a high value of 0.645 for India.23 The 2011 Human 
Development Index (the HDI which assesses long-term progress in health, education and income 
indicators) ranks India at a low 134 among 187 countries24 (0.547) - well below the 2011 World 
HDI at 0.682 as well as the Median HDI at 0.630.  However in India, gender is not the only 
factor to get discriminated against. There exist other elements such as caste - a system of social 
stratification, which has prevailed in India since pre-historic times25. Affirmative action policies 
have been active in India since 1950 to alleviate the “lower” castes.  Yet there exist ample 
evidence of discrimination against the “lower” castes26. So how does caste interact with gender 
in India?  The extant literature on caste and gender so far has mainly focused on how the lower 
castes (especially the women) have been discriminated against by higher castes (Kannabiran & 
                                                            
23 From http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/68606.html.  A higher value of the GII indicates more inequality.  
24 From http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IND.html. 
25 See (Keay, 2010), pp. 189 for more information. More details of the discrimination in India based on caste or 
gender may be found in Appendix H.   
26 See (Beteille, 1965), (Srinivas, 1980), (Anderson, 2005) for details 
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Kannabiran, 1991), how women’s status in several regions in India continue to be defined by 
their caste (Deshpande, 2002) or how women have been under-represented in areas such as 
public office (Rai, 2002).27  
Evidence of differential preferences leading to some evidence of discriminatory behavior 
with regard to gender or race is replete from the US.  (Hallock & Bertrand, 1999) find that 
between the years 1992-97, representation of women in the highest paid jobs is just 2.5%.28  
(Wolfers, 2006) finds that the number of female CEOs has increased from just 4 in 1992 to 34 in 
2004; however they still represent just 1.3% of the observations in his sample. (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2009) find that female MBAs may be less willing to aggressively negotiate for pay 
and promotion.29 (Goldin & Rouse, 2000) use the audition process of symphony orchestras to 
determine that the number of women hired increases by 50% when the audition process is 
“blind” – implying a screen is used to conceal the gender of the musician from the jury.  There 
are related labor market outcomes as well. (Blau, Kahn, & Waldfogel, 2004) examine why the 
male and female wages have been slow to converge in the 1990s against the 1980s. They 
determine that the changes in labor force selectivity, changes in gender differences in 
unmeasured characteristics and in labor market discrimination, as well as changes in the 
favorableness of demand shifts are the major factors here. (Bertrand et al., 2010) examine the 
careers of MBAs from the University Of Chicago Booth School Of Business for 17 years to 
understand how gender affects the career dynamics. Although the starting position is the same, 
                                                            
27 In India, just 60 out of the 545 seats – 11% in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) and 26 seats out of the 
allotted 245 seats- 10.6% in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) comprise of women (From Inter-
Parliamentary Union – Composition of women, October 2012, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm) 
28 They use Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp dataset, which contains compensation information (base  
salary, bonus and the value of granted stock options) of the top five executives for all firms in the S&P  
500, S&P Midcap 400 and S&P Smallcap 400 for the years 1992-97.  
29 (Black & Strahan, 2001) discuss the regulations in the banking industry where they found that the  
firms discriminated by sharing rents (brought about by deregulating) disproportionately with the male  
employees and estimate that the wages fell by 12% for males, as against just 3% for women implying a  
greater share of rents being shared with male workers. 
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the earnings of the male MBAs increase by almost 60 log points within a decade after MBA 
completion – most of which may be explained by differences in training prior to MBA 
graduation, differences in career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours. Most studies of 
wage and occupational differences find an unexplained gap, although the differential and the 
unexplained portion have both decreased over time. 30 Evidence of racial discrimination is also 
widespread across the labor market (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004); rental housing markets 
(Hanson & Hawley, 2011); how employment opportunities for low wage workers is subtly but 
systematically problematic for minority workers (Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009) or how 
the probability of a welfare sanction (a financial penalty applied to individuals who fail to 
comply with welfare program rules) increases  significantly when the discretization is attached to 
a black rather than a white welfare client  (Schram, Soss, Fording, & Houser, 2009)- to name a 
few.  (Alesina et al., 1999) examine how heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a 
city is linked to the amount and type of public goods in the city and determine that the shares of 
spending on productive public goods—education, roads, sewers and trash pickup—in American 
cities are inversely related to the city’s ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other 
socioeconomic and demographic determinants.    
Our results point to some very interesting facts. There are major differences in behavior 
across and within countries. In India, males of both low and high castes choose to compete 
significantly more than females of both castes, while in the US, the White males choose to 
compete significantly more than all other categories - the White females, African American 
males and females. Yet a cross-country comparison reveals U.S. males as the most competitive 
and the Indian females as the least competitive. Even U.S. females are marginally more 
                                                            
30 For more details, see the literature review provided by (Altonji & Blank, 1999) and, for long term trends, (Goldin, 
2006). 
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competitive than the Indian males (at 6.5% level of significance).  In cooperation however, 
Indian males are found to be significantly more cooperative relative to females from both India 
and the US. Males in the U.S. are found to cooperate at levels that are insignificantly lower than 
the Indian males, yet within just the U.S. sample, the White males cooperate at significantly 
higher levels relative to the other groups.  These results are robust to addition of demographic 
controls as well as curtailing the sample to an age group of less than 25 years.  
Before proceeding further, we explain what we mean by “competition” and cooperation” in 
the context of our experiment.   We define competition as “competing against others”. This may 
be looked upon as external or extrinsic competition. We design experiments here to test how a 
subject competes against others (e.g., a tennis player would want to win all the Grand Slams by 
defeating the rest of the contestants).  By cooperation, we mean the “association of persons for 
common benefit”.31  In this essay, we consider “cooperation” to be the same as “being able to 
coordinate with the paired group member’. The experiments reported here test cooperation in the 
sense that if two individuals in a group are cooperative, that would bring about the maximum 
benefit to the group. Otherwise, there is a possibility that both may end up losing money. 
Whether individuals can actually reach that level of association is what we test in our 
experiments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an exposition of the 
experimental hypotheses while section III examines the experiment design. Section IV explains 
the experimental procedures followed in the two countries and section V discusses the results. 
Section VI concludes. 
 
                                                            
31 Merriam-Webster dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperation, accessed October 11 
2011. 
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Stylized Facts for this Experiment 
The objective of this experiment is to check whether there are differences in competitive and 
cooperative behavior when genders interact with castes or races.  The two-person gender groups 
(in both India and the US) are as follows: 
 Males with males (all male groups) 
 Males with females (mixed gender groups) 
 Females with females (all female groups) 
The two-person caste compositions (for India) are as follows:  
 High-castes with high-castes (all high caste groups) 
 High-castes with low-castes (mixed caste groups) 
 Low-castes with low-castes (all low caste groups) 
The two-person caste compositions (for the US) are as follows:  
 Whites with Whites (all White groups) 
 Whites with African Americans (mixed race groups) 
 African Americans with African Americans (all African American groups) 
The literature on gender competition suggests overwhelmingly that males compete more than 
females in general (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007); (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004) and especially 
so in patriarchal societies (Gneezy et al., 2009). Therefore, we formulate our research hypotheses 
for the gender group combinations are as follows:  
Stylized Fact I: Men choose to compete more than women. 
Stylized Fact II: Females choose to cooperate more than men. 
(Cox, Sadiraj, & Sen, 2014) conducted artifactual field experiments to examine the effect of 
caste in the context of social dilemmas with asymmetric public goods and common pool resource 
games. Their results indicate that while high castes exhibit within-group bias by acting more 
altruistically towards other high castes; low castes contribute less (public goods games) or 
extract significantly more (common pool games) when playing against their own caste.  This 
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leads us to the testable assumption that perhaps the lower castes are possibly more competitive 
while the higher castes are more cooperative. We will examine the truth behind this assumption 
in the course of our experiment. Therefore, our research hypotheses for the caste group 
combinations are as follows: 
Stylized Fact III: High caste subjects choose to compete less than low caste subjects. 
Stylized Fact IV: High caste subjects choose to cooperate more than low caste subjects. 
(Simpson, McGrimmon, & Irwin, 2007) finds that trust tends to be greater within race 
categories relative to across race categories. Trust is an essential element in cooperation (Ostrom, 
2009). We hypothesize that within-group trust and hence cooperation is greater than across-
group cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research which examines how the 
different races perform in a competitive task, which makes it difficult to formulate a stylized fact 
of any particular race competing more. However, since competition is expected to be at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from cooperation, we invert the case for competition to create 
Stylized Fact VI: across race competition is higher than within race competition. Therefore, our 
research hypotheses for the race group combinations are as follows: 
Stylized Fact V: Cooperation is greater within a race than across races.   
Stylized Fact VI: Competition is greater across races than within a race.  
 Subjects participated in three separate “parts” during the experiment. The first part is a 
risk elicitation treatment. The second is a competition game and the third part is a cooperation 
game. Descriptions of the experimental procedures followed in the two countries and the three 
games follow.  Instructions may be found in Appendix G. 
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Experimental Design 
Round 1: The Risk Round 
Following (Gneezy et al., 2009), we design the risk game to introduce exogenous variation in 
the observability of investment returns. Each participant is given an initial endowment of Rs 100 
in India ($8 in the US) and asked to divide the endowment between a zero-risk, zero-interest 
savings account and an investment which is risky but potentially profitable.   The participant 
would receive five times the amount that they chose to invest in the risky prospect with 
probability one half, and will lose the amount invested otherwise. At the time of making the 
decision, the subject is informed that if this round is selected for payment at the end of the 
experiment, a coin will be flipped to determine whether his or her risky investment is successful. 
Thus, the main decision a subject is faced with is how much of the endowment to invest in the 
risky security and how much to allocate to the zero-profit alternative. Subjects are informed that 
if this round is chosen for payment at the end of the experiment, the die roll would actually be 
conducted and whatever they earned would be paid in private.32  
Round 2: The Competition Task 
Once subjects finished the making the decision for the risk round, they are informed about 
the gender and caste of their paired group member. Thereafter they are asked to complete the 
competition task.  They are asked to under hand toss a tennis ball into a bucket placed 3 meters 
(10 feet) away for which they have 10 attempts. A successful shot occurs when the tennis ball 
                                                            
32 There are several reasons why this simple binary task was chosen. First, we have subjects with low education 
levels and there could be possible lack of comprehension of a sophisticated risk elicitation task such as the one by 
(Holt & Laury, 2002). (Charness & Viceisza, 2012) test the understanding and level of meaningful responses to this 
task across farmers in rural Senegal and find a low level of understanding (including multiple switching by over 
50% of the subjects). Moreover the (Holt & Laury, 2002) mechanism allows the subjects to see all the lottery 
choices before making a single decision. (Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt, 2014) demonstrate the problems that arise across 
the changes in the elicited risk preferences regarding the behavioral properties of this random decision selection 
mechanism. 
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enters the bucket. The task was chosen because it is simple to explain and implement and no 
gender differences in ability are expected, as demonstrated in (Gneezy et al., 2009).  
But before subjects start this task, they are asked to make a decision on how they wished to 
be paid for their performance. They make this choice before performing the task.  The two 
options to choose from are (a) Rs 20 per successful shot in India ($2 in the US), regardless of the 
performance of their paired opponent or (b) Rs (4*20) = Rs 80 each successful shot ($8 in the 
US) if they outperform their opponent. They are informed that in case they chose the second 
option and scored the same or less than the opponent; they would still receive Rs 20 (or $2) per 
successful shot. 33 
Round 3: The Cooperation Round 
In this round, we used a modification of the roadmap game (adapted from (Deutsch & 
Krauss, 1962)) to elicit whether individuals cooperate with each other. Each subject pair (we call 
them A and B) is asked to travel from their respective starting points to their destinations. As 
indicated in the Figure E.1 roadmap, each subject has a different starting point and a different 
destination. There are two possible routes each subject can take. They can take either the short 
route (one lane road) or the long route (alternate route). If both individuals travel along the short 
path, their paths will collide and neither can reach their destination. Along the long route, they do 
not cross each other; however this route is long and takes more time compared to the short route. 
A gate is placed at both ends of the short route. Each subject has control over the gate closest 
to their starting position. Each subject has the option of opening the gate to let the opponent pass 
                                                            
33 This payoff structure is a modification over Gneezy et al (2009): the current design is starker since there is 
absolutely no reason for anyone to choose "not compete" because there is no way one can lose money in this game. 
Therefore anyone choosing to "not compete" would do so since they really do not want to compete with the paired 
group member. 
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or one can choose to close the gate and restrict the other person from travelling along the short 
route.  
So in our game the subjects decide simultaneously- 
 which route they would choose – the long one or the short one and  
 whether they want their gate open or closed (if they choose the long route). 
So the options are: 
a) (long route, gate open), where the subject takes the long route and allows his opponent 
pass through the short route by opening his gate, thus showing cooperative behavior; 
b) (long route, gate closed), where the subject shows non-cooperative behavior since he 
keeps his gate closed and does not allow his opponent to pass, while travelling via the 
long route; 
c) (short route, gate open), where the subject wants to travel via the short route, so he has to 
keep his own gate open.34 
Table E.1 shows the payoff structure for the normal form of the game for all possible 
decisions. If both subjects choose to travel via the long route, they each get a payoff of 1 unit 
when they reach their destination, irrespective of whether the gates are closed or open (since they 
are not using the shorter route). If one subject uses the short route and is able to reach the 
destination, they can get 5 points provided the paired partner kept the gate open. If the gate is 
closed, they get 0 points. If both use the short route, each subject gets -2 points, since neither 
would complete their trip.  
Here 1 point translates to Rs 20 ($2 in the US). In case a subject earns a high payoff of 5 
points in a round, she earns 5 times the amount or Rs 100 ($10) for that round.  At the end of the 
                                                            
34 The last option: short route, gate closed is ruled out this case since if a subject wants to travel via the short route, 
he will not be able to get into that route unless his own gate is open. 
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experiment, she gets paid on the basis of what she has earned in all the 10 rounds in this task (if 
this round is chosen for payment).  The player types (A or B) are randomly assigned to the two 
players in a team. At the end of each round, both players are informed of the scores obtained and 
the decisions by each player in the pair.   
Note that an efficient strategy would be for player 1 to choose the route and gate options 
as (long, open) in one round, thereby allowing the player 2 to choose the short route with gate 
open option (which gives the maximum payoff). Now, player 2, if motivated by positive 
reciprocity towards the player 1, chooses the long route with open gate in the following round, 
and allows player 1 to choose short route, with gate open. Testing for whether this level of 
cooperation and coordination can be attained by the players over two consecutive rounds is our 
objective in this round. We want to examine whether females perform better at this cooperation 
task, since it would offer an explanation for less competitive behavior among women.  
We will also point out that in this experiment, being cooperative is not the same as being 
altruistic. An altruistic individual would act in a selfless manner e.g., offer money to a paired 
group member even if the decision maker does not get any benefits from such an action. A 
selfish action would be exactly the opposite where the subject would think of only the self-
benefit and will not be concerned about others’ welfare. By cooperation in this experiment we 
mean a situation where the best case scenario for an individual is to be “selfishly altruistic” –if I 
am being altruistic in one round, I have the expectation that the paired person will be altruistic 
towards me in the next round. This is certainly not a purely selfless act nor a purely selfish action 
- since being selfish is likely to hurt my own chances in the forthcoming rounds.  
We note here that the order of the experiment was always the risk round, followed by the 
competition round and finally the cooperation round. Since subjects made the decisions for the 
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risk round before knowing who their paired group member would be, so this round could not be 
conducted at any time other than at the start of the experiment. The risk and competition rounds 
were conducted in private; one after the other while the cooperation round was performed while 
everyone was sitting together in the main room. At the juncture between the risk round and the 
competition round, the subjects were informed about the gender and caste of their paired group 
member. Providing this information was obviously crucial to the whole experiment. If the 
cooperation round had been performed in the middle, it would not have been possible to convey 
the information about the paired group member to each individual subject.  In addition since this 
paper extends the experiment of Gneezy et al (2009), we wanted to keep the order the same as in 
the original experiment for easier comparison purposes.  
Experimental Procedures across India and the United States 
Procedures followed in India 
The experimental sessions in India were conducted at Panarhat, Falta in the South 24 
Parganas district in the eastern state of West Bengal using the premises of a local NGO during 
February 2012. At each place, volunteers for the NGO invited potential subjects by reading out 
the invitation script generated by us in the local language, Bengali.35 The experiments were 
conducted using subjects from distant villages to ensure a good mix. All sessions were conducted 
in the local native language, Bengali. The experiments followed a single blind procedure. Once 
the participants showed up at the central location on the day of the experiment they were asked 
to provide certain demographic information such as their sex, age, religion, marital status, caste, 
                                                            
35 The prospective subject was informed that an experiment is being conducted at a central location (e.g., a school), 
and they are being invited to participate. If they did show up at the designated time and place, they will have to 
perform some tasks and make some decisions. They are guaranteed to earn at least Rs 50 (show up fee); and if they 
do participate, they have a chance to earn a lot more.  
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years of education and occupation. They were also asked whether they have ever participated in 
any sport, and if so, for how many years. 
The experimenter read the consent form to them in Bengali. Subjects indicated their 
willingness to participate by signing the form.36 Next, the instructions were read aloud to the 
entire group of assembled participants by the experimenter. Subjects were also told at this point 
that they will receive payment for either Rounds 1, 2 or 3. The experimenter used a 6-sided die at 
the end of the experiment to decide which round they would get paid for. Subjects received an 
additional Rs 50 as show up fee.  Subjects were informed that each of them would be included in 
a two-person team. Each team remained fixed for the entire experiment. The team member was 
another person from the entire gathering of individuals at the school on that particular day.  
Next, the subjects are asked to come one by one to a separate private room for a one-to-one 
interaction with the experimenter. They made their choice for the risk task. Thereafter each 
participant is informed of the gender and caste of their partner. However no subject is ever 
informed of the identity of the other person. Thereafter subjects chose the competition reward 
scheme and completed this task. They are not informed of their opponent’s performance. They 
were told to go back to the main room and await instructions for the next round.  
After all subjects had completed the first two rounds, we played the third round to 
examine cooperation. Each subject was handed an envelope with 10 decision sheets, stapled 
together. The experimenter clarified all the instructions and asked the subjects to make their 
decision for the first round.  Once all subjects have circled their choices in their decision sheets 
for the first round, the sheets were collected and points awarded for each decision.  Next, the 
                                                            
36 Unlike in a laboratory experiment in an American university, (where the instructions would be handed to all 
participants), we would not hand instructions to the subjects, since we are likely to have a mix of literate and semi-
literate subjects. The instructions were verbally read out to subjects so as not to discriminate. The consent forms and 
the instructions were translated from English to Bengali and checked after having a different person translate them 
back into English. 
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sheets are returned to each subject. They are asked to carefully consider the decision of their 
partner for that round and thereafter complete the same set of decisions for the next round. Again 
all sheets are collected and points awarded. We repeated this process 10 times. 
To ensure no strategic behavior, we implemented a number of procedures. The volunteers of 
the NGO were specifically asked to ensure no talking or discussion among the subjects. Since 
most people preferred to sit next to their friends or neighbors or people with whom they had 
travelled to the location, we repeatedly informed the subjects that their friends or neighbors will 
not be placed in the same group as them; they would be paired with strangers from other villages. 
This information was provided to the subjects several times and at regular intervals. People were 
made to sit far apart from each other to further hamper the process of communication. Groups 
were created beforehand with matched alphanumeric codes known only to the experimenter37 – 
so that subjects (or even the volunteers) had no way of knowing which two people were in the 
same group.    
All sessions were conducted at the Panarhat, Falta area, South 24 Parganas in rural West 
Bengal, India during February 2012. We conducted 6 sessions with 28 subjects per session, 
generating a total sample of 168 subjects. Table E.2 summarizes some characteristics of the 
subject population in India. We had an exactly equal gender split among our subject pool. 74% 
belonged to the higher caste. 
Subjects were between 18-36 years, with a mean age of 26 years.  The average age among 
male subjects was 25 years (standard deviation of 5 years) while the average for a female subject 
was 28 years (standard deviation of 6 years).  All subjects had received some form of education.  
35% of the male subjects had some level of secondary education and a further 51% had 
                                                            
37 For example, two members of a group could be ABC321 and PQR987. It would be impossible for a subject (or 
volunteer) to guess accurately which two people were in the same group. 
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completed high school; 67% of the female subjects had some level of secondary education and 
another 25% had completed high school. Among the male subjects, 39% were students, 12% 
were farmers while 40% provided were employed either as a shopkeeper or other miscellaneous 
jobs.  We also find that 80% of the female subjects were housewives and the rest were students. 
4% of our entire sample is unemployed.  89% of the female population is married, compared to 
32% of the male subjects.  95% of the females have played some game38 in the past (88% of 
these subjects have between 4-10 years’ experience of playing games); while all males have 
previously played some games (75% of them have between 10-22 years’ experience of playing 
games).   
Procedures followed in the United States 
The subjects in the U.S. were recruited via the ExCEN Recruiting system. Once subjects 
had been seated in the laboratory, they were asked to fill out a demographic questionnaire which 
asked the same questions as in India.  
After everyone had consented to be part of the experiment, the instructions were verbally 
read out to the subjects. The show up fee was $7.50. Once instructions had been provided for the 
first two rounds, subjects were asked to come to a separate place one by one where they first 
made the decisions for the risk task. Thereafter they were informed about the gender and race of 
their paired group member, asked to make a choice for the reward scheme in the competition 
round and then actually complete the competition task of tossing 10 tennis balls into a bucket 
placed 3 meters (10 feet away). Once all subjects had completed the first two rounds, the third 
and final task to test cooperation was played out exactly in the same way as in India.  
                                                            
38 These games include cricket, football, badminton etc in India while games played in the U.S. included volleyball, 
basketball, baseball, track and field etc 
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We conducted 19 experimental sessions at the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) at 
Georgia State University during March-May 2013. We have a total sample size of 184 subjects. 
Table E.3 provides some descriptive statistics of the subjects.  49% of the population was female 
(90 females) and 42% was White (77 Whites).    41% of the females and 43% of the males were 
White.  Just 2% of the sample is married.  Subjects were between 18-35 years, with a mean age 
of 20 years.  The average age among male subjects was 20.56 years (standard deviation of 3 
years) while the average for a female subject was 19.99 years (standard deviation of 3 years).    
Subjects had on average between 14-15 years of education (implying that most were 
sophomores or juniors). 82% of the females have played some sports or games in the past 
(between 1-15 years’ experience of playing games with an average of about 5 years’ experience); 
while 88% of the males have previously played some games (between 5-25 years’ experience 
with an average of about 7 years’ experience). 
Experimental Results 
Next, we examine the results from the three different experimental treatments across India and 
the US.  
Choice of Risky Investment 
 We first examine the amounts placed in the risky investment by gender and caste or race.  In 
India on average, males invest Rs 56 in the risky investment; while females invest Rs 50. A 
parametric means test and a Mann-Whitney non-parametric test rejects the notion that the level 
of contribution to the risky investment is the same across genders (t = -1.9130; z = -1.849).  
On average in India, high caste subjects invest Rs 52 in the risky venture while the 
corresponding figure for low castes is Rs 55. The means test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and 
the Mann-Whitney (MW) tests fail to reject the notion that level of contribution to the risky 
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investment is same across high castes vs. low castes (t =   0.6908; p-value 0.725 in KS test and z 
= 1.096 in MW test).   
In the US, males invest $5.69 on average. White males invest the highest amount among all 
gender and race categories ($6.25) while African American males invest $5.28 on average. These 
figures are higher than the average investment in the risky venture by all females ($4.83); White 
females ($5.04) and African American females ($4.68).  A means test, a Mann-Whitney test and 
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test rejects the idea that the level of contribution to the 
risky investment is the same across genders.39  
Table E.4 reports an OLS regression that examines the choice of risky investment. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of the endowment invested in the risky investment. Column 
(2) present s the results from the pooled data from India and the US.  We have added country-
gender interaction dummies here: US-males (which takes value=1 if subject is male and is from 
the US); US-Females (which takes value=1 if subject is female and is from the US) and Indian-
Females (which takes value=1 if subject is female and is from India). We examine results 
relative to the omitted category: Indian –Males (which takes value=1 if subject is male and is 
from India).  We find that the percentage of endowment invested in the risky option is 
significantly higher for the males in the U.S. while Indian females tend to invest a significantly 
lower percentage of their endowment.  We also find that the more educated subjects invest 
more40.  
                                                            
39 The means test provides a t value of 3.20; the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test provides a z 
value of -3.112 and corrected p-value from the KS test is 0.002. 
40 Our results are similar to the results reported in Gneezy et al (2009), who conduct the exact same test across the 
Khasi and the Maasai subjects and determine no difference in investment levels across genders in the two cultures: 
the gambled amount for Khasi (Maasai) women is not found to be significantly different from the gambled amount 
for Khasi (Maasai) men according to a two-sample t test. 
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 Column (3) provides results from India only. We add gender-caste interaction variables: 
male-high (which takes value=1 if subject is male and high caste); male-low (which takes 
value=1 if subject is male and low caste); female-high (which takes value=1 if subject is female 
and high caste) and female-low (which takes value=1 if subject is female and low caste). The 
omitted category is high caste males. We find no significant difference in the percentage of the 
endowment invested in the risky option by any of the three categories (relative to our omitted 
group: high caste females).  
Column (4) examines the choices from the subjects in the US.  Here we add gender-race 
dummies: African American Males (which takes value=1 if subject is male and is African 
American); African American Females (which takes value=1 if subject is female and is African 
American); White Females (which takes value=1 if subject is female and is White).  The omitted 
category is White males who invest a significantly higher amount in the risky investment relative 
to the other three categories- the White females as well as the African American males and 
females. This effect is robust to addition of demographic controls. So, on average White males 
take the most risk. So our main results are: 
Result 1: U.S. males invest significantly more in risky part of the lottery while Indian 
females invest significantly less relative to Indian males. U.S. females invest 
insignificantly more than Indian males. 
Note that at the time of making the decision for how much to invest in the risky venture, we 
look only at how the males behaved vs. the females. We do not look at the behavior of the group 
with males with other males or males and females since the information about the paired partner 
had not been provided to the subject at this point. Partner information was provided after the 
subject had completed making the risky investment decision. 
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Competition round: Decision to Compete  
The first main question we are interested in is whether men are actually more competitive 
compared to females (Stylized Fact I). We conduct a binary probit analysis considering the 
decision to compete as the dependent variable. We construct a binary variable “t2_compete” 
which takes the value 1 if the subject chooses to compete and 0 otherwise. Table E.5 reports the 
marginal effects from a probit analysis using the decision to compete as the dependent variable.  
Column (2) reports the pooled data from India and the US, while columns (3) and (4) report 
data separately for India and the U.S.  only. All columns control for age, years of education, 
marital status, whether the subject is a student or not, whether the subject has played any games 
and if so, how many years they have played and the percentage they had invested in the risky 
option in the first round. We find that U.S. males are significantly more likely to choose to 
compete relative to the omitted category: Indian males, while Indian females are significantly 
less likely to choose to compete relative to the Indian males. Not surprisingly, if a subject has 
played sports before, they are far more likely to choose to compete.   
In column (3), we report the results from India and examine the choices of high caste 
females, low caste males and females relative to the omitted group: high caste males.  We find 
that males from low castes choose to compete insignificantly less relative to the high caste males 
while both high and low caste females choose to compete significantly less. This is robust to 
controlling for all our demographic variables.   
Note that if a subject chooses to compete but is unable to outperform their partner (obtains 
less or equal to the paired partner), they do not actually lose monetarily since they still get paid 
as the case where they chose to not compete (they would still receive Rs 20 per successful shot). 
Therefore there is no incentive to choose “not compete”.   Therefore a decision to choose “not 
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compete” here would indicate a very strong desire to avoid competition at any cost.  However 
even in this situation most Indian female subjects chose “not compete” when informed that they 
were paired against a male.  On such occasions, the instructions were explained again and 
subjects were informed that they would not lose by choosing “compete” to ensure that the female 
subject had not misunderstood the instructions. However the choice of “not compete” was not an 
uninformed one.  Many female subjects responded that such behavior (competing against a male) 
was not “expected” from them.  It appears that these female subjects have a deep-rooted 
stereotype in their minds – where competing against a male would be considered “improper” 
behavior. Responding in a “correct” manner was more important to them than monetary gain.  
Note that when paired with other females, most female subjects chose “compete”.  
Column (4) in Table E.5 reports the marginal effects from a probit regression to examine 
the choice to compete among the U.S. subjects.  In the U.S., similar to the sessions in India, each 
subject is informed about the gender and race of the paired partner and thereafter asked to decide 
if he or she wants to compete or not before starting to toss the tennis balls.  We examine the 
choices of African American males, African American females and White females relative to the 
White males. We find that the White males choose to compete significantly more than White 
females, African American males and females. This effect is robust to controls such as whether 
the subject has ever played games and how many years they have played, the amount invested in 
the risky investment and demographics.41  
                                                            
41 On average males choose to compete 97% of the time while females choose to compete 92% of the time.  African 
American males choose to compete 94% of the time while all our White male subjects chose to compete. Among the 
females, African Americans choose to compete 89% of the time while the White females chose to compete 97% of 
the time on average. It is surprising that even when subjects had nothing to lose monetarily, about 6% of the subjects 
chose to “not compete”. This was not due to a lack of understanding the instructions. During informal conversations 
with the experimenter, the general reason to choose “not compete” turned out to be either “to not embarrass myself” 
or “not having the confidence to get even one successful shot, let alone beat my partner”.   
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Figures E.2-E3 and E.6-E.7 provide graphical expositions of the decisions to compete 
among the group in India and the US, segregated by gender groups. Figure E.2 examines the 
decision to compete among males in the all-male groups (left panel) vs. their decision in the 
mixed gender groups (right panel) in India.  Figures E.6 examines the decision to compete 
among the males in all-male groups (left panel) vs. their decision in the mixed gender groups 
(right panel) in the U.S. while Figure E.7 examines the decision to compete among the females 
in mixed groups (left panel) vs. their decision in the all-female groups (right panel).  No 
significant differences are found in the decision to compete across any of the paired groups in 
any of these categories.  However we do find striking differences in the decision to compete 
among the Indian females: just 40% choose to compete when paired with males but when paired 
with other females, nearly 71% choose to compete with each other.  
Therefore, we find support for our Stylized Fact I: that the males from both India and the 
U.S. are more competitive compared to females of both countries. Stylized Fact III is not 
supported since both the high and low caste females chose to compete significantly less relative 
to the high and low caste males (column 3 in Table E.5). Stylized Fact VI is rejected since the 
highest level of competition is seen for the white males who choose to compete irrespective of 
who they have been paired with. So competition is high across race groups as well as within race 
groups at least among the males. So our results are: 
Result 2: U.S. males and females compete significantly more while Indian females 
compete significantly less relative to the Indian males. In India, females of either caste 
compete significantly less while low caste males compete insignificantly less than the 
high caste males. In the United States, White males are the most competitive. 
50 
 
Next, we ask a related question: the males may choose to compete more than females; but 
are they really able to perform better? Or is it just over-confidence? If the performance of the 
males is not at par with their decision to compete, we can perhaps attribute their decision to 
compete to over confidence.  To examine performance in the competition round we use a 
Negative Binomial model where the dependent variable is a non-negative count variable.  Table 
E.6 examines the actual performance during the competition round could generate values that are 
as follows: 0, 1, 2, 3 …10, depending on the number of tennis balls the subject manages to toss 
into the bucket, hence a negative binomial model is appropriate here. Column (1) examines the 
pooled data where males from both countries are found to perform significantly better relative to 
females from either country. In India (column (3)), high caste females perform significantly 
worse relative to all other categories while performance of the African American females is 
significantly worse relative to the other categories in the US.  
Performance in the Cooperation Round 
We have found that the males in our sample choose to compete more and perform better 
in the competition round; now we want to examine whether females are more cooperative 
relative to males.  We want to check whether performance of the females is better compared to 
the performance of the males in this round. In other words, we ask the question whether the 
females able to coordinate better across the rounds - compared to the males.  As mentioned 
before, we consider “cooperation” to be the same as “being able to coordinate with the paired 
group member”.  We reiterate that here we consider “cooperation” to be the same as “being able 
to coordinate with the paired group member” which would earn both members the maximum 
amount of money.  
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We conduct an ordered probit analysis to further examine the individual level of 
cooperation in Table E.7. We create a new dependent variable, the “cooperation” variable which 
can take any value between 0 and10 depending on how many rounds the subjects managed to 
cooperate (and coordinate so that each gets a high payoff).42  Once again, we examine the results 
from the pooled data first and then examine the results from India and the U.S. separately.  
Column (2) in Table E.7 reports the results from the pooled data. We find that both 
groups of females (from India and the US) are found to cooperate significantly less relative to the 
Indian males while the U.S. males cooperate insignificantly less. This result is robust to 
controlling for all the demographic variables.  Column (3) reports the results from India where 
the omitted category is high caste males. High caste females are found to cooperate significantly 
less relative to the high caste males while the effects for low caste males and females are 
insignificant.  Column (4) reports the results only for the U.S. where we find that all categories - 
African American males, African American females and White females cooperate significantly 
less relative to the White males. 
Result 3: Females cooperate significantly less irrespective of country, U.S. males 
cooperate insignificantly less relative to Indian males. In India, high caste females 
cooperate significantly less; low caste males and females cooperate insignificantly less 
relative to then high caste males. In the United States, White males cooperate more than 
everyone else.  
Whether a subject decides to cooperate or not may depend of who the paired partner is. In 
other words, the same subject may choose to cooperate in one group while choosing to not 
cooperate in a different group. Evidence of differential behavior is available from the (Cox, 
                                                            
42 So for example, if a group managed to cooperate (and coordinate) in 6 out of the 10 rounds, they get 6 for this 
round.  
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Sadiraj, & Sen, 2014)paper across the different castes. What we have examined in Table E.7 is 
the individual propensity to cooperate; next we will examine behavior across the different 
groups.  
Tables E.8 and E.9 examine the cooperation in the different groups in India and the U.S. 
respectively.  Table E.8 examines the effect of cooperation across different gender-caste groups.  
Our omitted category is the group of high caste females with low caste females. We note 
significantly higher levels of cooperation among the following groups: Low caste males with low 
caste males; Low caste males with low caste females; High caste males with high caste males; 
High caste males with high caste females; High caste males with low caste males; High caste 
males with low caste females and High caste females with low caste males – all relative to the 
omitted group of high caste females with low caste females.  Surprisingly we find that the levels 
of cooperation among the all-female groups: low caste females with low caste females and high 
caste fem ales with high caste females are insignificantly different relative to the omitted group.  
Table E.9 examines the effect of cooperation across different gender-race groups.  The 
omitted category is the group where African American males interact with other African 
American males. We find that relative to the omitted category, cooperation is significantly higher 
among the following groups: when we have White males paired with other White males, White 
males paired with White females, White females paired with other White females, White males 
paired with African American males and White males paired with African American females. On 
the other hand, the remaining categories (African American males paired with African American 
females, African American females paired with other African American females, White females 
with African American males, White females with African American females and the case of no 
gender-race information) have positive coefficients but none of these coefficients are significant. 
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Therefore, the level of cooperation among these groups is statistically indistinguishable from the 
group that pairs African American males with African American males. 
Result 4: Significantly higher levels of cooperation are determined among the all-male 
groups and the mixed groups, relative to all-female groups, irrespective of caste in India. 
In the United States, we find significantly higher levels of cooperation among the groups 
with White males, relative to any group without White males. 
Figures E.4-E.5 and E.8-E.9 provide graphical expositions of the decision to cooperate 
among the group in India and the US, segregated by gender groups. Figure E.4 examines the 
decision to cooperate among males in the all-male groups (left panel) vs. their decision in the 
mixed gender groups (right panel) in India. Once again, the striking differences are seen among 
the level of cooperation by Indian females in the mixed gender vs. the all-female groups. 
Females show more cooperative spirit when they are paired with males, but the level of 
cooperation drops drastically when paired with other females. 
Therefore, we reject our Stylized Fact II and find the counter-intuitive result that females 
are less cooperative (especially against other females) compared to their male counterparts at 
least in India.  In the U.S., females belonging to both races are less cooperative compared to 
White males but their level of cooperation is statistically indistinguishable from the African 
American males.  
We also find partial support for our Stylized Fact IV: high caste males (always) and low 
caste males (mostly) tend to cooperate at significantly higher levels compared to high caste 
females. The level of cooperation among low caste females is found to be insignificantly greater 
compared to the high caste females. Stylized Fact V is also partially supported: cooperation is 
higher within one race (White) compared to the other (African American); yet we find evidence 
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of significant inter-race cooperation when White males are paired with either African American 
males or with African American females. We also get a positive (insignificant) effect when 
White females are paired with African American males or females. Therefore our results are: 
Since the sample from the United States consists of subjects mostly under the age of 25, 
we conducted additional analysis with just the sample of subjects from both countries who are 
less than 25 years of age. Appendix F reports the results from this additional analysis for all our 
three experimental rounds. Our qualitative results do not change and in fact, become stronger in 
several situations. In competition, we still find that males in the U.S. choose to compete 
significantly more than Indian males while Indian females choose to compete significantly less. 
We still find that females in India choose to compete significantly less relative to the males, 
regardless of caste while White males choose to compete the most relative to any other groups in 
the US.  In cooperation, males from either country cooperate significantly more than the U.S. 
females. The coefficient for Indian females is negative but not significant at conventional levels 
(11.6%). High caste females cooperate significantly less in India while in the U.S. once again, 
White males cooperate significantly more than all other categories. In cooperation groups with 
all males (from either caste or either race) or males with females cooperate significantly more 
than the all-female groups in both countries.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted an experiment to examine competition and cooperation 
across genders and castes in rural India and compared the data with similar experiments 
conducted in the U.S. to examine gender-race interactions.  We tested the hypotheses that males 
will compete more, while the females will exhibit a higher level of cooperation in either country.  
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In India we find evidence that males of either caste choose to compete more relative to 
higher caste female subjects. Females choose to compete less. Both males and females made 
their decision to compete (or not) based on the gender of the paired group member.  Females 
eagerly compete against other females; yet they refuse to compete against males.  As mentioned 
before, choosing to not compete against males is not due to a lack of understanding of the 
instructions. This result is similar to what Laury et al (2013) find across single gender and coed 
schools: younger women in single gender schools compete more compared to their counterparts 
from coed schools in Georgia, USA.  In cooperation, our regression results indicate that the high 
caste males always cooperate significantly more compared to all other groups.  The level of 
cooperation among the low caste (males and females) is insignificantly higher relative to the high 
caste females.  We find the counterintuitive result that females cooperate more when paired with 
males, yet the level of cooperation drops drastically when paired with other females. 
In the US, we tested competition and cooperation among a group of undergraduates. We 
find that both White and African American males choose to compete far more than females. 
White males choose to compete more in the competition task. In terms of cooperation, White 
males exhibit the highest level of cooperation among all possible gender and race categories 
regardless of who they are paired with. All other gender-race categories: White females, African 
American males and females cooperate with certain race-gender categories but not with others. 
Therefore the White males fare the best in our experiment since they choose to compete the most 
and are universally cooperative.  
 Our results in competition are part of a vast literature that documents males choose to 
compete more than females. We add to that literature by including the gender – caste and gender-
race interactions. In terms of cooperation, our results are in line with Solow and Kirkwood 
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(2002), who find no evidence that women are less likely to free-ride.  We do not find support for 
Eckel’s (1998) claim that women are more likely to choose more equal distributions, nor Sell et 
al (1993) who say that the sex of the partner and sex composition of the group had no significant 
effects upon individuals' contributions to the group.   
Our Indian results are closest to the outcomes from the Spanish public examinations 
reported by Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010), who find that while the male candidates benefit 
when randomly assigned to committees with a larger number of female evaluators; but female 
candidates are relatively less likely to succeed in such circumstances. Therefore, instead of the 
so-called `glass ceiling' (perception that males drive discrimination against women), they find 
evidence of a different kind of discrimination: it is actually the females driving the 
discrimination against other females. This appears to be a gender confirmation of a well-
documented psychological feature called Stereotype threat -the risk of confirming to a negative 
stereotype about one's group. Steele & Aronson (1995) showed that African American college 
freshmen and sophomores performed poorly on standardized tests compared to White students 
when race was emphasized.  In our experiment, we find something similar: our Indian female 
subjects compete more and cooperate less against other females relative to males. 43  
Across both countries, we find strikingly similar behavior among the males in 
competition: in both India and the US, they choose to compete more than females irrespective of 
caste or race. We also find that in both countries the sex of the partner and sex composition of 
the group matters a lot.44 In terms of cooperation, we find high caste Indian males exhibit 
                                                            
43 Our findings have policy implications for India, especially since the discussion about the Equal Opportunities 
Commission on minorities has recently been revived.  Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) point to the Spanish 
Equality Law that imposes gender parity across all Spanish recruiting committees; yet such policies can be counter-
productive. In light of the ongoing debate regarding the Equal Opportunities Commission in India, such possible 
adverse issues need to be carefully considered before imposing any equality laws.  
44 This result is similar to the findings of Gneezy et al (2003).   
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maximum levels of cooperation which may be compared to the high degree of cooperation 
shown by the White males.  Yet we do note an important distinction in the cooperation results 
between the Indian females and the U.S. females - the American females choose to compete as 
well as cooperate when paired with males or females, irrespective of race. Our female subjects 
from rural India compete much less when paired against males, even when there is no incentive 
to choose not compete; and cooperate more with males (yet they choose to compete more and 
cooperate less with other females). This may be interpreted as a form of inequality aversion 
where the Indian females have an aversion to being paid more than their male counterparts. No 
such gender bias is observed among the U.S. females. The level of cooperation among the 
American females (whether White or African American), though lower relative to the White 
males, is still similar to the level of cooperation among the African American males or females.  
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Chapter III:  Dictates, Ultimatums and Spousal Empowerment in Rural India 
Introduction 
How do people make decisions when they know that their decisions (a) will or (b) will 
not be known to their spouses? Do they behave more efficiently or less? Would it be more or less 
strategically?  In developing countries, the individuals may be subject to risk but absence of 
formal avenues to insure themselves against this risk may lead them to use informal mechanisms 
or choose to pool risk within a household (Robinson, 2012).  If risk is to be shared or pooled 
among the members of a household, it is important to learn how the pooling is done. Does a high 
level of reciprocity exist across members of the same household? Does behavior in experiments 
vary significantly when the individuals are made aware (or not) that the paired person is a 
spouse? Under conventional wisdom, one might assume that there will be higher levels of 
reciprocity and risk-sharing between spouses; yet past evidence (Hoel, 2013; Mani, 2011) 
suggests otherwise. (Mani, 2011) experimented with voluntary contribution mechanism games 
between spouses in rural Andhra Pradesh, India using a within-subjects design and found that 
men do not maximize household income in 31-51% of decisions while women behave 
inefficiently in 9-28% of decisions. Surprisingly, (Mani, 2011) also finds that men in rural South 
India are willing to undercut their own income to reduce their wives’ incomes. (Hoel, 2013) used 
a within-subjects design to test efficiency and perfect information between spouses in Kenya and 
finds that 37% of people give more when their choice will be revealed to their spouse, but 13% 
are more generous when their decision remains hidden. People who are generous in public but 
selfish in secret behave less efficiently in secret when their spouse is more aware of their 
finances. Note that both (Hoel, 2013) and (Mani, 2011) have used a within-subjects design with 
each subject facing multiple decisions across several treatments, which possibly creates cross 
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task contamination (Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt, 2014). One can also have heterogeneous 
preferences among the members in a household. (Schaner, 2012) examines the question of 
whether heterogeneous discount rates lead individuals to take costly action to manipulate the 
intra-household resource allocation in terms of savings behavior and determines that the couples 
who are poorly matched on discount factors forgo at least 58 percent more potential interest 
earnings when compared to their better matched peers. Therefore it is of great importance to 
understand how individuals allocate or reciprocate when they are partnered with their own 
spouses.   
(Cox, Sadiraj, & Sen, 2014) conducted asymmetric voluntary contributions and common 
pool resource games using the exogenous variation across the Indian caste system and find an 
absence of payoff-enhancing cooperation when the low caste subjects interact with other low 
caste subjects. The highest level of efficiency occurred when high caste subjects interacted with 
other high caste subjects. Mixed-caste groups achieved intermediate efficiency.  In their 
experiment, however, subjects who are strangers to each other were placed into groups in that 
experiment. In the current experiment we study whether higher levels of reciprocity are exhibited 
when we have spouses as subjects. 
To better understand the dynamics, we conducted artifactual field experiments45 with 
different forms of the dictator and ultimatum games in a between-subjects study of spouses in 
rural West Bengal, India. The games we use in this experiment are adapted from (Shor, 2007) 
who re-examines the idea of fairness by bringing in procedural justice into the frame. They play 
the standard ultimatum and dictator games, but in addition they have two variations of the 
normal dictator and ultimatum games. The first variation is a dictator game with role choice 
where the first mover is given the option of being the dictator or giving up the responsibility of 
                                                            
45 Using the classification by (Harrison & List, 2004) 
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being a dictator to the paired second mover.  The second variation is an empowerment game 
where the first mover has the choice of playing a dictator game (by not empowering the second 
mover) or an ultimatum game by allowing the second mover to have the right of accepting or 
rejecting their proposal. Shor’s results exhibit an interesting pattern in which 17 of 54 subjects 
(31%) chose the second mover to be the dictator; in the empowerment game 33 of 54 subjects 
(61%) chose to give the other player the ability to reject their offer and therefore chose to play an 
ultimatum game rather than a dictator game.  
Similar to the experimental treatments reported in (Shor, 2007), we conducted the normal 
dictator and ultimatum games, as well as the two variations. To examine how individuals behave 
when they know that they are playing against their spouse vs. when they are not made aware of 
that fact, we played two treatments for each game.  In each of the first treatments subjects were 
told that the paired person was their spouse. In the second treatment, subjects were not informed 
that they were playing with their spouse.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the conceptual 
framework that guides the experimental design. As well as how these experiments were 
implemented in the field. Section III describes the testable stylized facts for this experiment; 
Section IV describes the empirical analysis and results and Section V concludes. 
Experiment Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in rural West Bengal. We worked in conjunction with a local 
non-government organization, whose premises were used for our study. For each session, 
approximately 15-20 husband and wife pairs were invited to come to a certain location (a school) 
at a pre-specified date and time. At the time of the invitation, each subject was informed that an 
experiment was being held at the location on the pre-specified date and time.  If they showed up 
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for the experiment with their spouse on time, they would receive the show-up fee of Rs 50. If 
they participated in the experiment, they could earn a lot more.  We conducted 17 sessions. Each 
session had 2 parts – the dictator/ultimatum game followed by the risk control round.  In the 
ultimatum games, we also elicited the beliefs of the FMs.  
Part 1 – Dictator and Ultimatum Games 
We had a total of eight treatments.  Two person groups were formed with both spouses in 
the same group. In four of these treatments, subjects knew that their paired group member was 
their own spouse. In the other four control treatments, information about spouse was not 
provided. All other features remained the same across paired treatments.  
The first two treatments are standard ultimatum games: treatment 1 is with spouse 
information while treatment 2 is without spouse information.  In both these treatments, the first 
mover (FM) is provided an endowment of Rs 400 and may choose to send some money to the 
second mover (SM).  The SM can decide to accept or reject the offer. If the spouse chooses to 
accept the offer, both spouses get paid according to the split proposed by the FM.  But if the SM 
chooses to reject the offer, each spouse just gets the show up fee (Rs 50). Treatment 3 and 4 are 
standard dictator games where treatment 3 is with spouse information while we do not provide 
spouse information in Treatment 4.  In these pair of treatments, the FM is again provided an 
endowment (Rs 400) and may choose to send some money to the SM (spouse). Here, the paired 
SM has no decision to make.  So this will be a case of either a surplus destruction game (as in 
vetos in ultimatum games) or possibly pure redistribution (dictator games). 
The next pair of treatments involves dictator games with role choice. Again, in treatment 
5, spouse information is provided while we do not provide this information in treatment 6.  The 
FM is given the same endowment (Rs 400) as in Treatments 1 and 2 but is now asked to choose 
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whether or not to send money to their paired SM (spouse) – in addition, they will also have the 
choice of whether they would like to be the dictator or give up this right to the SM (spouse). So 
they can behave like a dictator and propose a split for their spouses in which case the spouse 
does not have a say in the decision making process; otherwise they can let their spouse be the 
dictator and allow the spouse to make the decision.  If they give up the power, they have no 
further decision to make; they will have to accept whatever decision is made by their spouse.   
The last two treatments are called empowerment games. Once again spouse information 
is provided in treatment 7 while we do not provide this information in treatment 8.  The FM in 
this pair of treatments is provided the same endowment (Rs 400) and asked to choose whether or 
not to send money to the SM (spouse); however they will also be given the choice of whether 
they would like to empower their spouse or not. If empowered, the spouse can accept their offer 
or reject it.  If they empower their spouse and the spouse accepts the proposed split, both subjects 
get the proposed split, but in case of rejection, each subject will get just the show up fee of Rs 
50.   
We compare behavior in cases where the subject is informed that they are playing against 
their spouse against the situation where they are not informed of the fact that their paired partner 
is actually their own spouse. We ask whether their perceptions of risk and reciprocity change 
when they know that they are playing the game with their spouses. 
Note that the ultimatum game, where the FM may choose to send some money to the SM 
but the SM makes the final decision whether to accept or reject the offer is potentially risky to 
the FM.  A FM with homo economicus preferences can propose to keep all the money for 
himself; however this may be rejected by the SM (as has been shown by experimental data, e.g., 
(Dickinson, 2002).  If the SM rejects the FM’s proposed split, each subject ends up with only the 
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show-up fee. Proposing less than a 50-50 split could pose a risk to the FM and the riskiness of 
the FM’s offer is arguably monotonically increasing with the proportion of the total amount of 
money she proposes to keep for herself. Therefore in the ultimatum games, we elicited the FM 
beliefs as well (see Part 3-Belief elicitation for more details). One may propose an egalitarian 
split because of risk aversion rather than altruism. Compare this scenario with that of a dictator 
game which is a control for the FM’s expectations of rejection by the SM. Since the FM no 
longer has to worry about whether his or her proposed split is accepted or rejected, the risk 
element has been removed from the game – which is one reason why the dictator game is 
constructed as a control for the ultimatum game.  The dictator game is also used as a control 
treatment for the ultimatum game because positive offers in the latter can be motivated by 
altruism as well as risk aversion.  Therefore in our design we also use a risk control task which is 
described below.  
Part 2 - Risk Control Round  
After the dictator/ultimatum round has been completed for all subjects, we play the risk 
round. We adapt the experimental design from (Holt & Laury, 2002) to provide subjects with 
choices over monetary lotteries. Table 1 summarizes the design and parameters.  Subjects are 
informed that they will have to complete 5 tasks and that one of these 5 tasks will be randomly 
selected for payment.  
There are 2 options, A and B.  An option is represented by either a blue bag for option A 
or a red bag for option B.  Each bag has 10 different colored balls representing different payoff 
values.  Subjects are informed right at the start that the number of balls of different colors in the 
5 tasks will be different across the blue and red bags and they should choose accordingly. 
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The blue bag (option A) always has 10 balls which are either green or orange in color.  
Each green ball always represents Rs 200 while each orange ball always represents Rs 160.  On 
the other hand the red bag (option B) always has 10 balls which are either yellow or pink in 
color.  Each yellow ball always represents Rs 385 while each pink ball always represents Rs 10.  
The combinations of the different colored balls in each bag are reported in Table 1.  
For example, consider the implementation of Task 1 from Table 1. For option A 
represented by a blue bag, we placed 3 green balls and 7 orange balls into the bag in front of the 
subjects and explained that if this blue bag is selected and one of the green balls is drawn, the 
subject would receive Rs 200.  On the other hand, if one of the orange balls is drawn it would be 
worth Rs 160. Similarly for Task 2 there will be 4 green balls and 6 orange balls.  
Option B is represented by a red bag.  For Task 1, we placed 3 yellow balls and 7 pink 
balls into the red bag and explained that if this red bag is selected and one of the yellow balls 
drawn, it would be worth Rs 385. Similarly, if one of the pink balls is drawn, it would be worth 
Rs 10.  
All subjects in a session were given the instructions for the dictator or ultimatum games 
first and asked to come one by one to a separate room to make their decisions in private.  
Afterwards they were asked to return and sit in the main room. Before the start of the risk round, 
the subjects were provided with a decision sheet which exhibited the five tasks.  First subjects 
were provided the general instructions for the risk round, the blue and the red bags and the 
contents of each bag.  
Thereafter they were informed and shown the color combinations of the 10 balls 
representing different payoff values in the blue and red bags for the first task.  They were told 
that they would have to indicate which bag they would prefer for this task.  A subject could pick 
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either option A if they liked the blue bag or option B if they liked the red bag. Volunteers from 
the NGO made sure subjects did not chat or interact with other and made their own decisions. If 
a subject had questions, they were asked to raise their hand and the experimenter explained or 
clarified instructions once again.  Next we checked every subject’s decision sheet to ensure that 
the task had been completed and thereafter we went on to the second task. 
 After all 5 tasks had been completed for all subjects in a similar fashion, we called each 
subject one by one to the private room once again and one of the 5 tasks was selected at random 
for each subject by picking up one of five numbered white balls – note that these balls are white, 
numbered and different from the ones used in the blue or red bags. The differences were also 
clearly pointed out to all subjects to avoid confusion.  Thereafter the task chosen (by one of the 
white numbered balls) was played out for real money in front of the subject.  The blue or red bag 
(as chosen by the subject for that task) was filled with the specific color combination for that 
particular task and the subject was asked to pick up one ball from the bag albeit without looking 
inside.  Depending on the color of the ball picked up, the subject received payment for the risk 
round. 
The purpose of the risk control task was to elicit risk preferences which will allow us to 
estimate the subject’s coefficient of risk aversion to complement the data from the dictator and 
ultimatum games.  Therefore we used a shortened version of the original (Holt & Laury, 2002) 
ten lottery choices. We reduced the number of possible classifications to five (from the original 
nine in (Holt & Laury, 2002), Table 3, pg. 1649) in order to make the one-on-one oral elicitation 
of option choices more manageable.  However what we cut off are two risk preference 
classifications at the top (highly risk loving and very risk loving) and the two risk preference 
classifications at the bottom (highly risk averse and “stay in bed”). The total percentage of 
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choices in these four rows in (Holt & Laury, 2002), Table 3 is 6%. Using our data, we can 
estimate whether the subject’s risk preferences are risk loving, risk neutral, slightly risk averse, 
risk averse or very risk averse.46 
Part 1A - Belief Elicitation 
This applies only to the FMs in Ultimatum games (Treatments 1, 2) and in Treatments 7 
and 8 (if the SM had been empowered). This is not applicable for the SMs in Ultimatum games, 
for anyone in Dictator Games (Treatments 3 and 4) or in the Dictator games with role choice 
(Treatments 5 and 6). The risk round is played after belief has been elicited in applicable cases.  
The following questions from Table 2 were asked after the decision of the split had been 
made: “I will ask you some questions about whether your spouse/paired person B will accept the 
proposed split. There is no right or wrong answer – I just want to know what you think.  Please 
answer any one: whether you agree strongly OR agree OR disagree OR disagree strongly 
whether the spouse/paired person B will accept. You can get an additional Rs 100 if you tell me 
what you think.”    
We followed the payoff protocol “pay all sequentially” for this experiment. So subjects were 
paid for both rounds (dictator or ultimatum and the risk round) and were informed about their 
payments at the end of each round. In the games where the belief was elicited, subjects received 
the payment for specifying their beliefs as well. Instructions may be found in Appendix K. 
Testable Stylized Facts for this Experiment 
Previous research has found certain stylized facts regarding spousal behavior across different 
countries. We will try to examine whether these stylized facts are true for our experiment as well. 
These stylized facts are as follows: 
                                                            
46 We will note here that we are not reporting results from the risk round since about 51% of our entire subject pool 
switched multiple times suggesting incomprehension.  
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 Stylized fact 1: Average offers made by FMs in all games will be higher with spouses 
(Treatments 1,3,5 and 7) relative to strangers (Treatments 2,4,6 and 8).  
This is derived from previous artifactual field experiments conducted across several 
developing countries that suggest that spouses behave strategically depending on whether (or 
not) the information of their behavior is available to their spouse. 47 
Stylized fact 2:  Across all treatments, the female spouses will make average offers that are 
higher relative to the average offers made by the male spouses.   
This is derived from previous work by Mani (2011) which suggests that the husbands 
undercut their own income to reduce the income of their wives in southern India while Ashraf 
(2009) finds that in rural Philippines husbands put money into personal accounts in private 
decision-making but when required to communicate, they prefer wives’ accounts.   
 
Experimental Results 
Average Offers by Treatment 
Table I.3 provides a comparison of the average offers made by the FMs in the Ultimatum 
games, Dictator games, Dictator with Role Choice games and Empowerment games when the 
subjects may or may not know that they are playing with their spouses. In all treatments, subjects 
make higher average offers when they know that they are playing with their spouses rather than 
when they are not made aware that the SM is in fact their own spouse. Column (2) provides 
information about when the offers are significantly different across games with and without 
spouse information. Treatments differ for the ultimatum games: with and without spouse 
information; the dictator game with role choice- when the FMs keep the Dictator role for 
themselves as well as the SM is given the responsibility of a dictator by the FM as well as when 
                                                            
47 See (Ashraf, 2009; Hoel, 2013; Mani, 2011) among others. 
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the dictators choose to play the ultimatum game in the Empowerment games. We also test the 
equality of average offers across each pair of games (this is reported in spare brackets in column 
(2) for each pair of games). We find significantly different behavior with and without spouse 
information in the following treatments - ultimatum games, the dictator with role choice game – 
both when the dictator role is retained by the FM as well as when the FM decides to give up this 
role to the SM as well as in the empowerment games when FMs decide to play the ultimatum 
game. However the amounts offered by FMs when they know that they are playing with their 
spouse in unanimously higher compared to when this information is not made public. So in fact 
we find support for our Stylized Fact 1 since people do seem to care about offering a higher 
amount of money when they know that they have been paired with their own spouse relative to 
when they are not made aware of that fact.   
Columns (3) and (4) of Table I.3 examine the average offers by male and female spouses 
while column (5) examines the equality of these offers. In nearly all cases, the male spouses 
make higher offers relative to female spouses. The only exception is the treatment of dictator 
games without any spouse information where male FMs offer about 28% of their endowment but 
female FMs offer nothing. Thus we find evidence that male FMs are actually found to make 
higher offers on average relative to the female FMs and hence we can reject Stylized Fact 2. 
We analyze further to examine the Stylized Facts. Figures I.1-I.4 show the average offers 
made by FMs across all 8 treatments, segregated by gender.  The left panel (odd numbers) in all 
panels provides information of average offers when spouse information is publicly available 
while the right panel (even numbers) provides information of average offers when spouse 
information is not publicly available.  Figure I.1 shows the average offers in the Ultimatum 
Game when subjects are given the information that their paired partner is their spouse (Treatment 
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1) and when they are not provided the spouse information (Treatment 2). When spouse 
information is provided, 81% of the subjects send Rs 200 which is exactly half of their 
endowment.  Another 9.5% choose to send their entire endowment. In Treatment 2 when spouse 
information is not provided, almost 62% of the subjects choose to send Rs 0 while 38% send Rs 
200. 
In a dictator game with spouse information (Treatment 3), 62.5% of subjects choose to offer 
nothing to their spouses while 18.75% offer Rs 200. 6.25% offer Rs 100 and another 12.5% offer 
Rs 300. When subjects are not aware that they are playing against their spouse, 75% choose to 
offer nothing while 16.67% offer Rs 200. 4% offer Rs 250 while another 4% offer Rs 350. 
Figure I.3 shows that in the dictator game where the FMs are offered the choice of role as 
“dictator” or to give up this role (Treatment 5), 41% of FMs chose to give the power of being a 
dictator to their spouses (20 FMs out of 49) while only 18.75% (9 out of 48 FMs) gave the power 
when they did not know that they were playing with their spouse in Treatment 6. Figure I.4 
indicates that among the 59% of the FMs who chose to not give any power to their spouses in 
Treatment 5 (n=29), 62% gave nothing 17.24% gave Rs 200, 10.34% gave Rs 150 while about 
7% gave Rs 100 and 3% gave Rs 300.  In Treatment 6 when subjects are not made aware of the 
fact that they are playing with their spouses, 87.18% of FMs gave nothing while 7.69% gave Rs 
200.48 Therefore while FMs give more when they know that they are paired with their spouses 
(relative to when this is unknown), the male spouses actually offer more rather than the female 
spouses.     
So our main results are: 
Result 1:  The FMs make the highest offers (69% of endowment) in Empowerment 
Games when FM gave power to reject to the Spouse. The male and female FMs make 
                                                            
48 Further information about the break ups and histograms may be found in the Appendix J.  
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highest offers (74% of endowment from the male FMs; 68% of endowment from the females) in 
the same Empowerment Games with spouse information.  
Result 2:  The FMs make the lowest offers (4.81% of endowment) in the Dictator with 
Role choice Games when FM kept dictator role for themselves and in the Empowerment 
Game when FM did not give power to reject to spouse (4.89% of endowment).  Lowest 
offers by Male Spouses happen in the Empowerment Games (6.25% of endowment) 
when FM did not give power to reject to their spouses while female FMs make lowest 
offers in Dictator Games with no Spouse information  and Empowerment Game when 
FM did not give power to reject to spouses. In both cases, female FMs offer nothing.  
Table I.4 provides an OLS regression to further examine these issues. Column (2) examines 
the behavior of the full sample when spouse information is provided to the subjects while 
column (3) examines the behavior of the full sample when spouse information is not provided. In 
column (2), relative to the omitted category (dictator games), subjects make higher offers in the 
Ultimatum Games and the Empowerment Games. In column (2), we also find that significantly 
lower offers are made to their spouses by college-educated FMs and by subjects who are over the 
age of 40. In column (3), we find that significantly higher offers are made by male FMs, while 
significantly lower offers are made by subjects who either have one or more daughters or live in 
a joint family (with their in-laws).  
In games where we provide spouse information, male spouses make significantly higher 
offers in the Ultimatum Games and the Empowerment Games while they make significantly 
lower offers if they are college educated or if they are over the age of 40. On the other hand, 
female spouses make significantly higher offers in the Ultimatum Games and significantly lower 
offers if they are college educated.  
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  In games where we withhold the information about spouses, we find that male spouses 
make significantly higher offers if they are college educated. Both male and female spouses offer 
significantly less if they have one or more daughters.  
Behavior in Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
Table I.5 examines the FM behavior in the ultimatum and dictator games. In the paired 
ultimatum games (with and without spouse information), we find that subjects offer significantly 
more when the spouse knowledge is made public, relative to the omitted category (ultimatum 
without spouse information). Female spouses also offer significantly more when knowledge of 
spouse is known to them, relative to when they do not know this information. Female spouses 
offer significantly less when they have one or more sons, while Muslim wives offer significantly 
more to their husbands.  In the ultimatum games without spouse information, 3 out of 14 SMs 
rejected the offer from their paired FMs. No rejections happened when the SM knew that the 
paired FM was their own spouse. 
In the paired dictator games (with and without spouse information), we find that subjects 
offer insignificantly more when the spouse knowledge is made public, relative to the omitted 
category (dictator without spouse information). However female spouses do offer significantly 
more when the spouse knowledge is made public, relative to when they do not know the identity 
of paired SMs.  
Behavior in Dictator with Role Choice and Empowerment Games 
Next we examine whether FMs are more likely to give decision-making power to 
strangers in Treatment 6 than to their spouses in Treatment 5 or whether the FMs will empower 
strangers in Treatment 8 rather than spouses in Treatment 7. 
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First we examine whether FMs choose to give up their role as dictator to the SMs in 
treatments 5 and 6 in Table 6. Note that if a FM gives up the role and make the SM the 
“dictator”, they do not have any other decision to make.  The SM makes the decision of dividing 
the money.  In such cases the FMs will have to accept whatever division is proposed by the SMs. 
On the other hand if the FMs choose not to give up their decision making power, the FMs will 
retain their roles as dictators in such occasions and play the normal dictator game where the SMs 
will have no decision to make. 
In Table I.6, column (2) we report marginal effects from a binary probit analysis that 
examines the FM choices. We find that relative to the case of no-spouse information, there is 
positive likelihood that the FMs give up the decision-making role to the SMs when the FMs 
know that they are playing with their spouses. This is however insignificant. The choice to 
remain as the dictator is not found to be dependent on whether the spouse is male or female, 
number of sons or daughters, the level of education or years married. Low caste Hindus and 
Muslims are found to be significantly more likely to give up the decision-making power to their 
spouses relative to the omitted category of high caste Hindus. Subjects in the age range of 25 or 
less are also found to be significantly more likely to give up the decision-making power to their 
spouses relative to the older FMs.  
If FMs choose to remain as dictators, how much do they offer their paired SMs? Column 
(3) provides this information. Relative to the no-spouse case, FMs make insignificantly higher 
offers when they are know that they are paired with their spouses. The amount offered by the 
FMs does not appear to depend on the gender, level of education, number of children, family 
status (joint or nuclear), number of years married, age range or the religion and caste 
composition of the subjects.  
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Column (3) examines the offers made by SMs when they have been provided the 
decision-making power by the FMs. These SMs reciprocate by offering a significantly higher 
amount when they know that their spouses have given them this power (relative to when they do 
not know this fact). Similar to the case of the FMs, the amount offered does not appear to depend 
on the gender, level of education, number of children, family status (joint or nuclear), number of 
years married, age range or the religion and caste composition of the decision makers.  
Result 3: In Dictator with Role Choice Game, FMs are insignificantly more likely to 
remain as dictators when they know that they are playing with their spouses. SMs who 
are given decision-making power by their spouses (FMs) and are aware that the FMs are 
their own spouses return significantly higher amounts to their paired FMs. 
Next we examine the behavior of the FMs who choose to empower (or not) their spouses 
by deciding to play the ultimatum game (or dictator game). Note that if the FMs choose to 
empower the SMs, this will make the game into an ultimatum game since the empowered SM 
can choose to accept or reject the proposed split. On the other hand if the FM chooses not to 
empower the SM, then the game is converted to a dictator game where the FM retains full 
control over the endowment.   
Table I.7 examines the FM decisions in Empowerment Games. Column (2) of Table 7 
reports the first decision made by the FMs. We find that there is significantly positive likelihood 
that the FMs empower the SMs when FMs know that they are playing with their spouses in the 
Empowerment Game with Spouse Information. This effect is irrespective of whether we consider 
the male or female FMs. Subjects with some level of education (either school or college) and low 
caste Hindus are significantly more likely to empower their paired SMs (relative to subjects with 
no education and high caste Hindus, respectively). Having one or more daughters (relative to 
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having no daughters), one or more sons (relative to having no sons), living in a joint family with 
in-laws (relative to living in a nuclear family) or being in the 25 years or less age bracket 
(relative to the age range 25-40 years) implies that the FM is significantly less likely to empower 
the SM. When the ultimatum game is played, subjects who have one or more daughters make 
significantly higher offers relative to the subjects who have no daughters.49 So our main results 
are: 
Result 4:  In Empowerment Games, FMs are significantly more likely to empower 
spouses when they have spouse information. Having more children, living in a joint 
family or being younger implies a significantly lower likelihood that the SM is 
empowered relative to FMs who have no children, live in nuclear families or are 
older.  
The Empowerment Games involves a choice of whether or not to be a dictator or to play the 
dictator game.  In additional analysis, we include the number of safe choices in the risk game by 
a subject in the regressions. Our hypothesis is that, all else equal, higher risk aversion will imply 
a higher likelihood of choosing the dictator game.  Table I.8 reports results from the 
Empowerment Game regressions and includes the number of safe choices in the risk game by a 
subject. In the Empowerment Game, we find that higher risk aversion (implying more safe 
choices are made) is associated with a higher likelihood of choosing to play the dictator game. 
Therefore our final result is: 
Result 5: All else equal, higher risk aversion is associated with a higher likelihood of 
choosing to play the dictator. 
                                                            
49 In regressions not reported here, we check whether having more sons or daughter or both decreases the likelihood 
of empowerment or the amount being offered. We find that having more sons or more daughters implies a 
significantly higher likelihood that the subject chooses not to empower the SM. However the number of children 
does not have any effect on the amount that is offered.  
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Conclusion 
We examine how spouses behave when they may or may not be aware that their decisions are 
known to their spouses.  We asked whether a high level of reciprocity exists across members of 
the same household and whether behavior in experiments varies significantly when the 
individuals are made aware (or not) that the paired person is a spouse.  To answer these questions 
we played artifactual field experiments using the dictator, ultimatum and variations of these 
games using two-person groups (spouses) of villagers in rural West Bengal, India.  
Our results indicate that when subjects know that they are playing with their spouses, they 
make significantly higher offers on average (33.69% of endowment) to their spouse relative to 
when they are not aware of the fact (13.49% of endowment). This is in line with previous 
evidence from the Philippines (Ashraf, 2009) and (Hoel, 2013).  In the two new variations we 
have used, the dictator with role choice games and the empowerment games, subjects show a 
higher likelihood of providing decision-making power to their spouses (in role choice games) or 
empowering their spouses (in the empowerment games) when they know that they paired with 
their spouses relative to when they are not made aware of that fact.  Similarly when the SMs 
know that they have been provided decision-making power (role choice games) or empowered 
(empowerment games) by their spouses, they reciprocate more relative to when they do not 
know this fact. However contrary to previous literature, we find that the female spouses will 
make offers that are lower on average relative to the ones made by the male spouses.50Average 
offers by male spouses are significantly higher offers on average (28.29% of endowment) 
relative to the ones by the female spouses (17.08% of endowment). 
                                                            
50 In informal conversations with the experimenter after decisions had been made, female subjects gave some 
behavioral insights into why they had shown somewhat “un-altruistic” behavior. The mount retained by a female 
FM was more likely to be spent on a microfinance project or their children’s welfare. Money provided to their 
husbands was more often than not spent in a myriad of non-efficient ways and was hence wasted.  
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We also find that the divisions in these games (with no spouse information) are actually far 
less equitable than traditional dictator games as reported in (Shor, 2007). For example, in the two 
new variations we have used here, FMs make an average offer of just 5.47% of their endowment 
in the dictator with role choice game while the average offer in the empowerment game is 18% 
of their endowment when they are not aware of the fact that they are playing with their spouses. 
When they know that their paired partner is their spouse, their average offers are 26.79% (role 
choice game) and 38.78% (empowerment game) of their endowment.   
In addition we find that when subjects are unaware that they are playing with their spouse, 
they choose to keep the dictator role for themselves or not to empower the other player. 18.75% 
of the FMs chose to empower the SMs in the role choice game while the number of FMs who 
empowered SMs was 28% when no spouse information was provided to anyone. Compare that to 
the 40.82% and 51.02% of FMs who made their spouses the dictators in the Role Choice games 
or empowered their spouses in the Empowerment games when they knew that they were actually 
playing with their spouses.  Therefore we find support for subjects’ concern for distributive 
fairness but not procedural fairness. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Theoretical Results in Chapter I 
 
We will use capital letters for vectors and s for the second mover. Let e be the initial Private 
Fund endowment of each player in the public good game and ne be the initial Group Fund 
endowment in the common pool game. Let m denote the marginal effect of player i’s action on 
the Group Fund. Let wtp(  ) denote the willingness to pay of player i with respect to player j, that 
is, 
( )( )
( )
i
ij
j
uwtp
u
   .  
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that player i’s payoff in the public good game when the vector 
of contributions is P, equals player i’s payoff in the common pool game when the vector of 
appropriations is, A E  P , verified as follows  
 icp (A)  e pi  1n (nem (e p j )j )  e pi 
1
n
(m (e  e p j )
j
 )
 e pi  1n (m p jj )   i
pg (P)        (A.1)
 
For player s (the second mover), then the best reply in the common pool game to appropriation 
vector As  E  P s satisfies e brs pg (Ps )  brscp (E  Ps ) as for all feasible appropriations, y one 
has  
 
 scp (E  Ps ,e brs pg (Ps ))   s pg (Ps ,brs pg (Ps ))
  s pg (Ps ,e y)   scp (E  Ps , y)                 (A.2)
 
where the first and the second equalities follow from statement (A.1) whereas the inequality 
follows from brs
pg (P s )being the best response to provision vector P-s in the public good game.  
It follows from statements (A.1) and (A.2) that P  (Ps , Br pg ( Xs )) is a SPE in the public good 
game iff A  (E  Ps , E  Br pg (E  Xs )) is a SPE in the common pool game. This together with 
player i’s payoffs from a vector of appropriations, A (=E-P) in the common pool game and from  
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the vector of contributions, P in the public good game being identical, imply that efficiency and 
the inequality index of payoff distributions are the same across games.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume convex preferences. Let P be the most efficient SPE in the 
public good game. Then (at an interior solution) for all (first movers) i, 
 
wtpij
j
 ( (P)) br(Ps )pi (1 wtpij ( (P)) (js
n
m
1)wtpis( (P))  nm 1     (A.3) 
where Ps=br(P-s) is a solution to the following equation 
wtpsi
pg ( (Ps ,br(Ps ))
is
 )  nm 1.                                          (A.4) 
Let Fi ( P )  denote the expression on the left-hand-side of the first equation. By Axioms S and R 
(see Cox et al. 2013), for all i, wtpsi
pg (Y )  wtpsicp(Y ),Y . Hence  
wtpsi
cp ( (E  Ps , E  br(E  Ps ))
is
 )  nm 1                           (A.5) 
By convexity, the second mover can increase the value of the left-hand-side of the last inequality 
by increasing his appropriation, as by doing so the second movers’ payoff increases whereas 
others’ payoffs decrease. By payoff equivalence, an increase in appropriations in the common 
pool game is equivalent to a decrease in “contributions” in the public good game, hence  
e Ascp(E  Ps )  Pscp  Ps pg
                                             (A.6)
 
Note that the relation between the vector of payoffs,  (P)  in the public good game and the one 
in the appropriation game at the (new) vector of contributions, (E  Ps , Ascp )  is  
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 cp (E  P s , Acp )    ( mn ,
m
n
1) ,  
where   Ascp  (e Ps )  0. Using the last statement and notation Fi ( P )  (below (A.4)) we get 
 
Fi ( cp (E  Ps , Acp ))  Fi(  ( mn ,
m
n
1) )
 
For separable preferences, i.e. Ui ( )  ui( i ) vi ( j )
j
  with wtpij (.)  ui( i )vi ( j )  positively 
monotonic on identical amounts of increase in   
payoffs, wtpij ( i   , j   )  wtpij ( i , j ), i , j ,one has  
 
Fi ( cp (E  Ps , Acp ))  F(  ( mn ,
m
n
1) )  F( )  n
m
1 
Therefore, the value of Fi ( cp (E  Ps , Acp )) increases if the first mover i leaves less in the Group 
Fund. Hence, the common pool game is expected to be less efficient than the payoff equivalent 
public good game. 
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Appendix B. Details on Procedures for the Village Experiment in Chapter I 
An individual subject’s decisions were recorded in a separate, private room by the experimenter. 
The final payment at the end of the experiment was handed out to each subject privately and 
separately. Each subject was paid according to what decision he or she had made in the 
experiment as well as the decisions made by the other group members in addition to the Rs 50 
show-up fee.  
The groups were formed based on the caste categories to which each subject belonged. 
Each subject was invited to come to a separate room to make her individual decision in private. 
After each subject came in and took his or her seat in the private room, the experimenter briefly 
explained the procedure and rules once again. Thereafter, the subject was handed a decision 
sheet based on his or her role as first mover or second mover. Across all ten treatments, the 
second mover subject was also informed about the amount of money contributed (PG) to or 
extracted (CP) from the Group Fund by each of the three first movers. The subject was asked to 
carefully consider all the information and thereafter make his or her decision in private. In the 
caste-informed treatments, each subject in a four-person group was informed about the caste 
composition of the other members of the group. No information about the caste of the other 
group members was provided to the subjects in the no-caste-information treatments.  
Once the decision had been made and recorded, the experimenter thanked the subject for 
his or her time and asked additional questions. During February 2012, a series of questions about 
household income was asked after all decisions had been made. However, we will not use these 
income figures in this analysis because the data are of low quality. Several subjects mentioned 
that their answers may be incorrect since they were themselves unaware of how much they 
consume out of their own produce and how much they sell. This proportion varies across the 
year – depending on the seasonality of the plant. In such occasions, the experimenter asked for  
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the most recent month and how much they earned during that time, but again, this may not 
reflect the correct figure as some plants grow well during winter months and poorly during 
warmer months. Several Hindu women mentioned that they live in a joint family with the 
families of their brothers-in-law or uncles and are hence unaware of what the total family income 
is. Some subjects admitted that they would not provide their correct income information. In some 
other occasions, the subject would provide a broad range and left the experimenter the task of 
guessing an accurate figure. In other cases, the subject would admit that they did not have any 
source of income and they depended on loans from family members or neighbors for sustenance. 
We randomized people from high and low castes into treatments with and without 
information on caste. We focus our data analysis on differences across treatments. The 
treatments are independent of characteristics of the individual subjects, therefore the expected 
interaction of income and the treatment is zero. Hence our estimate of the treatment effect is 
unbiased in the limit. This is supported by our large sample size. Our focus is to test the 
importance of revealing information on caste and whether this contextual cue changes how 
people act. Both the high and the low castes are faced with identical tasks. So we expect that any 
possible effects of unobserved incomes are independent of information on caste.  
We had to overcome difficulties in recruiting lower caste subjects. In order to be able to 
recruit a heterogeneous subject sample, we went to villages with relatively large presence of 
lower caste individuals. However, there were still obstacles to obtaining a good show up rate of 
the lower caste subjects. There were several instances where the husband or father of a female 
lower caste subject would show up at the site, ask to talk to the experimenter (Sen) to ensure that 
his wife or daughter would be interacting with a female experimenter and no male interaction  
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with a male (volunteer or NGO worker) would be required. Only after he was assured that no 
male interaction would occur, the female subject was brought to the site.  
In other locations, we found subjects typically arriving at the experiment site in groups 
with their friends or neighbors. To ensure that subjects did not play strategically believing that 
their friends would be in the same group, we applied the following procedure. The name and 
village of residence of the subjects had been taken down one after the other in the order of arrival 
at the experiment site. Each subject was called by name one after the other to come to the private 
room. However consecutive people being called to the private room were placed in different 
groups. For example, subject numbers 1, 2 and 3 may have come from the same village and be 
called one after the other, but we placed them in different groups –for example subject #1 may be 
the first mover person 1 in Group 1, subject #2 could be the first mover person 1 in Group 2 and 
subject #3 could be the second mover person 1 in Group 3. At the time of explaining the 
instructions of the game, the subjects were clearly informed that they would be in groups 
different from their friends. When a subject came to the private room to make the decision, he or 
she was once again reminded that friends were not in the same group. Subjects may have made 
an assumption of a person’s caste or characteristics when they saw the last person leaving the 
room. To minimize any effects from such observations, subjects were specifically informed that 
the previous person leaving the room would not be in their group. 
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Appendix C: Figures and Tables for Chapter I 
 
Figure C.1. Play Efficiency 51 
 
Figure C.2. Play Efficiency among Caste-informed Villagers 
                                                            
51 DAG represents a dummy for AG or Appropriation Groups. 
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 Figure C.3: Figures for PG games - FM and SM normalized decisions  
 
Figure C.4: Figures for CP games - FM and SM normalized decisions 
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Table C.1. Efficiency, Trust and Conditional Altruism among West Bengali Villagers 
 Efficiency Trust Conditional Altruism 
Game 
 
Composition 
Public 
Good 
Common 
Pool 
Public Good 
Common 
Pool 
Public Good 
Common 
Pool 
No Caste 
Information 
0.45 
(0.34, 0.56) 
0.21*** 
(0.05, 0.37) 
73.57 
(59.23, 87.91) 
{63} 
63.61* 
(57.59, 82.03) 
{54} 
48.57 
(-14.85, 112.00) 
{21} 
-66.39** 
(-144.21, 
11.43) 
Homogenous  
(all High) 
0.57 
(0.45, 0.70) 
0.56 
(0.33, 0.79) 
{15} 
88.33 
(73.42, 
103.25) 
{54} 
93.33 
(74.24, 
112.43) 
78.33 
(11.59, 145.01) 
56 
(-34.75, 
146.75) 
{15} 
Homogenous  
(all Low) 
0.17 
(0.08, 0.26) 
{26} 
0.16 
(0.07, 0.25) 
{20} 
69.81 
(57.59, 82.03) 
{78} 
38.5*** 
(24.21, 52.79) 
[60} 
-107.77 
(-171.16, -
44.38) 
{26} 
-18.75** 
(-77.01, 39.51) 
{20} 
Mixed  
(High SM) 
0.45 
(0.27, 0.63) 
{22} 
0.37 
(0.21, 0.52) 
{25} 
94.77 
(80.47, 
109.08)  
83.20 
(68.54, 97.86) 
{75} 
-13.64 
(-101.84, 74.57) 
{22} 
-30.4 
(-112.23, 
51.43) 
{25} 
Mixed  
(Low SM) 
0.30 
(0.14, 0.46) 
{17} 
0.41 
(0.27, 0.55) 
{20} 
64.11 
(49.45, 78.78) 
{51} 
70.75 
(53.91, 87.59) 
-10.88 
(-87.65, 65.89) 
{17} 
35.75 
(-33.02, 
104.52) 
{20} 
 
Figures in brackets correspond to 95% CI; braces show the number of observations; bold, largest and smallest values in a column. 
Game effect significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). 
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Table C.2. Censored Regressions with clusters at village level:  
Dependent variable is the difference between SM choice and the most selfish 
choice 
Public Good Game Common Pool Game 
Regressors No demographics 
With 
demographics  
No 
demographics 
With 
demographi
cs 
First Mover Choice Effects 
X_Choice_Sum 1.23 1.045 0.58 0.77 
[0.020]** [0.027]** [0.192] [0.101] 
X_Choice_Min -0.94 -0.710 2.55 2.12 
[0.550] [0.634] [0.039]** [0.089]* 
Caste Effects 
Homogenous High 100.10 198.71 203.01 277.36 
[0.168] [0.014]** [0.133] [0.086]* 
Homogenous Low -249.52 -299.35 -62.68 -79.60 
[0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.390] [0.331] 
Demographics 
Male -46.30 -72.57 
[0.527] [0.371] 
Years of education 15.12 9.82 
[0.166] [0.201] 
Married -153.26 -27.73 
[0.119] [0.672] 
High Caste -141.86 -132.63 
[0.100] [0.205] 
Constant 48.23 236.98 -10.84 7.75 
[0.541] [0.164] [0.910] [0.936] 
Observations 99 99  95 95 
Number of clusters 29 29  32 32 
Robust p values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; SEs clustered at village 
level  
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Appendix D: Instructions for PG and CP Games, India in Chapter I 
PG INSTRUCTIONS 
First room: introduction  
Welcome. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.   
I will first read to you the Informed Consent Form.  You can indicate your willingness to 
participate by signing/putting your thumb impression on the form. 
I will now ask you to provide some information about yourself. 
 You full name: 
 Your address/village of residence:  
 Your religion: 
 Your caste: 
 Your age; 
 Your education level: 
 Your marital status: 
 Your current occupation: 
 Your voter id/ tractor/scooter/driving license no. /Ration card number/School leaving 
certificate number 
Thank you very much for providing this information. Please go sit in the room. 
Second room Instructions (where all subjects have been seated) 
 No Talking Allowed  
 You will be asked to make one decision in this experiment and provide answers to a short 
questionnaire. 
 Each person will be matched with 3 other people to form a group. Thus, each group will 
contain 4 individuals. 
 Starting Balances  
Each individual starts with an Individual Fund of 150 INR (provided by our university). 
Each four person group begins with a Group Fund of 0 INR.  
 
Decision Task for each of the 3 Type X Decision Makers in a Group  
o First, the three Type X persons in a group make their decisions. 
o Each Type X person will decide whether or not they want to contribute any 
amount from his/her own Individual Fund to the Group Fund.  
o If the Type X person contributes 15 INR to the Group Fund, his/her Individual 
Fund decreases by 15 INR.   At the same time, the experimenter will add another 
30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund increases by 45 INR. 
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o Each decision must be in multiples of 15.  Maximum contribution is 150 INR per 
person of Type X. 
o So, each Type X person can contribute 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 105, 120, 135, or 
150 INR to the Group Fund, which increases by three times the amount of the 
Type X person’s contribution.  
Decision Task for the 1 Type Y Decision Maker in a Group  
o The Type Y person will be shown the decisions of each of the 3 anonymous Type 
X persons in his/her group.  
o The Type Y person will now decide whether or not to contribute any amount from 
his/her own Individual Fund to the Group Fund OR withdraw any amount from 
the Group Fund that was added by the 3 Type X persons. 
o If the Type Y person withdraws 15 INR from the Group Fund, his/her Individual 
Fund increases by 15 INR. At the same time, the experimenter will withdraw 
another 30 INR from the Group Fund.  So the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
o If the Type Y person contributes 15 INR to the Group Fund, his/her Individual 
Fund decreases by 15 INR. At the same time, the experimenter will add another 
30 INR to the Group Fund.  So the Group Fund increases by 45 INR. 
o Each decision must be in multiples of 15. Maximum contribution is 150 INR. 
o So, the Type Y person can withdraw any amount of 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 105, 
120, 135, 150 ….. up to a total amount of INR that would reduce the value of the 
Group Fund to 0 INR.  
o The Type Y person can contribute any amount of 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 105, 
120, 135, 150.  
Earnings  
o The final value of the Group Fund, after the Type X and Type Y person decisions 
will be divided equally among all individuals in the group.  
o This amount would be added to the amount that the individual has in his/her own 
Individual Fund.  
Thus, a person’s total earnings will equal the final value in his/her own Individual Fund 
plus one-fourth of the final value of the amount left in the Group Fund.  
This decision task will be completed only once.  
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Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends since 
that will not help them – they are in a separate group.  
Are there any questions? 
First room – one to one interaction with the subject: repeated three times for the 3 Type X 
subjects 
Type X subject (repeat 3 times) 
 First, I will verify your information. 
 You are Type X person.  The other Type X members in your group are from caste____, 
the Type Y person is from caste ____.  
 You will now take your decision about how much to contribute to the Group Fund. 
o If you contribute 15 INR, your Individual Fund decreases by 15 INR. At the same 
time, the experimenter will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group 
Fund increases by 45 INR. 
o You can contribute any multiple of 15, such as 0, 15, 30, 45, …, 150. If you send 
150 INR, your Individual Fund decreases by 150 INR. At the same time, the 
experimenter will add another 300 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund 
increases by 450 INR. 
 Whatever is left in the Group Fund after all 3 Type X people and the 1 Type Y person have 
made their decisions will be divided equally among the four people in your group.    
 Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
 Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends 
since that will not help them – they are in a separate group.   
 After you finish, I will ask some additional questions. 
Type Y subject 
 First, I will verify your information.  
 You are Type Y.  The three Type X members in your group are from caste____.   
 The three Type X people in your group have taken the following decisions:  
Type X #1 has chosen to send ____________INR to the Group Fund.   
Type X #2 has chosen to move ____________ INR to the Group Fund.   
Type X #3 has chosen to move ____________ INR to the Group Fund.   
So now the Group Fund has an amount  
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= 3* (Type X person 1’s contribution to the Group Fund + Type X person 2’s contribution to 
the Group Fund + Type X person 3’s contribution to the Group Fund) = 
_____________________________________________INR.   
 You will now take your decision about how much to withdraw from or how much to 
contribute to the Group Fund. 
o If you withdraw 15 INR from the Group Fund, your Individual Fund increases by 
15 INR. At the same time, the experimenter will withdraw another 30 INR from 
the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
o You can withdraw any multiple of 15, such as 15, 30, 45, ….up to a total amount 
of INR that would reduce the value of the Group Fund to 0 INR. 
o If you withdraw 150 INR, your Individual Fund increases by 150 INR. At the same 
time, the experimenter will withdraw another 300 INR from the Group Fund. So 
the Group Fund decreases by 450 INR. 
o If you contribute 15 INR, your Individual Fund decreases by 15 INR. At the same 
time, the experimenter will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group 
Fund increases by 45 INR. 
o You can contribute any multiple of 15, such as 0, 15, 30, 45, …, 150.  
o If you contribute 150 INR, your Individual Fund decreases by 150 INR. At the 
same time, the experimenter will add another 300 INR to the Group Fund. So the 
Group Fund increases by 450 INR. 
 Whatever is left in the Group Fund after your decision will be divided equally among 
yourself and the 3 Type X people in your group.    
 Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet  
 Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends 
since that will not help them – they are in a separate group.  
 After you finish, I will ask some additional questions. 
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PG: Decision Form for Type X #1 Person 
 
Type X #1  
 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you contribute to the Group Fund decreases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund is increased by three times the 
amount you contribute.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to contribute to the Group Fund 
 
 0       15       30         45        60          75         90       105        120       135        150        
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PG: Decision Form for Type X #2 Person 
 
     Type X #2  
 
     Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you contribute to the Group Fund decreases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund is increased by three times the 
amount you contribute.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to contribute to the Group Fund 
 
0       15       30         45        60          75         90       105        120       135        150       
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PG: Decision Form for Type X #3 Person 
 
Type X #3  
 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you contribute to the Group Fund decreases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund is increased by three times the 
amount you contribute.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to contribute to the Group Fund 
 
  0       15       30         45        60          75         90       105        120       135        150        
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PG: Decision Form for Type Y 
Type Y person     Group Number: _____________ 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #1 has chosen to send _______________________INR to the Group Fund.   
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #2 has chosen to send _______________________INR to the Group Fund.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 has chosen to send ________________________INR to the Group Fund.   
So, the Group Fund now has ___________________________________INR 
Recall that each 15 INR that you contribute to the Group Fund decreases the value of your Individual 
Fund by 15 INR. I will add another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund increases by three 
times the amount you contribute.  
Each 15 INR you withdraw from the Group Fund increases the value of your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will withdraw another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by three times 
the amount you withdraw.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group have made their decisions will be 
shared equally by the four people in the group. 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to contribute to the Group Fund: 
      0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150        
OR 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to withdraw from the Group Fund 
0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150 
165         180        195         210       225        240       255       270         285         300 
315         330        345         360       375        390        405        420        435         450 
465         480        495         510       525        540       555       570         585         600 
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CP INSTRUCTIONS 
First room: introduction  
Welcome. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.   
I will first read to you the Informed Consent Form.  You can indicate your willingness to 
participate by signing/putting your thumb impression on the form. 
I will now ask you to provide some information about yourself. 
 You full name: 
 Your address/village of residence:  
 Your religion: 
 Your caste: 
 Your age; 
 Your education level: 
 Your marital status: 
 Your current occupation: 
 Your voter id/ tractor/scooter/driving license no. /Ration card number/School leaving 
certificate number 
Thank you very much for providing this information. Please go sit in the room. 
Second room Instructions (where all subjects have been seated) 
 
 No Talking Allowed  
 You will be asked to make one decision in this experiment and provide answers to a short 
questionnaire. 
 Each person will be matched with 3 other people to form a group. Thus, each group will 
contain 4 individuals. 
 Starting Balances  
Each four person group starts with a Group Fund of 1800 INR (provided by our 
university). Each individual begins with an Individual Fund of 0 INR.  
 Decision Task for the 3 Type X Decision Makers in a Group  
o First, the three Type X persons in a group make their decisions. 
o Each Type X person will decide whether or not to withdraw any money from the 
Group Fund to move to his/her own Individual Fund.  
o If the Type X person withdraws 15 INR from the Group Fund, his/her Individual 
Fund increases by 15 INR.   At the same time, the experimenter will withdraw 
another 30 INR from the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
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o Each decision must be in multiples of 15.  Maximum withdrawal is 150 INR per 
person of Type X. 
o So, each Type X person can withdraw 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 105, 120, 135, or 
150 INR from the Group Fund to move to his/her Individual Fund. The Group 
Fund decreases by three times the increment in the Individual Fund. 
 
 Decision Task for the 1 Type Y Decision Maker in a Group  
 
o The Type Y person will be shown the decisions of each of the 3 anonymous Type 
X persons in his/her group.  
o The Type Y person will then decide whether or not to withdraw any money from 
the Group Fund to move to his/her own Individual Fund.   
o If the Type Y person withdraws 15 INR from the Group Fund, his/her Individual 
Fund increases by 15 INR. At the same time, the experimenter will withdraw 
another 30 INR from the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
o Each decision must be in multiples of 15.  
o So, the Type Y person can withdraw 0, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90, 105, 120, 135, 150 
….. up to a total limit of money that would reduce the value of the Group Fund to 
0 INR. The Group Fund decreases by three times the amount of increment of the 
Individual Fund.  
 
 Earnings  
 
o Whatever remains in the Group Fund will be divided equally among all 
individuals in the group.  
o This amount would be added to the amount that the individual has in his/her own 
Individual Fund.  
Thus, a person’s total earnings will equal the final value in his/her own Individual Fund 
plus one-fourth of the final amount left in the Group Fund.  
This decision task will be completed only once. 
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Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends since 
that will not help them – they are in a separate group.  
Are there any questions? 
First room – one to one interaction with the subject: repeated three times for the 3 Type X 
subjects 
Type X subject (repeat 3 times) 
 First, I will verify your information. 
 You are Type X person.  The other Type X members in your group are from caste____, 
the Type Y person is from caste ____.  
 You will now take your decision about how much to withdraw from the Group Fund. 
o If you withdraw 15 INR, your Individual Fund increases by 15 INR. At the same 
time, the experimenter will withdraw another 30 INR from to the Group Fund. So 
the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
o You can withdraw any multiple of 15, such as 0, 15, 30, 45, …, 150. The Group 
Fund decreases by three times the increment of the Individual Fund.  
 Whatever is left in the Group Fund after all 3 Type X people and the 1 Type Y person have 
made their decisions will be divided equally among the four people in your group.    
 Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
 Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends 
since that will not help them – they are in a separate group.  
 After you finish, I will ask some additional questions. 
 
Type Y subject 
 First, I will verify your information. 
 You are Type Y person.  The three Type X members in your group are from caste____,  
The three Type X people in your group have taken the following decisions: 
Type X #1 has chosen to withdraw ____________INR from the Group Fund.   
Type X #2 has chosen to withdraw ____________INR from the Group Fund.   
Type X #3 has chosen to withdraw ____________INR from the Group Fund.   
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So now the Group Fund is left with an amount  
= 1800- 3*(Type X person 1’s move to Individual Fund +Type X person 2’s move to Individual 
Fund +Type X person 3’s move to Individual Fund) INR 
= _____________________________________________INR.   
 You will now take your decision about how much to withdraw from the Group Fund. 
o If you withdraw 15 INR from the Group Fund, your Individual Fund increases by 
15 INR. At the same time, the experimenter will withdraw another 30 INR from 
the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by 45 INR. 
o You can withdraw any multiple of 15, such as 15, 30, 45, ….up to a total amount 
of INR that would reduce the value of the Group Fund to 0 INR. 
o The Group Fund decreases by three times the amount of increment in your 
Individual Fund.  
 Whatever is left in the Group Fund after your decision will be divided equally among 
yourself and the 3 Type X people in your group.    
 Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
 
 Please note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors – they will be in 
different groups. So please do not make decisions thinking that will help your friends 
since that will not help them – they are in a separate group.  
 After you finish, I will ask some additional questions. 
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CP: Decision Form for Type X #1 Person 
 
Type X #1  
 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you withdraw from the Group Fund increases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will withdraw another 30 INR from the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by three 
times the increment of your Individual Fund.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to withdraw from the Group Fund: 
 
      0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150 
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       CP: Decision Form for Type X #2 Person 
 
Type X #2  
 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you withdraw from the Group Fund increases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will withdraw another 30 INR from the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by three 
times the increment of your Individual Fund.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to withdraw from the Group Fund: 
 
      0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150 
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CP: Decision Form for Type X #3 Person 
 
Type X #3  
 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
 
Type Y person is of ___________________________ caste.   
 
Recall that each 15 INR that you withdraw from the Group Fund increases your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will withdraw another 30 INR from the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by three 
times the increment of your Individual Fund.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decision will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to withdraw from the Group Fund: 
 
      0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150 
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CP: Decision Form for Type Y 
Type Y Person 
Group Number: __________________________________ 
Type X #1 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #1 has chosen to withdraw _______________________INR from the Group Fund.   
Type X #2 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #2 has chosen to withdraw _______________________INR from the Group Fund.   
Type X #3 is of _______________________________ caste.   
Type X #3 has chosen to withdraw ________________________INR from the Group Fund.   
So, the Group Fund now has ___________________________________INR 
Each 15 INR you withdraw from the Group Fund increases the value of your Individual Fund by 15 
INR. I will withdraw another 30 INR to the Group Fund. So the Group Fund decreases by three times 
the increment of your Individual Fund.  
The amount in the Group Fund after all four people in your group made their decisions will be shared 
equally by the four people in the group. 
 
Circle the number of rupees you wish to withdraw from the Group Fund:  
0        15        30         45        60          75         90       105        120        135        150 
165         180        195         210       225        240       255       270         285         300 
315         330        345         360       375        390        405        420        435         450 
465         480        495         510       525        540       555       570         585         600 
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Appendix E: Figures and Tables for Chapter II 
 
 
Figure E.1: Subject’s Road Map (adapted from Deutsch & Krauss, 1962) 
 
               Pl B 
Pl A 
Long route, 
gate open 
Long route, 
gate closed 
Short route, 
gate open 
Long route, 
gate open 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,5) 
Long route, 
gate closed 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,0) 
Short route, 
gate open 
(5,1) (0,1) (-2,-2) 
 
Table E.1: Points Structure in the Cooperation Game 
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Figure E.2: Decision to Compete among Males in India–  
Males with Males (Left panel - Group 1) vs. Males with Females (Right Panel - Group 2) 
[Note: 1 means decision to compete; 0 means decision to not compete.] 
 
 
Figure E.3: Decision to Compete among Females in India –  
Females with Males (Left panel - Group 2) vs. Females with Females (Right panel - Group 3) 
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Figure E.4: Level of Cooperation among Males in India – 
Males with males (Left panel - Group 1) vs. Males with females (Right panel - Group 2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure E.5: Level of Cooperation among Females in India –  
 Females with males (Left panel - Group 2) vs. Females with females (Right panel - Group 3) 
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Figure E.6: Decision to Compete among Males in the U.S.–  
Males with Females (Left panel - Group 0) vs. Males with Males (Right panel - Group 1) 
[Note: 1 means decision to compete; 0 means decision to not compete.] 
 
 
 
Figure E.7: Decision to Compete among Females in the U.S. –  
Females with Males (Left panel - Group 0) vs. Females with Females (Right panel - Group 1) 
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Figure E.8: Level of Cooperation among Males in the U.S. – 
Males with females (Left panel - Group 0) vs. Males with males (Right panel - Group 1) 
 
 
 
Figure E.9: Level of Cooperation among Females in the U.S. –  
 Females with males (Left panel - Group 0) vs. Females with females (Right panel - Group 
1) 
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Table E.2: Summary Statistics on Experimental Subjects from India 
Variable Mean S.D. N 
Gender (Male=1; 0 otherwise) 0.50 0.50 168 
Caste (1=high; 0 otherwise) 0.74 0.44 165 
Across Females       
Caste 
Age 
0.78 
28.06 
0.41 
5.59 
84 
84 
Primary Education or less 0.67 0.47 84 
Married 0.89 0.31 84 
Played any games 0.95 0.21 84 
Number of years played 5.86 2.72 84 
Choice of Risky investment - All Females 49.82 19.49 84 
Choice of Risky investment - High Caste Females 50.45 20.30 66 
Choice of Risky investment - Low Caste Females 47.50 16.47 18 
Chose to Compete - All Females 0.54 0.50 84 
Chose to Compete - High Caste Females 0.56 0.50 66 
Chose to Compete - Low Caste Females 0.44 0.51 18 
Performance in Competition Task - All Females 2.73 1.56 84 
Performance in Competition Task - High caste Females 2.59 1.48 66 
Performance in Competition Task - Low caste Females 3.22 1.77 18 
Level of Cooperation - All Females 3.52 3.45 84 
Level of Cooperation - High caste Females 3.34 3.37 66 
Level of Cooperation - Low caste Females 4.19 3.73 18 
Across Males       
Caste 
Age 
0.69 
24.61 
0.46 
5.48 
84 
84 
Primary Education or less 0.35 0.48 84 
Married 0.32 0.47 84 
Played any games 1 0 84 
Number of years played 13.54 5.14 84 
Choice of Risky investment - All Males 55.77 20.82 84 
Choice of Risky investment - High Caste Males 54.38 23.06 56 
Choice of Risky investment - Low Caste Males 60 15.61 25 
Chose to Compete - All Males 0.87 0.34 84 
Chose to Compete - High Caste Males 0.88 0.33 56 
Chose to Compete - Low Caste Males 0.84 0.37 25 
Performance in Competition Task - All Males 3.98 1.66 84 
Performance in Competition Task - High caste Males 3.88 1.51 56 
Performance in Competition Task - Low caste Males 4.08 2.04 25 
Level of Cooperation - All Males 5.13 3.08 84 
Level of Cooperation - High caste Males 5.73 3.10 56 
Level of Cooperation - Low caste Males 4.40 2.48 25 
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Table E.3: Summary Statistics on Experimental Subjects from the U.S. 
Variable Mean S.D. N 
Gender (Male=1; 0 otherwise) 0.51 0.50 184 
Race (1=White; 0 otherwise) 0.42 0.49 184 
Across Females       
Race  0.41 0.49 90 
Age  19.98 3.44 90 
Class Standing 2.46 1.03 90 
Marital Status 1.03 0.23 90 
Played any games? 0.82 0.38 90 
Number of years played 4.94 4.89 90 
Choice of Risky investment - All Females  4.83 1.81 90 
Choice of Risky investment - African American Females 4.68 1.65 53 
Choice of Risky investment - White Females 5.04 2.02 37 
Chose to Compete - All Females 0.92 0.27 90 
Chose to Compete - African American Females 0.89 0.32 53 
Chose to Compete - White Females 0.97 0.16 37 
Performance in Competition Task - All Females 2.63 1.52 90 
Performance in Competition Task - African American Females 2.45 1.46 53 
Performance in Competition Task - White Females 2.89 1.59 37 
Level of Cooperation - All Females 3.56 3.27 90 
Level of Cooperation - African American Females 2.83 3.17 53 
Level of Cooperation - White Females 4.61 3.18 37 
Across Males       
Race  0.43 0.50 94 
Age  20.56 3.09 94 
Class Standing 2.57 1.11 94 
Marital Status 1.06 0.32 94 
Played any games? 0.88 0.32 94 
Number of years played 6.62 5.85 94 
Choice of Risky investment - All Males 5.69 1.85 94 
Choice of Risky investment - African American Males 5.28 1.78 54 
Choice of Risky investment - White Males 6.25 1.80 40 
Chose to Compete - All Males 0.97 0.18 94 
Chose to Compete - African American Males 0.94 0.23 54 
Chose to Compete - White Males 1.00 0.00 40 
Performance in Competition Task - All Males 3.78 1.81 94 
Performance in Competition Task - African American Males 3.93 2.03 54 
Performance in Competition Task - White Males 3.58 1.47 40 
Level of Cooperation - All Males 4.49 3.85 94 
Level of Cooperation - African American Males 3.00 3.72 54 
Level of Cooperation - White Males 6.51 3.04 40 
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Table E.4: OLS to examine Investment in Risky Option 
  Percentage of Endowment invested in Risky Option 
  
Pooled Data 
(2) 
India Data 
(3) 
U.S. Data 
(4) 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  0.1108     
  [0.011]**     
U.S. Females 0.0067     
  [0.875]     
Indian Females -0.0736     
  [0.042]**     
India Data       
High Caste Females   -0.0343   
    [0.421]   
Low Caste Males   0.0629   
    [0.155]   
Low Caste Females   -0.0607   
    [0.266]   
U.S. Data       
African American Males     -0.1169 
      [0.014]** 
African American Females     -0.1856 
      [0.000]*** 
White Females     -0.1402 
      [0.012]** 
Demographic Variables       
Years of Education 0.0117 0.0098 0.0114 
  [0.051]* [0.129] [0.581] 
Married -0.0766 -0.0373 -0.1677 
  [0.123] [0.504] [0.060]* 
Age (in years) 0.0016 -0.0018 0.006 
  [0.620] [0.644] [0.337] 
Subject is a Student 0.0495 -0.0068 0.000 
  [0.362] [0.911] [0.00] 
Constant 0.4214 0.5025 0.65 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.019]** 
Observations 352 168 184 
R-squared 0.14 0.053 0.133 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table E.5: Marginal Effects from Binary Probit Regressions to examine  
the Choice of Compete 
  
Pooled Data 
(2) 
India Data 
(3) 
U.S. Data 
(4) 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  1.0807     
  [0.006]***     
U.S. Females 0.7392     
  [0.065]*     
Indian Females -0.6082     
  [0.058]*     
India Data       
High Caste Females   -0.6604   
    [0.076]*   
Low Caste Males   -0.2084   
    [0.580]   
Low Caste Females   -1.0639   
    [0.016]**   
U.S. Data       
African American Males     -4.7176 
      [0.000]*** 
African American Females     -4.8495 
      [0.000]*** 
White Females     -4.4953 
      [0.000]*** 
Demographic Variables       
Age (in years) -0.0297 -0.0354 -0.0439 
  [0.207] [0.190] [0.416] 
Years of Education 0.037 0.027 0.0032 
  [0.372] [0.520] [0.988] 
Married 0.342 0.3977 0.000 
  [0.341] [0.322] [0.00] 
Subject is a Student -0.5337 -0.4912 0.000 
  [0.187] [0.261] [0.00] 
Played any games? 1.0853 0.1433 1.0498 
  [0.003]*** [0.837] [0.017]** 
Number of years played 0.022 0.0131 0.1353 
  [0.337] [0.662] [0.018]** 
Percentage invested in Risky 0.9832 0.7516 1.5468 
  [0.027]** [0.163] [0.122] 
Constant -0.4378 1.0063 5.1144 
  [0.609] [0.385] [0.038]** 
Observations 352 168 184 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table E.6: Negative Binomial Regressions for Performance in Competition 
Round 
Pooled Data 
(2) 
India Data 
(3) 
U.S. Data 
(4) 
Pooled Data 
U.S. Males  0.0312 
[0.766] 
U.S. Females -0.3012 
[0.009]*** 
Indian Females -0.3743 
[0.000]*** 
India Data       
High Caste Females -0.5049 
[0.000]*** 
Low Caste Males 0.0627 
[0.573] 
Low Caste Females -0.2322 
[0.124] 
U.S. Data       
African American Males 0.1131 
[0.225] 
African American Females -0.3024 
[0.003]*** 
White Females -0.177 
[0.101] 
Demographic Variables       
Chose to Compete 0.1484 0.1377 0.2794 
[0.085]* [0.151] [0.159] 
Age (in years) 0.0045 0.0061 0.0057 
[0.516] [0.533] [0.639] 
Years of Education -0.0063 -0.0026 -0.0039 
[0.686] [0.874] [0.927] 
Married -0.1644 -0.0725 -0.284 
[0.060]* [0.495] [0.040]** 
Subject is a Student 0.0735 0.0178 0.000 
[0.516] [0.880] [0.00] 
Played any games? 0.0644 -0.1211 -0.0054 
[0.474] [0.575] [0.955] 
Number of years played 0.0069 -0.0077 0.0138 
[0.175] [0.348] [0.025]** 
Constant 1.1296 1.3849 1.1071 
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.059]* 
Observations 352 168 184 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table E.7: Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Regressions for 
Performance in Cooperation Round at the individual level 
 
Pooled Data 
(2) 
India Data 
(3) 
U.S. Data 
(4) 
Pooled Data 
U.S. Males  -0.1776 
[0.402] 
U.S. Females -0.4532 
[0.027]** 
Indian Females -0.3958 
[0.027]** 
India Data       
High Caste Females -0.4996 
[0.025]** 
Low Caste Males -0.261 
[0.211] 
Low Caste Females -0.1456 
[0.671] 
U.S. Data       
African American Males -1.0553 
[0.000]*** 
African American Females -1.075 
[0.000]*** 
White Females -0.5174 
[0.015]** 
Demographic Variables       
Age (in years) 0.0105 0.0164 0.0101 
[0.461] [0.373] [0.695] 
Years of Education 0.0296 0.0263 0.0284 
[0.284] [0.415] [0.756] 
Married 0.1696 0.368 -0.3431 
[0.425] [0.150] [0.343] 
Subject is a Student -0.1538 -0.1904 0.000 
  [0.517] [0.472] [0.00] 
Observations 352 168 184 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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Table E.8: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Cooperation Task  
for Indian Groups 
 
(omitted category - High caste females with low caste females) 
Dependent variable - Level of Cooperation (takes value 0-10 based on how 
many rounds both subjects in a group chose to cooperate)  
Low caste males with low caste males 1.7054 
[0.000]*** 
Low caste males with low caste females 2.2637 
[0.000]*** 
Low caste females with low caste females 0.6988 
[0.180] 
High caste males with high caste males 2.5376 
[0.000]*** 
High caste males with high caste females 2.2408 
[0.000]*** 
High caste females with high caste females 0.805 
[0.186] 
High caste males with low caste males 2.0435 
[0.000]*** 
High caste males with low caste females 2.0942 
[0.000]*** 
High caste females with low caste males 1.8878 
[0.000]*** 
Observations 81 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
The standard errors are clustered at the group level. 
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Table E.9: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Cooperation Task 
for U.S. Groups 
 
(omitted category: African American males with African American males) 
Dependent variable - Level of Cooperation (takes value 0-10 based on how 
many rounds both subjects in a group chose to cooperate)  
African American males with African American 
females 0.3612 
[0.547] 
African American females with African American 
females 0.4762 
[0.373] 
White males with White males 2.0357 
[0.000]*** 
White males with White females 1.5931 
[0.001]*** 
White females with White females 1.7683 
[0.003]*** 
White males with African American males 1.9377 
[0.002]*** 
White females with African American females 0.5384 
[0.320] 
White males with African American females 1.0404 
[0.084]* 
African American males with White females 0.6185 
[0.278] 
Observations 88 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
The standard errors are clustered at the group level. 
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Appendix F: Additional Tables to examine Subject Behavior under age 25 for Chapter II 
Table F.1: OLS for checking Investment in Risky Option   
Percentage of Endowment invested in Risky Option 
Pooled Data India Data U.S. Data 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  0.0407 
[0.397] 
U.S. Females -0.0773 
[0.114] 
Indian Females -0.1303 
[0.029]** 
India Data       
High Caste Females -0.0999 
[0.162] 
Low Caste Males 0.0608 
[0.273] 
Low Caste Females -0.1363 
[0.150] 
U.S. Data       
African American Males -0.1225 
[0.016]** 
African American Females -0.2086 
[0.000]*** 
White Females -0.1589 
[0.008]*** 
Demographic Variables       
Years of Education 0.0375 0.0388 0.0254 
[0.002]*** [0.008]*** [0.323] 
Married -0.1249 -0.1271 -0.0965 
[0.103] [0.135] [0.607] 
Age (in years) -0.0095 -0.0076 -0.0042 
[0.286] [0.657] [0.742] 
Subject is a Student -0.0406 -0.0441 
[0.531] [0.569] 
Constant 0.4764 0.4041 0.5904 
  [0.010]** [0.287] [0.075]* 
Observations 248 75 173 
R-squared 0.135 0.175 0.113 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table F.2: Binary Probit Regressions to examine Choice of Compete  
 
  Pooled Data India Data U.S. Data 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  1.0541 
[0.047]** 
U.S. Females 0.6522 
[0.244] 
Indian Females -1.4247 
[0.007]*** 
India Data       
High Caste Females -2.0409 
[0.005]*** 
Low Caste Males -0.1411 
[0.783] 
Low Caste Females -2.0083 
[0.007]*** 
U.S. Data       
African American Males -4.8271 
[0.000]*** 
African American Females -4.9757 
[0.000]*** 
White Females -4.7323 
[0.000]*** 
Demographic Variables       
Age (in years) -0.0172 0.1006 -0.1581 
[0.836] [0.425] [0.325] 
Years of Education 0.0124 0.0106 0.1516 
[0.903] [0.930] [0.598] 
Married -0.3396 -0.4863 0.000 
[0.556] [0.437] [0.00] 
Subject is a Student -0.1755 0.1743 
[0.783] [0.793] 
Played any games? 1.405 0.000 1.0851 
[0.001]*** [0.00] [0.011]** 
Number of years played 0.014 -0.0425 0.1354 
[0.694] [0.510] [0.012]** 
Percentage invested in Risky 0.6591 -0.2048 1.2655 
[0.244] [0.796] [0.198] 
Constant 0.0706 0.33 5.4935 
[0.968] [0.906] [0.033]** 
Observations 248 74 173 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table F.3: Negative Binomial Regressions for Performance in Competition Round 
Pooled Data India Data U.S. Data 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  0.0017 
[0.988] 
U.S. Females -0.3105 
[0.016]** 
Indian Females -0.4232 
[0.027]** 
India Data       
High Caste Females -0.5489 
[0.009]*** 
Low Caste Males 0.073 
[0.607] 
Low Caste Females -0.6238 
[0.071]* 
U.S. Data       
African American Males 0.1318 
[0.194] 
African American Females -0.2914 
[0.007]*** 
White Females -0.1665 
[0.153] 
Demographic Variables       
Chose to Compete 0.2738 0.2562 0.2776 
[0.070]* [0.229] [0.168] 
Age (in years) 0.0064 0.0419 -0.0033 
[0.748] [0.252] [0.921] 
Years of Education 0.0063 0.0169 0.0119 
[0.771] [0.501] [0.840] 
Married -0.0441 -0.0092 0.000 
[0.736] [0.953] [0.00] 
Subject is a Student -0.0678 0.0106 
[0.608] [0.940] 
Played any games? 0.0226 0.2166 -0.0366 
[0.818] [0.443] [0.726] 
Number of years played 0.0131 -0.0148 0.0183 
[0.054]* [0.297] [0.013]** 
Constant 0.8262 0.0672 0.7656 
[0.084]* [0.944] [0.165] 
Observations 248 75 173 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table F.4: Ordered Probit Regressions for Performance in Cooperation 
Round 
 
Pooled Data India Data U.S. Data 
Pooled Data       
U.S. Males  -0.2697 
[0.260] 
U.S. Females -0.5309 
[0.026]** 
Indian Females -0.4594 
[0.116] 
India Data       
High Caste Females -0.7221 
[0.064]* 
Low Caste Males -0.3912 
[0.211] 
Low Caste Females -0.2687 
[0.593] 
U.S. Data       
African American Males -1.0453 
[0.000]*** 
African American Females -1.0867 
[0.000]*** 
White Females -0.5194 
[0.018]** 
Demographic Variables       
Age (in years) 0.0369 0.0624 0.0526 
[0.366] [0.442] [0.369] 
Years of Education 0.0604 0.0695 0.0134 
[0.222] [0.230] [0.903] 
Married 0.336 0.4651 -0.234 
[0.224] [0.231] [0.182] 
Subject is a Student -0.2791 -0.2564 
[0.269] [0.413] 
Observations 248 75 173 
 Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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Table F.5: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Cooperation Task  
for Indian Groups 
(omitted category - High caste females with low caste females) 
Dependent variable - Level of Cooperation (takes value 0-10 based on 
how many rounds both subjects in a group chose to cooperate)  
Low caste males with low caste males 1.4939 
[0.063]* 
Low caste males with low caste females 2.7343 
[0.002]*** 
Low caste females with low caste females 2.1801 
[0.001]*** 
High caste males with high caste males 3.0194 
[0.000]*** 
High caste males with high caste females 2.0563 
[0.003]*** 
High caste females with high caste females -0.2217 
[0.800] 
High caste males with low caste males 1.6833 
[0.008]*** 
High caste males with low caste females 2.677 
[0.000]*** 
High caste females with low caste males 1.9197 
[0.005]*** 
Observations 35 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
The standard errors are clustered at the group level. 
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Table F.6: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Cooperation Task 
for U.S. Groups 
(omitted category: African American males with African American males) 
Dependent variable - Level of Cooperation (takes value 0-10 based on how many 
rounds both subjects in a group chose to cooperate)  
African American males with African American females 0.3802 
[0.544] 
African American females with African American females 0.4465 
[0.428] 
White males with White males 1.9155 
[0.001]*** 
White males with White females 1.5649 
[0.003]*** 
White females with White females 1.7274 
[0.006]*** 
White males with African American males 1.8737 
[0.005]*** 
White females with African American females 0.3815 
[0.480] 
White males with African American females 0.9967 
[0.131] 
African American males with White females 0.5554 
[0.365] 
Observations 83 
Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The standard errors are clustered at the group level. 
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Appendix G: Subject Instructions for Chapter II (India) 
First room: introduction  
Welcome. Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this experiment.   
I will first read to you the Informed Consent Form.  You can indicate your willingness to 
participate by signing the form. 
I will now ask you to provide some information about yourself. 
 You full name; 
 Your address; 
 Your religion; 
 Your caste; 
 Age; 
 Your education level; 
 Your marital status; 
 Your current occupation; 
 Whether you have ever played a sport, and for how many years; 
 Your voter id/Your driving license no./your Ration card number 
Thank you very much for providing this information. Please go sit in the room. 
First room Instructions (where all subjects have been seated) 
 No Talking Allowed. Please switch off your cell phones or mute them. 
 This experiment has three tasks. You will each have to complete these tasks.  
 After all three tasks have been completed; you will be compensated for your time. I will 
randomly pick up one of the three tasks and pay you for that task. In addition, you will 
also receive Rs 50 show up fee. Payment will be made in private at the end of the 
experiment. 
 Therefore, you may be paid for any one task: either task 1 or task 2 or task 3. You will 
not know which task you are paid for until the end of the experiment.  
 Each person will be randomly matched with 1 other person to form a team. Thus, each 
team will contain 2 individuals. You will not be told who the other person in your team 
is. This pairing will remain fixed for the whole duration of the experiment.  
 Note that you may have come with your friends or neighbors. They will not be placed in 
the same group as you. Your partner will be a stranger.  
 For the first two tasks, I will call each individual one by one to a different room. I will 
ask each one of you to take one decision and afterwards you would have to perform a 
task. 
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 I will explain below what the decision is and what task you have to perform. 
 The decision you have to take:  
o I will give you an initial endowment of Rs 100. This money has been provided by 
my university.   
o You task is to decide how to divide this endowment between a zero-risk, zero-
interest savings account and an investment which is risky but potentially 
profitable.  
o You can receive five times the amount that you choose to invest in the risky 
prospect with probability one half, or lose the amount invested otherwise.  
o At the end of the experiment, if this round is chosen for payment, a coin will be 
flipped to determine whether the risky investment is successful or not.  
o So the main decision is to divide your endowment between the risky investment 
and the non-risky zero profit alternative.  
o Once your decision has been completed, we will go on to the second task. 
 The task you have to perform: 
o You have to toss a tennis ball into a bucket 10 feet away-Underhand. 
o You will have to do this task 10 times.  
o A successful shot meant that the tennis ball entered the bucket. 
Once everyone has finished doing these 2 tasks, we will start the third task. This will be 
conducted in this room. I will give you the instructions at that point of time. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Once we have completed all three rounds, I will again ask each one to come one by one to the 
other room. I will flip a 6 sided die to determine whether all of you get paid on Task 1, 2 or 3.  
So everyone will be paid for the same task, but you don’t know which task it is until the 
experiment is over. In addition, you also get Rs 50 as show up fee. 
Second room: one to one interaction with me: Task 1 
 I will now give you Rs 100.  
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 You have to decide how much of that endowment you want to put in a zero-risk, zero-
interest savings account and how much you want to put in an investment which is risky 
but potentially profitable. 
 The amount invested in the risky investment - if it is successful, you will receive 5 times 
the amount you invested. 
 The amount invested in the risky investment – if it is not successful, you will receive 
zero. 
 The amount kept in the savings account stays the same. 
 There is a half chance that the risky investment will be successful and a half chance that 
it will be unsuccessful. 
 If this round is chosen for payment at the end of the experiment, I will flip a coin to 
decide whether the investment is successful or not. 
 So now, please make your decision about how to divide the endowment. 
 [Decision sheet to subject- subject makes decision.] 
Second room: one to one interaction with me: Task 2 
As I mentioned before, you have been randomly paired with another person. I will not tell you 
who the other person is. However, your teammate is _________________ (male/female) and is 
from ___________________ (high/low) caste. 
 You have to toss a tennis ball into a bucket placed 10 feet away.  
 Please throw the ball underhand.  
 You have to do this 10 times.  
But before we start, I will ask you to make a decision:  I will give you a choice.  
 You have to choose between  
o Rs 20 per successful shot, regardless of the performance of your paired opponent 
or,  
o Rs 20X4=Rs 80 per successful shot if you outperform your opponent.  
 If you choose the second option and score the same or less than the other participant, you 
will still receive Rs 20 per successful shot.  
 So please make the decision about how you would like to proceed. Then complete the 
task.  [Subject completes task.] 
 Please go back to the first room and wait there. 
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First room: interaction with whole group: Task 3 
I have given each of you an envelope. Please open it.  Look at the roadmap on the board or the 
one with you. Suppose you are A and your paired opponent is B.  
Each of you has a starting point and a destination. There are two ways to reach the destination. 
You can take either the short route (One Lane road) or the long route (Alternate Route).   
If both of you take the short route, at one point, you will meet each other. You cannot cross each 
other. Along the long route, you will not cross each other; however this route is long and takes 
more time. 
One more important point to notice: 
A gate is placed at both ends of the one lane route. If you are A, you have control over the gate 
closest to your starting position. You can open the gate to let your opponent pass, or you can 
close the gate and stop the other person from travelling along the one-way route.  
But if you close your gate, you cannot travel along the short route yourself – you have to take the 
longer route. So you can NEVER choose the (short route, gate closed) option. 
 
Figure G.1: Subject’s road map (in instructions) 
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So now you have to make 2 simultaneous decisions: 
o Whether you want to travel along the LONG route (Alternate route) or the SHORT one 
(one lane road); 
o Whether you want the gate to be OPEN or CLOSED. 
For each trip you complete, you can earn at least 1 point, where 1 point translates to Rs 10. The 
player types (A or B) would be randomly assigned to the two players in a team.  
How will you be paid? Here is the payoff table: 
               Player B 
Player A 
Long route, 
gate open 
Long route, 
gate closed 
Short route, 
gate open 
Long route, 
gate open 
(1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 5) 
Long route, 
gate closed 
(1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) 
Short route, 
gate open 
(5, 1) (0, 1) (-2, -2) 
 
Table G.1: Payoff structure in Task 3 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid on the basis of what you have earned in all the 10 
rounds in this task (if this round is chosen for payment). 
In your envelope, you will find 10 sheets of decision making.  Make your decisions for Round 1.  
Please circle your choices in the sheet of paper.  
Once you are done, please raise your hand, I will come and collect the sheet of paper from you. 
Once everyone has completed, I will update all the accounts. Thereafter, I will give you back the 
sheet of paper with the information of what decisions your paired opponent has taken as well as 
payoff from this round to both of you.  
Once everyone has been informed, we will go on to the second round.   
We will repeat this 10 times. Are there any questions?  [Subjects complete task.] 
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Decision Form for Task 1 
Subject id#__________________ 
The decision you have to take:  
o I will give you an initial endowment of Rs 100. This money has been provided by 
my university.   
o You task is to decide how to divide this endowment between a zero-risk, zero-
interest savings account and an investment which is risky but potentially 
profitable.  
o You can receive 5 times the amount that you choose to invest in the risky prospect 
with probability one half, or lose the amount invested otherwise.  
o So the main decision is to divide your endowment between the risky investment 
and the non-risky zero profit alternative.  
o If this round is chosen for payment, then we will actually flip the coin to see how 
much each of you earned from this round. 
So please make your decision about how much you want to put in the risky investment and how 
much you want to put in the zero-risk zero-interest account. 
My decision is:  
Risky investment Non-risky investment 
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Decision Form for Task 2 
Subject id#__________________ 
Your partner is  
 ________________ (male/female) and  
 belongs to the ___________ (high/low) caste. 
 
 You have to toss a tennis ball into a bucket placed 10 feet away. 
 Please throw the ball underhand. 
 You have to do this 10 times.  
But before we start, I have to ask you to make a decision:  I will give you a choice.  
 You have to choose between  
o (a) Rs 20 per successful shot, regardless of the performance of your paired 
opponent or,  
o (b) Rs 4X20=Rs 80 per successful shot if you outperform your opponent.  
 If you choose the second option and score the same as the other participant, you will 
receive Rs 20 per shot.  
So now please make your decision about how you want to play this round. 
I want to choose: 
Option 1 (NOT compete) Option 2 (Compete) 
 
 
 
The task:  
Subject # _______________ has tossed __________ tennis balls into the bucket. 
Please go and sit in the first room. 
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Decision Sheet for Task 3 – Round 1 – you are Person A 
Subject id#__________________ 
 
Please look at the payoff table and the roadmap and then choose. 
 
UNDERLINE any one of the 3 options below 
LONG route with gate CLOSED 
LONG route with gate OPEN 
SHORT route with gate OPEN 
 
 
 
RESULTS from Round 1 (to be filled in by the experimenter) 
 
 
Person B’s choice Your payoff Person B’s payoff 
Round 1 
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Decision Sheet for Task 3 – Round 1 – you are Person B 
Subject id#__________________ 
 
Please look at the payoff table and the roadmap and then choose. 
 
UNDERLINE any one of the 3 options below 
LONG route with gate CLOSED 
LONG route with gate OPEN 
SHORT route with gate OPEN 
 
 
 
RESULTS from Round 1 (to be filled in by the experimenter) 
 
 
Person B’s choice Your payoff Person B’s payoff 
Round 1 
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 Appendix H: Discrimination by Caste and Gender in India for Chapter II 
 
The forty-second Amendment to the Constitution of India explicitly promotes social equality 
and implies the absence of discrimination on the grounds of caste, color, creed, sex, religion, 
or language. Yet as late as in 2008, an expert group established by the Ministry of Minority 
Affairs, Government of India clearly acknowledged that ”Discriminatory practices reportedly 
continue to exist in education, employment, housing and other areas where women, dalits, 
tribals, disabled persons, minorities and other “deprived sections” are sometimes denied of equal 
opportunity.” (Dalits belong to India’s "untouchable" or the lowest castes).52 There was a dire 
need for an Equal Opportunity Commission in India53 since there is no effective method to 
address the rampant discrimination and denial of equal opportunity to disadvantaged sections. 
The report proposed a draft bill in 2008 to promote “Equality of Opportunity” to all sections of 
people particularly the deprived groups and establish the Equal Opportunity Commissions to 
effectively intervene in policy development, program implementation and public administration 
on behalf of the deprived and discriminated. However no concrete action has been undertaken by 
the Government of India as of today.54  
 
 
                                                            
52 This report conceded “Though Equality is a foundational value of our Republic; stark inequalities mark our 
present social reality and prospects for the future generations. Inter-group inequalities often coincide with 
boundaries of communities and are becoming more visible than before. Hence there is an urgent need to address 
these inequalities and supplement the existing policies of reservations by fine tuning the definition of the 
beneficiaries, expanding the range of modalities and evolving a forward looking and integral approach to affirmative 
action. That is why we need an Equal Opportunity Commission.” 
53 The report can be downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India: 
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/pdfs/eoc_wwh.pdf 
54 A report in June 2012 states that the current political party has revived the debate on whether they will actually set 
up the EOC – there have been fears in the past that setting up the EOC would make National Commission for 
Minorities, (which tackles cases of violation of rights) redundant. 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120608/jsp/nation/story_15584314.jsp#.UH7iW7JlR4c 
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A. Discrimination by Caste 
No collection of wealth must be made by a Sudra, even though he be able (to do it); for a Sudra 
who has acquired wealth, gives pain to Brahmanas. 
From The Laws of Manu (1964) ch. X, verse 129, p. 430; reprinted in (Deshpande, 2001) 
Since ancient times, Hindu society was divided into five distinct hereditary and mutually 
exclusive Jatis or castes, namely, the Brahmins (priests) at the top, followed by the Kshatriyas 
(warriors), the Vaisyas (traders and merchants), the Sudras (conducting basic jobs for everyone 
else) and the “untouchables” (or Dalits), engaged in the most appalling menial jobs55. After 
Independence from the British in 1947, the Constituent Assembly of India undertook steps to 
improve the condition of the low castes, including the “reservation” status for the Scheduled 
Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)56. However this did not mean an eradication of the caste 
system. In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress in 1957, noted Indian 
anthropologist M. N. Srinivas lamented that ‘the manner in which the British transferred political 
power to the Indians enabled caste to assume political functions. In independent India, the 
provision of constitutional safeguards to the backward sections of the population, especially the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, has given a new lease of life to caste.”(From Caste in Modern 
India, (Srinivas, 1957)). 
 
                                                            
55 Historically, a village economy had a specific caste hierarchy where the upper caste individuals were rich land 
owners, who hired the low caste individuals to work on their lands. This usually translated to exploitation of the low 
castes by the high caste individuals ((Beteille, 1965); (Srinivas, 1980); (Anderson, 2005); (Bose, 1958) and 
(Srinivas, 1957)).   
56 This meant favorable treatment of the low castes in the form of quotas in education and public sector jobs. Refer 
to The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; and The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. 
(http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule3a.htm; http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule9a.htm) 
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According to UNICEF and Human Rights Watch, caste discrimination affects an 
estimated 250 million people worldwide, majority of whom are located in India.57 Deshpande 
(2001) identified and aggregated five indicators- education, occupation, landholding, assets and 
livestock and constructed a Caste Development/Deprivation Index and found evidence of “inter 
caste disparity within the more general problem of poverty”.  (Borooah, 2005) analyzed 
inequality and poverty in India within the context of caste-based discrimination and showed that 
at least one-third of the average income differences were due to the “unequal treatment” of the 
low castes. (Hoff & Pandey, 2006) found public revelation of caste led to a 20 percent decline in 
performance among low caste subjects. (Ito, 2009) found evidence of discrimination against 
backward classes with regard to regular employment in rural North India.  (Aiyar, 2012) 
provided examples of cases of the improvement in the status of the Dalits after twenty years of 
reforms in India yet acknowledged at the end that they are still at the very bottom of the 
economic ladder.  
B. Discrimination by Gender 
In the late 1980s, Amartya Sen coined the term "missing women" for the estimated 100 
million women in the world who are not alive due to family neglect and discrimination58. Out of 
these women, 50 million are estimated to be missing from India alone. The current sex ratio in 
India bears testimony to this disturbing fact. The Census of India, 2011 finds that there are 
approximately 940 females per 1000 males; an improvement from the 2001 sex ratio (933  
                                                            
57 http://www.hrw.org/news/2001/08/29/global-caste-discrimination. A 2007 United Nations anti-racism committee 
report pointed out to two distinct causes: “the “untouchability” and discrimination upper-caste community members 
practice on a daily basis and the desire of upper-caste community members to protect their own entrenched status by 
preventing Dalit development and the fulfillment of Dalits’ rights”. 
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/chrgj-hrw.pdf ) 
58 http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/gender/Sen100M.html, 1990.   
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females per 1000 males); yet the sex ratio among children in the 0-6 age category has dwindled 
to 914 female children per 1000 males (against 927 in 2001). While the sex ratio in the overall 
category shows an improvement, the sex ratio among 0-6 aged children in the urban areas has 
declined to 902 in 2011 (against 906 in 2001) while the comparative figures for rural India are 
919 in 2011 (vs. 934 in 2001).  
Earlier studies have examined the phenomena such as the declining sex ratio, differences 
in education, occupation etc. in India59. (Deshpande, 2007) constructed a Gender-Caste 
Development Index based on data from 1998-99 in order to quantify intergroup disparity based 
on gender and caste. She concluded that despite improvement over the early 1990s, the material 
standard of living as well as educational outcomes for women continue to be low, along with 
significant inter caste disparity as well as regional variation.  (Menon & Rodgers, 2009) 
examined the question of women’s age gap in India’s manufacturing sector and found that 
India’s increasing openness to trade is actually associated with larger wage gaps in India’s 
concentrated manufacturing industries. (Ramaswami & Mahajan, 2012)examined the effect of 
variations in female labor supply to agriculture (in part due to cultural restrictions) and variations 
in male labor supply to agriculture (because of non-farm employment opportunities) on female 
and male wages and the gap between them, and found evidence that greater female labor supply 
to agriculture reduces female wages more than male wages and hence affects the female to male 
agricultural wage ratio adversely.  
                                                            
59 See for example, (Dreze & Sen, 1995), (Duraisamy & Duraisamy, 1999), (Drèze & Murthi, 2001), (Gandhi 
Kingdon, 2002), and (Bajpai & Goyal, 2004), (Deshpande, 2007).  
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Table I.1: Risk Control Task  
 Option A -  BLUE BAG Option B – RED BAG 
Task 
1 
3/10 of Rs 200; 7/10 of Rs 160  
(3 green balls & 7 orange balls in a 
blue bag.) 
3/10 of Rs 385; 7/10 of Rs 10 
(3 yellow balls & 7 pink balls in a 
red bag.)  
Task 
2 
4/10 of Rs 200; 6/10 of Rs 160  
(4 green balls & 6 orange balls in the 
blue bag.) 
4/10 of Rs 385; 6/10 of Rs 10  
(4 yellow balls & 6 pink balls in 
the red bag.) 
Task 
3 
5/10 of Rs 200; 5/10 of Rs 160  
(5 green balls & 5 orange balls in the 
blue bag.) 
5/10 of Rs 385; 5/10 of Rs 10 
(5 yellow balls & 5 pink balls in 
the red bag.)   
Task 
4 
6/10 of Rs 200; 4/10 of Rs 160  
(6 green balls & 4 orange balls in the 
blue bag.) 
6/10 of Rs 385; 4/10 of Rs 10  
(6 yellow balls & 4 pink balls in 
the red bag.) 
Task 
5 
7/10 of Rs 200; 3/10 of Rs 160  
(7 green balls & 3 orange balls in the 
blue bag.) 
7/10 of Rs 385; 3/10 of Rs 10 
(7 yellow balls & 3 pink balls in 
the red bag.) 
 
Table I.2: Belief elicitation task 
The proposed split is as follows: Rs 0 to your 
spouse/paired person and Rs 400 to yourself 
Strongly agree / agree 
/disagree / Strongly disagree
The proposed split is as follows: Rs 80 to your 
spouse/paired person and Rs 320 to yourself 
Strongly agree / agree 
/disagree / Strongly disagree
The proposed split is as follows: Rs 160 to your 
spouse/paired person and Rs 280 to yourself 
Strongly agree / agree 
/disagree / Strongly disagree
The proposed split is as follows: Rs 320 to your 
spouse/paired person and Rs 80 to yourself 
Strongly agree / agree 
/disagree / Strongly disagree
The proposed split is as follows: Rs 400 to your 
spouse/paired person and Rs 0 to yourself 
Strongly agree / agree 
/disagree / Strongly disagree
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Appendix I (cont.) 
Table I.3:  Average Offers made by the FMs across Treatments, segregated by 
gender 
(in percentage). 
  
Percentage of 
endowment 
sent by all FMs
(2) 
Percentage of 
endowment sent  
by Male 
Spouses 
(3) 
Percentage of 
endowment 
sent  by Female 
Spouses 
(4) 
Gender 
Equality 
test 
(5) 
T1 - Ultimatum, Spouse 
info 55.36% 55.68% 55% 0.926 
T2 - Ultimatum, No 
Spouse info 
19.23% 
[0.00**] 28.57% 8.33% 0.159 
T3 - Dictator, Spouse 
info 20.31% 25% 15.63% 0.539 
T4 - Dictator, No Spouse 
info 15.10% [0.58] 27.88% 0% 0.0126***
T5 - Dictator, Role 
choice, Spouse info         
FM kept dictator role for 
self 16.81% 14.58% 20.45% 0.523 
Given dictator role by 
spouse (FM) 41.25% 48.86% 31.94% 0.399 
T6 - Dictator, Role 
choice, No spouse info         
FM kept dictator role for 
self 
4.81% 
[0.011**] 7.50% 1.97% 0.220 
Given dictator role by 
FM 
8.33% 
[0.038**] 25% 6.25% - 
T7 - Empowerment, 
Spouse info         
Spouse (FM) gave power 
to reject 68.75% 74.17% 67.50% 0.523 
Spouse (FM) did not give 
power to reject 4.89% 6.25% 3.57% 0.605 
T8 - Empowerment, No 
Spouse info         
FM gave power to reject 50% [0.003***] 50% 50% - 
FM did not give power to 
reject 5.56% [0.812] 11.76% 0% 0.0148***
 
Figures within square brackets in column (2) indicate the p-value from the test of equality 
between each pair of games across the eight treatments. 
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Figures I.1: Average offers by FMs in  Figures I.2: Average offers by FMs in 
Ultimatum Games     Dictator Games 
  
Left Panel: with Spouse Info;        Left Panel: with Spouse Info; 
Right Panel: No Spouse info      Right Panel: No Spouse info 
 
 
      
   
Figures I.3: Average offers by FMs in          Figures I.4: Average offers by FMs in 
Dictator Games with Role Choice   Empowerment Games 
 
 
Left Panel: with Spouse Info;        Left Panel: with Spouse Info; 
Right Panel: No Spouse info      Right Panel: No Spouse info 
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Appendix I (cont.) 
Table I.4: Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across All Games With and 
Without Spouse Information, segregated by Gender 
Dependent Variable - how much was sent by the FMs? 
 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Full 
Sample 
(3) 
Male 
Spouses 
(4) 
Female 
Spouses 
(5) 
Male 
Spouses 
(6) 
Female 
Spouses 
(7) 
Games With 
Spouse 
Information       
Ultimatum Game, 
Spouse Info 119.2314  116.2006 146.3168   
[0.003]*** [0.016]** [0.000]***
Dictator With Role 
Choice, Spouse 
Info -7.7389  
-20.1478 17.6025   
[0.844] [0.663] [0.611] 
Empowerment 
Game, Spouse Info 72.3204  132.9569 35.3723   
[0.016]** [0.002]*** [0.434] 
Games Without 
Spouse 
Information      
Ultimatum Game, 
No Spouse Info  8.412   12.3291 13.9413 
[0.754] [0.676] [0.648] 
Dictator With Role 
Choice, No Spouse 
Info  -47.9827   
-40.5351 -38.1045 
[0.190] [0.270] [0.276] 
Empowerment 
Game, No Spouse 
Info  7.0785   
37.3831 -18.6905 
  [0.827]   
[0.338] [0.645] 
All Demographics 
Male 49.9636 62.4071 
[0.108] [0.009]***
Education  Level 
Some school 
education -31.591 69.4526 -1.3276 -28.6516 66.724 58.8526 
[0.316] [0.111] [0.962] [0.352] [0.194] [0.248] 
College educated -151.6538 97.9683 -104.0634 -133.281 82.8133 0.000 
[0.002]*** [0.009]*** [0.032]** [0.026]** [0.037]** [0.00] 
139 
 
Appendix I (cont.) 
Table I.4: Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across All Games With and Without 
Spouse Information, segregated by Gender (cont.) 
Family details       
Has one of more 
daughters -0.5011 -29.0829 -12.1719 0.3309 -32.6297 -34.2086 
[0.986] [0.067]* [0.457] [0.991] [0.048]** [0.025]**
Has one of more 
sons -35.0773 -0.3464 -19.3263 -35.7535 -14.1919 -4.2683 
[0.124] [0.985] [0.231] [0.279] [0.547] [0.822] 
Lives in a joint 
family (with in-
laws) 21.759 -36.6125 
2.7465 34.9605 -39.1646 -17.4689 
[0.118] [0.052]* [0.877] [0.192] [0.245] [0.170] 
Years Married 
Have been married 
for 10 years or less -12.7031 -25.2591 -17.1022 20.2547 -8.5427 -8.3416 
[0.777] [0.318] [0.568] [0.531] [0.788] [0.785] 
Have been married 
for 25 years or 
more 100.1508 -7.1304 
43.478 74.8363 -15.2544 -1.9792 
[0.106] [0.823] [0.235] [0.316] [0.650] [0.954] 
Age bracket 
Age 25 or less -26.5191 18.4326 61.0728 -45.0278 -11.4673 -15.1635 
[0.678] [0.445] [0.266] [0.472] [0.656] [0.483] 
Age 40 or more -70.0272 2.1721 -53.1865 -38.9991 18.5955 4.5252 
[0.057]* [0.905] [0.040]** [0.178] [0.470] [0.888] 
Caste and 
Religion Details     
Hindu, Low Caste 28.2764 5.5661 17.2085 28.2356 -19.5742 -3.8589 
[0.245] [0.790] [0.556] [0.388] [0.325] [0.903] 
Muslim 28.1175 34.3828 -25.791 66.6654 31.7067 31.382 
[0.527] [0.140] [0.663] [0.179] [0.212] [0.141] 
Constant 75.1665 60.3813 119.1746 54.084 109.9961 87.3191 
[0.220] [0.137] [0.047]** [0.400] [0.058]* [0.093]* 
Observations 115 126 91 90 103 99 
R-squared 0.267 0.32 0.332 0.334 0.3 0.165 
Robust p values in brackets, SEs are clustered at village level; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table I.5: Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across Ultimatum and Dictator Games, 
With and Without Spouse Information. 
 
 
Dependent Variable - how much was sent by the FMs? 
 
 
Ultimatum (omitted games without 
Spouse info) 
Dictator (omitted games without 
Spouse info) 
  
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Male 
Spouses 
(3) 
Female 
Spouses 
(4) 
Full Sample
(5) 
Male 
Spouses 
(6) 
Female 
Spouses 
(7) 
Game Form   
Ultimatum, Spouse Info 197.2725 188.6394 191.2944 
  [0.016]** [0.111] [0.007]*** 
Dictator, Spouse Info   0.827 -40.8463 102.9808 
    [0.985] [0.631] [0.040]** 
All Demographics   
Male -17.379   93.98 
  [0.342]   [0.115] 
Education  Level   
No Education -66.6365 -57.805 -18.3257 -84.7685 -102.5214 19.8114 
  [0.522] [0.751] [0.751] [0.355] [0.286] [0.507] 
Family details   
Has one of more 
daughters 5.7778 14.4659 -3.9548 -3.8187 0.536 24.3283 
  [0.429] [0.553] [0.734] [0.851] [0.992] [0.409] 
Has one of more sons 3.9315 20.0343 -40.8182 32.5838 100.9601 -18.8646 
  [0.951] [0.814] [0.038]** [0.262] [0.149] [0.337] 
Lives in a joint family 
(with in-laws) 13.1345 13.0103 22.0774 -16.3236 12.0669 11.3285 
  [0.493] [0.149] [0.525] [0.220] [0.573] [0.523] 
Years Married   
Have been married for 
10 years or less 54.6596 29.4349 45.0172 -12.2956 21.1907 -28.8055 
  [0.115] [0.295] [0.222] [0.655] [0.775] [0.312] 
Have been married for 
25 years or more -76.7053 -98.6151 21.0786 70.1344 87.0396 14.1558 
  [0.505] [0.595] [0.181] [0.540] [0.551] [0.872] 
Age bracket   
Age 25 or less -56.0156 -43.2402 -29.9532 98.8577 155.8821 75.2978 
  [0.143] [0.579] [0.705] [0.021]** [0.172] [0.415] 
Age 40 or more 79.033 55.2693 9.8887 -2.8488 16.8202 -30.8736 
  [0.460] [0.499] [0.741] [0.984] [0.891] [0.619] 
Caste and Religion    
Hindu, Low Caste 5.7862 10.7001 36.7697 -13.6424 -62.154 -54.0046 
  [0.935] [0.882] [0.489] [0.606] [0.107] [0.482] 
Muslim 155.3131 159.7143 131.4103 28.0847 27.8443 -28.4434 
  [0.093]* [0.295] [0.044]** [0.465] [0.377] [0.453] 
Observations 34 28 27 40 29 27 
Robust p values in brackets, SEs are clustered at village level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table I.6: Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across Dictator with Role Choice 
Games, With and Without Spouse Information. 
 
  
 
FM chose to remain as 
Dictator 
(2) 
Amount offered by FMs 
(who chose to remain 
dictators) 
(3) 
Amount offered by 
SMs (who became 
dictators) 
(4) 
Game Form     
Dictator with Role Choice 
Game, with Spouse Info 0.3966 69.1697 132.9748 
  [0.372] [0.137] [0.003]*** 
All Demographics     
Male -0.0074 28.6873 74.3446 
  [0.987] [0.238] [0.205] 
Education  Level     
Some school education -0.2424 40.5359 76.9888 
[0.579] [0.265] [0.653] 
College educated 0.1342 -106.6641 0.000 
  [0.917] [0.142] [0.000] 
Family details     
Has one of more daughters -0.0172 -11.1462 58.9572 
[0.957] [0.552] [0.295] 
Has one of more sons -0.1673 1.3101 -83.4647 
[0.418] [0.924] [0.295] 
Lives in a joint family (with 
in-laws) -0.5969 3.7664 57.7894 
  [0.172] [0.840] [0.184] 
Years Married     
Have been married for 10 
years or less 0.4813 -23.3998 21.4723 
[0.311] [0.617] [0.797] 
Have been married for 25 
years or more 0.5467 15.7187 -32.0142 
  [0.239] [0.768] [0.698] 
Age bracket     
Age 25 or less -0.5688 26.8232 87.3808 
[0.015]** [0.581] [0.400] 
Age 40 or more 0.3534 -57.7113 14.1136 
  [0.216] [0.246] [0.877] 
Caste and Religion Details     
Hindu, Low Caste -0.8622 19.9534 -106.0469 
[0.020]** [0.494] [0.290] 
Muslim -0.8062 34.1844 70.4633 
[0.077]* [0.262] [0.178] 
Observations 97 68 29 
Robust p values in brackets, SEs are clustered at village level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table I.7: Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across Empowerment 
Games, With and Without Spouse Information  
 
FM chose to 
Empower SM 
(2) 
Amount offered- 
Ultimatum Game 
played 
(3) 
Amount offered- 
Dictator Game 
played 
(4) 
Game Form     
Empowerment Game, 
with Spouse Info 1.3391 129.9199 -24.4031 
  [0.001]*** [0.106] [0.286] 
All Demographics     
Male 0.0258 30.0286 35.6848 
  [0.933] [0.324] [0.136] 
Education  Level     
Some school education 12.4082 0.00 -15.5232 
[0.000]*** [0.00] [0.646] 
College educated 6.8878 67.2031 -13.9543 
  [0.000]*** [0.379] [0.695] 
Family details     
Has one of more 
daughters -0.3958 96.3409 -0.4578 
[0.014]** [0.002]*** [0.982] 
Has one of more sons -0.6523 85.209 3.1378 
[0.040]** [0.152] [0.795] 
Lives in a joint family 
(with in-laws) -0.7236 21.9871 1.7962 
  [0.009]*** [0.438] [0.915] 
Years Married     
Have been married for 10 
years or less -0.1452 -38.4468 13.2276 
[0.755] [0.405] [0.759] 
Have been married for 25 
years or more -0.0255 -8.4932 -12.7701 
  [0.977] [0.910] [0.513] 
Age bracket     
Age 25 or less -12.41 -75.4312 -9.5103 
[0.000]*** [0.282] [0.826] 
Age 40 or more 0.4876 -71.6728 -17.4014 
  [0.138] [0.059]* [0.509] 
Caste and Religion 
Details      
Hindu, Low Caste 0.8434 52.6904 0.5685 
[0.005]*** [0.375] [0.971] 
Muslim -0.1342 34.0191 32.8439 
[0.764] [0.740] [0.357] 
Observations 99 39 60 
Robust p values in brackets, SEs are clustered at village level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix I (cont.) 
Table I.8: Additional Regressions to compare Subject Behavior across 
Empowerment Games, With and Without Spouse Information (includes number 
of safe choices from the risk game) 
 
  
FM chose to 
Empower SM (played 
Ultimatum Game) 
(2) 
Amount offered-
Ultimatum Game 
played 
(3) 
Amount offered-
Dictator Game 
played 
(4) 
Game Form       
Empowerment Game, with 
Spouse Info 1.5083 112.0894 -25.8286 
  [0.000]*** [0.205] [0.230] 
All Demographics       
Male 0.0539 30.3041 34.6301 
  [0.858] [0.299] [0.150] 
Education  Level       
Some school education 12.4787 0.00 -21.0028 
[0.000]*** [0.00] [0.605] 
College educated 7.0395 52.8464 -18.9707 
  [0.000]*** [0.519] [0.656] 
Family details       
Has one of more daughters -0.3278 97.5645 -5.4633 
[0.035]** [0.005]*** [0.844] 
Has one of more sons -0.3999 60.0214 -4.2796 
[0.269] [0.411] [0.793] 
Lives in a joint family (with in-
laws) -0.7274 31.8108 2.2207 
  [0.004]*** [0.129] [0.904] 
Years Married       
Have been married for 10 years 
or less -0.0748 -36.1532 9.3824 
[0.880] [0.496] [0.817] 
Have been married for 25 years 
or more -0.2081 26.8096 -12.5616 
  [0.808] [0.802] [0.507] 
Age bracket       
Age 25 or less -12.4434 -68.2468 -10.9627 
[0.000]*** [0.365] [0.798] 
Age 40 or more 0.5326 -74.3842 -19.1763 
  [0.093]* [0.095]* [0.474] 
Caste and Religion Details       
Hindu, Low Caste 1.0088 40.6751 -2.1833 
[0.000]*** [0.338] [0.895] 
Muslim -0.1958 24.1488 35.815 
  [0.659] [0.787] [0.362] 
Risk Attitudes       
Number of Safe Choices -0.1463 12.3406 4.1719 
[0.033]** [0.231] [0.282] 
Observations 99 39 60 
Robust p values in brackets, SEs are clustered at village level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix J: Additional Figures for Chapter III 
 
 
 
Figure J.1: Histograms to examine Distribution of offers by Treatment & Gender across 
treatments 1 and 2: Ultimatum Game: With Spouse info and decisions by Female FMs (1, 0-Top 
Left panel), Ultimatum Game: With Spouse info and decisions by Male FMs (1, 1-Top Right 
panel), Ultimatum Game: Without Spouse info and decisions by Female FMs (2, 0-Bottom Left 
panel) and Ultimatum Game: Without Spouse info and decisions by Male FMs (2, 1- Bottom 
Right panel) 
[The top left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they know that they are playing 
against their husbands in the Ultimatum Game.  The top right figure indicates the behavior of 
male FMs when they know that they are playing against their wives in the Ultimatum Game.  The 
bottom left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they do not know that they are 
playing against their husbands in the Ultimatum Game.  The bottom right figure indicates the 
behavior of male FMs when they do not know that they are playing against their wives in the 
Ultimatum Game. 
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Appendix J (cont.) 
 
 
Figure J.2: : Histograms to examine Distribution of offers by Treatment & Gender across 
treatments 3 and 4: Dictator Game: With Spouse info and decisions by Female FMs (3 0-Top 
Left panel); Dictator Game: With Spouse info and decisions by Male FMs (3, 1-Top Right 
panel); Dictator Game: Without Spouse info and decisions by Female FMs (4, 0-Bottom Left 
panel) and Dictator Game: Without Spouse info and decisions by Male FMs (4, 1- Bottom Right 
panel) 
[The top left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they know that they are playing 
against their husbands in the Dictator Game.  The top right figure indicates the behavior of male 
FMs when they know that they are playing against their wives in the Dictator Game.  The bottom 
left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they do not know that they are playing 
against their husbands in the Dictator Game.  The bottom right figure indicates the behavior of 
male FMs when they do not know that they are playing against their wives in the Dictator Game.]  
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Figure J.3: : Histograms to examine Distribution of offers by Treatment & Gender across 
treatments 5 and 6: Dictator Game with Role Choice: With Spouse info and decisions by Female 
FMs (5, 0-Top Left panel); Dictator Game with Role Choice: With Spouse info and decisions by 
Male FMs (5, 1-Top Right panel); Dictator Game with Role Choice: Without Spouse info and 
decisions by Female FMs (6, 0-Bottom Left panel) and Dictator Game with Role Choice: 
Without Spouse info and decisions by Male FMs (6, 1- Bottom Right panel) 
[The top left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they know that they are playing 
against their husbands in the Dictator Game with role choice.  The top right figure indicates the 
behavior of male FMs when they know that they are playing against their wives in the Dictator 
Game with role choice.  The bottom left figure indicates the behavior of female FMs when they 
do not know that they are playing against their husbands in the Dictator Game with role choice.  
The bottom right figure indicates the behavior of male FMs when they do not know that they are 
playing against their wives in the Dictator Game with role choice.] 
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Figure J.4: Histograms to examine Distribution of offers in Treatment 7 (Empowerment Game) by 
Female FMs with spouse info:  
When they do not empower their husbands (0-left panel) and when they empower their husbands 
(1-right panel) 
 
Figure J.5: Histograms to examine Distribution of offers in Treatment 7 (Empowerment Game) by 
Male FMs with spouse info:  
When they do not empower their wives (0-left panel) and when they empower their wives (1-right 
panel) 
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Figure J.6: Histograms to examine Distribution of offers in Treatment 8 Empowerment Game) by 
Female FMs with no spouse info:  
When they do not empower the SMs (0-left panel) and when they empower the SMs (1-right panel) 
 
Figure J.7: Histograms to examine Distribution of offers in Treatment 8 Empowerment Game) by 
Male FMs with no spouse info:  
When they do not empower the SMs (0-left panel) and when they empower the SMs (1-right panel) 
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Figures J (1-7) show the average offers made by the male and female FMs across all 8 
treatments. Figure J.1 considers the average offers in the Ultimatum Game when male and 
female FMs are given the information that their paired partner is their spouse (Treatment 1) and  
when they are not provided the spouse information (Treatment 2). The top left panel indicates the 
behavior of female FMs when they know that they are playing against their husbands in the 
Ultimatum Game. The top right panel indicates the behavior of male FMs when they know that 
they are playing against their wives in the Ultimatum Game. When female FMs know that they 
are playing with their husbands, 90% offer Rs 200 while 10% offer Rs 400. When male FMs 
know that they are playing with their wives, 72.73% offer Rs 200, 9.09% offer Rs 150, 9% offer 
Rs 250 and another 9% offer Rs 300.  The bottom left panel indicates the behavior of female 
FMs when they do not know that they are playing against their husbands in the Ultimatum Game.  
The bottom right panel indicates the behavior of male FMs when they do not know that they are 
playing against their wives in the Ultimatum Game.  In treatment 2 when female FMs are not 
aware that they are playing with their husbands, 83.33% send Rs 0, 16.67% send Rs 200. When 
male FMs are not aware that they are playing with their wives, 43 % send nothing and 57% send 
Rs 200. 
 Figure J.2 considers the average offers in the Dictator Game when male and female FMs 
are given the information that their paired partner is their spouse (Treatment 3) and when they 
are not provided the spouse information (Treatment 4).  The top left panel indicates the behavior 
of female FMs when they know that they are playing against their husbands in the Dictator 
Game.  The top right panel indicates the behavior of male FMs when they know that they are  
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playing against their wives in the Dictator Game.  When female FMs know that they are playing 
with their husbands, 62.5% send Rs 0, 12.5% send Rs 100 and the remaining 25% send Rs 200. 
When male FMs know that they are playing with their wives, 62.5% send Rs 0, 12.5% send Rs  
200 and 25% send Rs 300. The bottom left panel indicates the behavior of female FMs when 
they do not know that they are playing against their husbands in the Dictator Game.  The bottom 
right panel indicates the behavior of male FMs when they do not know that they are playing 
against their wives in the Dictator Game.   In treatment 2 when female FMs are not aware that 
they are playing with their husbands, 100% of these female FMs send nothing.  When male FMs 
are not aware that they are playing with their wives, 53.85% send Rs 0, 30.77% send Rs 150, 8% 
send Rs 200 and another 8% send Rs 350. 
Next we examine the average offers by the male and female FMs who chose to be the 
dictator in these two treatments.  Figure J.3 considers the average offers by the male and female 
FMs in the Dictator Game with role choice.  The top left panel indicates the average offers by the 
female FMs when they know that they are playing against their husbands.  The top right panel 
indicates the average offers by the female FMs when they know that they are playing against 
their wives.  When female FMs know that they are playing with their husbands in treatment 5, 
55% send nothing, 36% send Rs 200 while 9% send Rs 50.  When male FMs know they are 
playing against their wives, 66.67% send nothing while 17% send Rs 200. The bottom left panel 
indicates the behavior of female FMs when they do not know that they are playing against their 
husbands in the Dictator Game. The bottom right panel indicates the behavior of male FMs when 
they do not know that they are playing against their wives in the Dictator Game. In treatment 6  
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when female FMs are not aware that they are playing with their husbands, over 89% send 
nothing while 5% send Rs 100.  When male FMs are not aware that they are playing with their 
wives, 85% send Rs 0 and 15% send Rs 200. 
Figures J.4 and J.5 consider the average offers by the FMs in the empowerment game 
when male and female FMs are given the information that their paired partner is their spouse 
(Treatment 7).   42% of the female FMs (10 out of 24 female FMs) choose to empower their 
husbands while 60% of the male FMs (15 out of 25 male FMs) choose to empower their wives. 
Among the female FMs who choose not to empower their husbands, 93% send nothing (13 out 
of the 14 female FMs) while 7% send Rs 200. Among the male FMs who choose not to empower 
their wives, 80% send nothing (8 out of 10 male FMs) while 20% send Rs 100. Across the same 
treatment 7, when the female FMs choose to empower their husbands, 60% send Rs 200 while 
30% send their whole endowment of Rs 400.  Among the male FMs who choose to empower 
their wives, 47% send their whole endowment of Rs 400, 7% send Rs 150, another 7% send Rs 
300 while 40% send Rs 200.   
Figures J.6 and J.7 consider the average offers by the FMs in the empowerment game 
when male and female FMs are not provided the information that their paired partner is their 
spouse (Treatment 8). In this treatment, 17% of the female FMs (4 out of 23 female FMs) choose 
to empower their paired SMs while 42% of the male FMs (10 out of 24 male FMs) choose to 
empower the SMs.   100% of the female FMs who choose not to empower their paired SMs send 
nothing (19 out of the 19 female FMs). Among the male FMs who choose not to empower their 
wives, 71% send nothing (12 out of 17 male FMs), 12% send Rs 100 while another 18% send Rs  
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200. Across the same treatment 8, when the female FMs choose to empower their paired SMs, all 
of them send Rs 200 (4 out of 4 female FMs). Among the male FMs who choose to empower 
their paired SMs, all of them send Rs 200 (10 out of 10 male FMs).  
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Appendix K: Subject Instructions for Chapter III  
Introduction 
Welcome. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.   
I will first read to you the Informed Consent Form.  You can indicate your willingness to 
participate by signing/putting your thumb impression on the form. 
I will now ask you to provide some information about yourself. 
 You full name: 
 Your address/village of residence:  
 Your religion: 
 Your caste: 
 Your age; 
 Your marital status and whether your spouse is present today (if not, please bring your 
spouse otherwise we cannot let you participate) 
 Your education level: 
 Your current occupation: 
 Your voter id/ driving license no. /Ration card number/School leaving certificate number 
Thank you very much for providing this information. Please go sit in the room. 
Treatments 1 and 2 
General Instructions for Treatments 1 and 2 (when all subjects have been seated) –  
 No Talking Allowed. Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other.  
 Please switch off your mobile phones.   
 In case there is something that you do not understand, you are kindly requested to raise 
your hand and ask questions.  
 Today, I will ask you to participate in a research study, where you will have a chance to 
get paid money. This money has been given to me by my university.  
 Each person in this room will be matched with 1 other person to form a group.  Thus, 
each group will contain 2 individuals. One person will be Person A, and the other will be 
Person B.  
 A sum of Rs 400 will be provided to one person, Person A.  
 Person A must decide whether to offer all, some or none of Rs 400 to Person B.  
 Person B must decide whether to accept or reject the Person A’s offer.  
 If the Person B accepts the offer, then the Person B gets a payoff equal to the offer and 
the Person A gets a payoff equal to Rs 400 minus the offer. In addition each person will 
also get the show up fee (Rs 50).  
 If the Person B rejects the offer, then both Person A and Person B get only the show up 
fee (Rs 50).  
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 The amounts can be sent in increments of Rs 50. So, the Person A can choose to send 
either Rs 0, 50, 100, 150,…, 400 to the Person B.  
 So what you get paid today depends on what decision you make as well as what decision 
the other person makes.  
 After everyone has made their decision, I will pay out everyone.  
 You will get an amount based on the decisions made today. In addition, everyone will get 
an extra Rs 50 for showing up to the experiment today on time.  
 Here is how we will do this: Once I finish explaining all instructions to you, I will request 
every one of you to come one by one to the second room to make your decision in 
private.  The individuals designated as Person A will come to the room first and make 
their decision in private. Afterwards, the Person B individuals will also be called into the 
room and decide whether to accept or reject the other person’s offer. Once my interaction 
with everyone is over, we will pay out everyone.  
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Decision sheet – Treatment 1: Person A 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person A.  The person B is your spouse.  Your spouse will get to know that the paired 
Person A is their spouse.  
Here is Rs 400. This is YOUR money. 
Also - whatever amount you choose to send today will be reported to them. They will get to 
know that you, their spouse have sent them Rs ____.  
Thereafter they will decide to accept or reject the offer. 
 Suppose you offer an amount of Rupees to your spouse. This amount can be anything 
from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
 If they accept, then you get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) and they get the 
amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will also get an additional Rs 50.   
 If they reject, each of you get Rs 50 only. 
Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
0  50  100      150  200    250  300    
350   400       
So you are giving your spouse Rs ____________________________ 
So, if your spouse accepts the offer, you will get Rs (400 - _____ +50) =Rs ____ and your 
spouse gets Rs (___+50) = Rs ______. 
But, if your spouse rejects the offer, you will each get Rs 50. 
Please go sit in the other room. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 1: Person B 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person B.  Person A is your spouse.  
They were given Rs 400. They chose to send you Rs ___________________ today.  
You now have one decision to make 
o Accept the offer: You can accept the offer – if you accept, each of you gets an 
amount of money according to the division proposed by your spouse. 
 So, you get Rs (____+50)=Rs___, while your spouse gets Rs(400-
__+50)=Rs__  
 
o Reject the offer: You can also choose to reject the offer. In that case, each of you 
will get Rs 50.  
What is your decision?  Please circle your choice:     
 
 ACCEPT      REJECT 
 
 
ACCEPT:  You have earned Rs (___________+50) =Rs _________________. 
Your spouse gets Rs ____________________________________ 
 
REJECT:  You get Rs 50; your spouse gets Rs 50. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 2: Person A 
First, I will verify your information. 
You are Person A.   
Here is Rs 400. This is YOUR money.  
The person B will NOT know your identity. They will get to know that their paired Person A has 
sent them Rs ____.  
Thereafter they will decide to accept or reject the offer. 
 Suppose you offer an amount of Rupees to your paired person B. This amount can be 
anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
 If they accept, then you get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) and they get the 
amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will also get an additional Rs 50.   
 If they reject, each of you get Rs 50 only. 
Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
0  50  100  150  200    250  300   
350     400 
So you are giving your paired Person B Rs __________________________ 
So, if the paired Person B accepts the offer, you will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50)  
=Rs ___________. The person B will get Rs (__+50)=Rs ___ 
If your paired Person B rejects the offer, you will each get Rs 50. 
Please go sit in the other room. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 2: Person B 
First, I will verify your information  
You are Person B.   
Your paired Person A was given Rs 400. They chose to send you Rs ___________________ 
today.  
You now have one decision to make 
o Accept the offer: You can choose to accept – in that case, each of you gets an 
amount of money according to the division proposed by the Person A. 
 So, you get Rs (____+50)=Rs___, while your paired person B gets 
Rs(400-__+50)=Rs__  
 
o Reject the offer: You can also choose to reject-in that case; each of you gets Rs 
50.  
What is your decision?  Please circle a choice:     
 
 ACCEPT      REJECT 
 
ACCEPT:  You have earned Rs (___________+50) =Rs _________________. 
Your paired person A gets Rs ____________________________________ 
 
REJECT:  You get Rs 50. 
Your paired person A gets Rs 50. 
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Treatments 3 and 4 
General Instructions for Treatments 3 and 4 (when all subjects have been seated) –  
 No Talking Allowed. Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other.  
 Please switch off your mobile phones.   
 In case there is something that you do not understand, you are kindly requested to raise 
your hand and ask questions.  
 Today, I will ask you to participate in a research study, where you will have a chance to 
get paid money. This money has been given to me by my university.  
 Each person in this room will be matched with 1 other person to form a group.  Thus, 
each group will contain 2 individuals. One person will be Person A and the other will be 
Person B.   
 A sum of Rs 400 will be provided to Person A. This is Person A’s money. 
 Person A may choose to share all, some or none of this money between his/herself and 
the other person (person B).  
 The amounts can be sent in increments of Rs 50. So, the Person A can choose to send 
either Rs 0, 50, 100, 150,…, 400 to the Person B.  
 How the division occurs will depend entirely on person A. So Person A has one decision 
to make.  
 Person B has NO decision to make. 
 So what you get paid today depends on what decision you make (if you are Person A) or 
what decision the other person makes (if you are Person B).  
 I will pay out everyone at the end. You will get an amount based on the decisions made 
today. In addition, everyone will get an extra Rs 50 for showing up to the experiment 
today on time.  
 Here is how we will do this: Once I finish explaining all instructions to you, I will request 
every one of you to come one by one to the second room to make your decision in 
private.  I will call the individuals designated as Person A to the room first to make their 
decision in private. Afterwards, the Person B individuals will also be called into the room 
and I will inform them of how much they have earned today. Once my interaction with 
everyone is over, we will pay out everyone. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 3: Person A 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person A.  The person B is your spouse. Your spouse will get to know that the paired 
person A is their spouse.  
Here is Rs 400.  This is YOUR money. 
Also - whatever amount you choose to send today will be reported to them. They will get to 
know that you, their spouse have sent them Rs ____.  
 Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to your spouse. This amount of Rupees can be 
anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
 So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today and they get the amount of 
Rupees you have offered them. 
 Each of you will also get an additional Rs 50.   
 But your spouse will have NO decision to make. 
 You will now make the decision about how much to send to Person B - your spouse. 
Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
0  50  100 150  200    250  
300    350   400       
 
So you are giving your spouse Rs _________. They will get Rs (___+50)=Rs ____ 
So, you will get Rs (400 - ________ +50) =Rs ___________.  
Please go sit in the other room. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 3: Person B 
 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person B.   
Your paired Person A is your spouse.  
They were given Rs 400 and chose to send you Rs ___________________ today.  
So you get Rs (________________+50) =Rs ________________ 
Your spouse received Rs (400-____________+50) =Rs______________________today. 
You have NO decision to make. 
 
  
162 
 
Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 4: Person A 
First, I will verify your information. 
You are Person A.   
Here is Rs 400.  This is YOUR money. 
The person B will NOT know your identity. They will just get to know that the paired Person A 
have sent them Rs ____. 
They will get to know whatever amount you choose to send today will be reported to them.  
 Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to your paired person B. This amount of 
Rupees can be anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
 So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today and they get the amount of 
Rupees you have offered them. 
 Each of you will also get an additional Rs 50.   
 But your paired person B will have NO decision to make. 
 You will now make the decision about how much to send to Person B. 
Please think carefully and circle your decision in this sheet. 
0  50  100 150  200    250  
300    350   400       
So you are giving your paired Person B Rs ____________________________ 
So, you will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50) =Rs ________________________.  
Please go sit in the other room. 
 
 
 
  
163 
 
Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 4: Person B 
 
First, I will verify your information  
You are Person B.   
Your paired Person A was given Rs 400 today and has chosen to send you Rs 
___________________ today.  
So you get Rs (________________+50) =Rs ________________ 
Your paired Person A received Rs (400-____________+50)  
=Rs______________________today. 
You do NOT have any decision to make. 
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Treatments 5 and 6 
General Instructions for Treatments 5 and 6 (when all subjects have been seated) –  
 No Talking Allowed. Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other.  
 Please switch off your mobile phones.   
 In case there is something that you do not understand, you are kindly requested to raise 
your hand and ask questions.  
 Today, I will ask you to participate in a research study, where you will have a chance to 
get paid money. This money has been given to me by my university.  
 Each person in this room will be matched with 1 other person to form a group.  Thus, 
each group will contain 2 individuals. One person will be Person A, and the other will be 
Person B.  
 A sum of Rs 400 will be provided to one person.  This is THEIR money.  
 This person may choose to share all, some or none of this money with the other person.  
 How the division occurs will depend entirely on the person making the decision.  
 The amounts can be sent in increments of Rs 50. So, the person who makes the decision 
can choose to send Rs 0, 50, 100, 150,…, 400 to the other person.  
 Who will get to decide? 
 Either you or the person you are paired with will be asked to make this decision. This will 
be chosen randomly. 
 You may be given that choice. Or, your paired person may instead be given that 
choice. In that case, you do not get the choice. But you will still be told the decision 
the other person has undertaken.   But note - whoever is made the decision-maker 
gets to choose - whether or not to give up power to decide to the paired person.  
 So you can either be told:  
o you get to choose: to be the decision-maker or not. 
o the other person received the choice and chose to be the decision-maker. 
o the other person received the choice, and chose to make you the decision-maker. 
 Once the roles have been decided, the decision-maker will decide whether or not to send 
to the other person.   
 The amounts can be sent in increments of Rs 50. So, the decision-maker can choose to 
send either Rs 0, 50, 100, 150,…, 400 to the other person.   
 So what you get paid today depends on what decision you make and/or what decision the 
other person makes.  
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 After everyone has made their decision, I will pay out everyone.  
 You will get an amount based on the decisions made today. In addition, everyone will get 
an extra Rs 50 for showing up to the experiment today on time.  
 Here is how we will do this:  
 Once I finish explaining all instructions to you, I will request every one of you to come 
one by one to the second room to make your decision in private.  Some individuals 
chosen randomly will come to the room first and get to choose to be the decision-maker.  
Afterwards, the rest of the individuals will be called into the room. Once my interaction 
with everyone is over, we will pay out everyone. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 5: Person A 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person A.  The person B is your spouse. Your spouse will get to know that their paired 
Person A is their spouse.  
You have to choose: you may or may not give up power to decide to your spouse.  
If you give up this power to your spouse, then you will not have any decision to make today. 
Your spouse will make the decision of how to divide Rs 400 between the two of you.  
Whatever decision you make will be reported to your spouse. So whether you choose to give 
them the decision-making power or keep it yourself, they will be informed.  Also, in the 2nd case, 
they will get to know the amount you choose to send today. 
Here is Rs400.  This is YOUR money. 
So now please choose: do you want to give the power to your spouse to make the decision? 
YES: I give the power to decide to my spouse. 
OK, please go and sit in the other room. You do NOT have any further decision to make. 
NO: I do NOT give the power to decide to my spouse.  
OK, now YOU have to decide whether or not you want to send some money. 
Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to your spouse. This amount of Rupees can be 
anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today 
and they get the amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will also get an 
additional Rs 50.   
Please make the decision about whether or not to send money to your spouse.  
0  50  100  150  200    250  300   
350   400       
So you are giving your spouse Rs __________. So they will get Rs (__+50)=Rs ____ 
So, you will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50) =Rs ________________________.  
Please go sit in the other room. 
167 
 
Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 5: Person B 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person B.   Person A is your spouse.  He/she was given Rs 400 and could choose to send 
some of the Rs 400 to you.  
They also had the option to give up their right of making the decision (of dividing this money).   
If they did not give up the power, they also had to choose how to divide Rs 400 between you. 
They have chosen to: 
o NOT GIVE you the power.  
o So Person A-your spouse still has the right to divide the money. 
o Your spouse has sent you Rs ____________ today.  
o So today you get Rs (_______+50) =Rs ______; while your spouse gets Rs (400-
___+50)=Rs ____ 
o You do NOT have any decision to make. 
They have chosen to: 
o GIVE you the power.  
o Hence now YOU have to decide how to divide the money. 
o Here is Rs 400 – this is YOUR money.  Now YOU have to decide whether or not 
you want to send some money. 
o Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to your spouse. This amount of 
Rupees can be anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
o So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today and they get the 
amount of Rupees you have offered them.  
o Each of you will also get an additional Rs 50.   
OK, now please make the decision about how much to send to your spouse.  
0  50  100  150  200    250  300    
350   400       
So you are giving your spouse Rs _____. So your spouse will get Rs (__+50)=Rs ___ 
You will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50) =Rs ________________________.  
Please go sit in the other room. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 6: Person A 
First, I will verify your information  
You are Person A.  You have to choose: you may or may not give up power to decide to paired 
person B.  
If you give up this power to your paired person B, then you will not have any decision to make 
today. Your paired person B will make the decision of how to divide Rs 400 between the two of 
you. 
Your identity will NOT be revealed to person B.  But whatever decision you make will be 
reported to your paired person B. So whether you choose to give them the decision-making 
power or keep it yourself, they will be informed.  Also, in the 2nd case, they will get to know the 
amount you choose to send today.  
Here is Rs 400.  This is YOUR money. 
So now please choose: do you want to give the power to your paired person B to make the 
decision? 
YES: I give the power to decide to person B. 
OK, please go and sit in the other room. You do NOT have any further decision to make. 
NO: I do NOT give the power to decide to person B.  
OK, now please make the decision about how much money to send to your paired person B.  
Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to paired Person B. This amount of Rupees can be 
anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today 
and they get the amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will get an additional Rs 
50.   
Please make the decision about whether or not to send money to your paired person B.  
0  50  100  150  200    250  300    
350   400       
So you are giving your paired person B Rs _______. They will get Rs __+50) =Rs______ 
So, you will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50) =Rs ________________________.  
Please go sit in the other room. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 6: Person B 
First, I will verify your information. 
You are Person B.   The paired person A was given Rs 400 and could choose to send some of the 
Rs 400 to you.  
They were also given the option to give up their right of making the decision (of dividing this 
money).   If they did not give up the power, they also had to choose how to divide Rs 400 
between the two of you. 
Person A has chosen to: 
o NOT GIVE you the power.  
o So Person A still has the right to divide the money. 
o Person A has sent you Rs ____________ today.  
o So today you get Rs (_______+50) =Rs ______; while your paired person B gets 
Rs (400-___+50)=Rs ____ 
o You do NOT have any decision to make. 
Person A has chosen to: 
o GIVE you the power.  
o Hence now YOU have to decide how to divide the money. 
o Here is Rs 400 – this is YOUR money.  Now YOU have to decide whether or not 
you want to send some money. 
o Suppose you offer some amount of Rupees to your person A. This amount of 
Rupees can be anything from 0, 50, 100, …400.  
o So you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) today and they get the 
amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will get an additional Rs 
50.   
OK, now please make the decision about how much to send to Person A.  
0  50  100  150  200    250  300   
350   400       
So you are giving your paired Person A Rs ______. So your paired person A will get Rs (__+50) 
=Rs ___ 
So, you will get Rs (400 - _______________ +50) =Rs ________________________.  
Please go sit in the other room.
170 
 
Appendix K (cont.) 
Treatments 7 and 8 
General Instructions for Treatments 7 and 8 (when all subjects have been seated) –  
 No Talking Allowed. Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other.  
 Please switch off your mobile phones.   
 In case there is something that you do not understand, you are kindly requested to raise 
your hand and ask questions.  
 Today, I will ask you to participate in a research study, where you will have a chance to 
get paid money. This money has been given to me by my university.  
 Each person in this room will be matched with 1 other person to form a group.  Thus, 
each group will contain 2 individuals. One person will be Person A –and the other will be 
a Person B.  
 A sum of Rs 400 will be provided to one person.  This is THEIR money.  
 Who gets the money will be chosen randomly. 
 This person may choose to share all, some or none of this money with the other person.  
 The amounts can be sent in increments of Rs 50. So, the person who makes the decision 
can choose to send either Rs 0, 50, 100, 150,…, 400 to the other person.  
 How the division occurs will depend entirely on the person making the decision.  
 This person will have another decision to make: 
 They must decide whether or not they would like to empower the paired person to have 
the right to accept or reject the offer. 
o If the paired person is not empowered to accept or reject the offer, then he/she 
simply keeps whatever amount the decision-maker offers. The decision-maker 
keeps the rest.  
o If the paired person is empowered to accept or reject the offer, then he/she must 
decide whether to accept or reject the decision-maker’s offer.  
o If the offer is accepted, then the payoffs will be as follows: 
 The decision maker gets a payoff equal to Rs (400-__+50)=Rs ____ 
 The paired person gets Rs (____+50)=Rs ____  
o If the offer is rejected, then the payoffs will be as follows: 
 The decision maker gets a payoff equal to Rs 50 
 The paired person gets Rs 50. 
 After everyone has made his/her decision, I will pay out everyone.  
 You will get an amount based on the decisions made today. In addition, everyone will get 
an extra Rs 50 for showing up to the experiment today on time.  
 Here is how we will do this: Once I finish explaining all instructions to you, I will request 
every one of you to come one by one to the second room to make your decision in 
private.  Some individuals chosen randomly will come to the room first and get to choose 
to be the decision-maker.  Afterwards, the rest of the individuals will be called into the 
room. Once my interaction with everyone is over, we will pay out everyone. 
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Decision sheet – Treatment 7: Person A 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person A. Your paired person B is your spouse. Your spouse will get to know that her 
paired person A is her spouse.  
Here is Rs 400. This is YOUR money.  
You have to make 2 decisions: 
 Choose whether you want to give your spouse the power to reject or accept your offer 
 You also have to choose how to divide the Rs 400.  
Now YOU have to decide whether or not you want to send some money. Suppose you offer 
some amount of Rupees to your spouse. This amount of Rupees can be anything from 0, 50, 100, 
…400.  
Your spouse will be informed about the offer.   If you empower them, they will have the choice 
to accept or reject your offer.  If they accept, you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees offered) 
today and they get the amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will also get an 
additional Rs 50. If they reject, each of you will get Rs 50. If you do NOT empower them, they 
will get whatever you decide for them today.   
Please make the decision about whether or not to send money to your spouse.   
Whatever decision you make will be reported to your spouse. So whether you choose to give 
them the power to accept or reject, she/he will be informed.  Also, she/he will get to know the 
amount you choose to send today. 
Now please choose: do you want to empower your spouse or not? Circle one: 
I WILL EMPOWER MY SPOUSE 
OK, now please choose the amount to offer to your spouse.  
0 50 100  150   200    250   300   350    400 
Your spouse will be informed about the decision. 
Thereafter they will have the choice to ACCEPT or REJECT the offer. 
Once you have completed the decision, please go and wait outside. 
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Appendix K (cont.) 
 
I WILL NOT EMPOWER MY SPOUSE 
OK, now please choose the amount to offer to your spouse. 
0 50 100  150   200    250   300  350    400      
Your spouse will be informed about the division.  
But they have NO decision to make. 
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Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 7: Person B 
First, I will verify your information and make sure your spouse is waiting in the other room. 
You are Person B. Your paired person A is your spouse.  
He/she was given Rs 400 and could choose to send some of the Rs 400 to you.  
Your spouse could also give you the power to accept or reject an offer.  If you accept the offer 
made by your spouse, then you will both get an amount of money according to the division 
proposed by your spouse. If you reject, neither of you get the Rs 400 – you will each only get Rs 
50 (the show up fee).  
Your spouse has chosen to: 
o NOT give you the power.  
o Your spouse has sent you Rs __________ today.  
o So today you get Rs( _________+ 50) =Rs _________. 
o You do NOT have any decision to make. 
Your spouse has chosen to: 
o GIVE you the power. They sent you: Rs _______ 
o Hence now YOU can decide –whether to accept or to reject. 
o Accept: you and your spouse get the money as per the division proposed by 
your spouse. 
o Reject: you each get Rs 50.  
What is your decision?  Please circle a choice:     
 ACCEPT      REJECT 
 
ACCEPT:  You have earned Rs (___________+50) =Rs _________________. 
Your spouse gets Rs ____________________________________ 
REJECT:  You get Rs 50; your spouse gets Rs 50. 
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Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 8: Person A 
First, I will verify your information. 
You are Person A. Your paired person B will NOT be informed of your identity.  
Here is Rs 400. This is YOUR money.  
You have to make 2 decisions: 
 Choose whether you want to give your person B the power to reject or accept your offer 
 You also have to choose how to divide the Rs 400.  
Now YOU have to decide whether or not you want to send some money. Suppose you offer 
some amount of Rupees to your person B. This amount of Rupees can be anything from 0,50, 
100, …400.  
Your paired person B will be informed about the offer.   If you empower them, they will have the 
choice to accept or reject your offer.  If they accept, you will get Rs (400-the amount of Rupees 
offered) today and they get the amount of Rupees you have offered them.  Each of you will also 
get an additional Rs 50. If they reject, each of you will get Rs 50. If you do NOT empower them, 
they will get whatever you decide for them today. 
Please make the decision about whether or not to send money to your paired person B.    
Whatever decision you make will be reported to your paired person B. So whether you choose 
to give them the power to accept or reject, she/he will be informed.  Also, she/he will get to 
know the amount you choose to send today. 
Now please choose: do you want to empower paired person B or not? Circle one: 
I WILL EMPOWER PAIRED PERSON B 
OK, now please choose the amount to offer to your spouse. 
0 50 100  150   200    250   300  350    400  
Your paired person B will be informed about the decision.  
Thereafter they will have the choice to ACCEPT or REJECT the offer. 
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Appendix K (cont.) 
Once you have completed the decision, please go and wait outside. 
I WILL NOT EMPOWER PAIRED PERSON B 
OK, now please choose the amount to offer to your spouse.   
0 50 100  150   200    250   300  350    400      
Your paired person B will be informed about the division.  
But they have NO decision to make. 
 
Once you have completed the decision, please go and wait outside.
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Appendix K (cont.) 
Decision sheet – Treatment 8: Person B 
First, I will verify your information 
You are Person B. Your paired Person A was given Rs 400 and could choose to send some of the 
Rs 400 to you.  
Your paired person A was given a choice – they could give you the power to accept or reject an 
offer.  If you accept the offer made by your Person A, then you will both get an amount of 
money according to the division proposed by person A. If you reject, neither of you get the Rs 
400 – you will each only get Rs 50 (the show up fee).   
Your paired person A has chosen to: 
o NOT give you the power.  
o Person A has sent you Rs __________ today.  
o So today you get Rs( _________+ 50) =Rs _________. 
o You do NOT have any decision to make. 
Your paired person A has chosen to: 
o GIVE you the power. They sent you: Rs _______ 
o Hence now YOU can decide –whether to accept or to reject. 
o Accept: you and your spouse get the money as per the division proposed by 
your spouse. 
o Reject: you each get Rs 50.  
What is your decision?  Please circle a choice:     
 
 ACCEPT      REJECT 
 
ACCEPT:  You have earned Rs (___________+50) =Rs _________________. 
Your paired person A gets Rs ____________________________________ 
REJECT:  You get Rs 50; your paired person A gets Rs 50.  
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